The Formation of the Taiwanese Nation-State:
A Civilizational-Constitutional View

Doctoral Thesis
in order to obtain the title of Doctor
from the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
at the University of Tübingen

presented by
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Tübingen
2021

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Date of oral defense: 10. 06. 2021

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Abstract

This is a study of nation-state formation. Theoretically, it demonstrates how the biography of a belated nation can be written in a non-essentialist way by taking a world-historical view. Empirically, it puts forward a civilizational-constitutional thesis of Taiwanese national history – or, to put it simply, a constitutional history of Taiwan. By reviewing and building on two peerless historiographical endeavors, Tsao Yung-ho's thesis of "History of Taiwan Island" (HTI) and Wu Rwei-ren's thesis of "Interfacial Nation-State Formation in Taiwan" (INSF), I lay out what is termed the "trilogy of historiography" in writing a non-essentialist Taiwanese national history, with which the present study hopes to make a modest contribution to the unfinished cause initiated by Tsao and taken on by Wu.

Adhering to the world-historical tenet implied in Tsao's thesis of HTI, I propose a civilizational-constitutional perspective, from which civilization is understood as an anthropic system with its own idiosyncratic ways of organizing collective lives, and constitution is conceptualized as a subset that specifically points to the socio-political properties and configuration of a civilization.

The merit of taking this civilizational-constitutional view is twofold. Theoretically, it can remedy the logically fatal weakness of skipping political history altogether inherent in Tsao's HTI, while also solving the three faults, i.e., an overly-filtered geopolitical viewpoint, a lopsided approach leaning toward the political aspect, and an inbuilt settler bias, from which Wu's INSF suffers. Empirically, we are able to move beyond the deeply ingrained understanding of Taiwan history, whose periodization is done in line with the duration of the island's successive foreign rule. Instead, through a systematic understanding of civilization and constitution, we develop a tripartite periodization of Taiwan history consisting successively of the Short Seventeenth Century, the Long Eighteenth Century, and the Lasting Nineteenth Century. Each of the three periods is characterized by a particular pattern of civilizational intersection that took place on Taiwan island and that had distinct impacts of the constitutional transformation of Taiwan.

First, the Short Seventeenth Century, spanning only around four decades between the mid-1620s and the early 1660s, marks the historic first encounter of Austronesian,

European, and Chinese civilizations on Taiwan island. In the first-ever encounter of the three civilizations, the constitutional prototype of contemporary Taiwan – that is, a Western-style political regime established on top of the tense coexistence of aborigines and settlers – was previewed, albeit on a smaller scale, on the island.

Second, the Long Eighteenth Century signifies an interval of nearly two hundred years between the first presence and the second arrival of European civilization in Taiwan. Between the mid-seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, Taiwan had witnessed confrontations, fusion, and hostile coexistence between Austronesian and Chinese civilizations in the absence of European civilization. In this historical window created by the withdrawal of the Dutch VOC in the early 1660s, the dual constitution consisting of a stateless Austronesian tribal society and an imperial Confucianized settler society took shape in Taiwan.

Third, the Lasting Nineteenth Century, characterized by the second intersection of the three civilizations following the reentry of European civilization into Taiwan in the mid-nineteenth century, has undergone a circuitous course of nation-state building, in which the Taiwanese nation-state as a Western-style political superstructure has been established upon the previously formed dual-constitution social fabric of Taiwan.

Introduction

This is a study of nation-state formation. Theoretically, it demonstrates how the biography of a belated nation can be written in a non-essentialist way by taking a global history perspective. Empirically, it puts forward a civilizational-constitutional thesis of Taiwanese national history – or, to put it simply, a constitutional history of Taiwan. By using two core concepts – basic community and political community, this study examines how the social fabric and political superstructure of the *de facto* Taiwanese nation-state have formed between the early seventeenth and early twenty-first centuries.

By reviewing and building on two peerless historiographical endeavors, that is, Tsao Yung-ho's the "History of Taiwan Island" (HTI) and Wu Rwei-ren's the "Interfacial Nation-State Formation in Taiwan" (INSF), this study builds a trilogy of critical Taiwan historiography by adding a civilizational-constitutional study of Taiwanese national history. In doing so, the present study hopes to make a modest contribution to the unfinished cause initiated by Tsao and taken on by Wu.

In this study, civilization is defined, in a broader way, as an anthropic system with its own idiosyncratic ways of organizing collective lives. And, constitution is conceptualized as a subset of a civilization that specifically points to the socio-political properties and configuration.

The merit of taking this civilizational-constitutional view is twofold. Theoretically, it can remedy the logically fatal weakness inherent in Tsao's thesis, that is, skipping political history altogether. Moreover, it can solve the three faults from which Wu's thesis suffers, i.e., an overly-filtered viewpoint, an approach overemphasizing state and downplaying society, and an inbuilt settler bias.

Empirically, with this thesis, we are able to move beyond the two mainstream yet deficient frameworks for understanding the history of Taiwan. The first is what I call the "pseudo-dynastic history of China," which is constituted by a fabricated linear continuity of a series of "dynasties." It begins with the three ancient dynasties (Xia, Shang, Zhou), which is followed by Han, Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, Qing, the Republic of China (ROC), and eventually the "ROC in Taiwan."

The second is what I call the "pseudo-dynastic history of Taiwan," which is a five-stage thesis of history, portraying the history of Taiwan as being successively ruled

under Dutch-Spanish, Zheng, Qing, Japan, and the ROC. The first framework had been set up as the official historical viewpoint in the authoritarian period, while the second one has risen to compete with the former since the democratization of Taiwan beginning in the 1990s. Despite their prevalence in both academic works and public discourses in different times, both of them are unsatisfactory for two reasons.

First, both the two frameworks draw a false analogy between the successive foreign conquerors coming from without and the succeeding dynasties created by different branches of the same noble houses in European feudalism. This false analogy hinders readers from properly understanding the natures of not only European history but also that of China and Taiwan as well as the differences between them.

Second, even the second framework, that is, the five-stage thesis of Taiwan history, is a periodization that is done in line with the duration of the island's successive foreign rules. It is self-contradictory that some researchers claim to construct historical narratives endowed with the so-called "subjectivity of Taiwan" by placing them in the frame defined by the duration of the island's successive foreign rules.

To move beyond the two frameworks above, and by taking a civilizational-constitutional view, I put forward a tripartite periodization of Taiwan history consisting of the Short Seventeenth Century, the Long Eighteenth Century, and the Lasting Nineteenth Century. Each of the three periods is characterized by a particular pattern of civilizational intersection that took place on Taiwan island, each of which had distinct impacts on the constitutional transformation of Taiwan.

The Short Seventeenth Century spanned only around four decades. This period marks the historic first encounter of Austronesian, European, and Chinese civilizations on Taiwan island. In the first-ever encounter of the three civilizations, the constitutional prototype of contemporary Taiwan – that is, a Western-style political regime established on top of the tense coexistence of aborigines and settlers – had appeared, albeit on a smaller scale, on the island.

The Long Eighteenth Century signified an interval of nearly two hundred years between the first presence and the second arrival of European civilization in Taiwan.

Between the mid-seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, Taiwan had witnessed confrontations, fusion, and hostile coexistence between Austronesian and Chinese civilizations in the absence of European civilization. In this historical window, the "dual constitution" of Taiwan, that is, the hostile coexistence of a stateless

Austronesian tribal society and an imperial Confucianized settler society, had taken form on the island.

The Lasting Nineteenth Century is characterized by the second intersection of the three civilizations, following the reentry of European civilization into Taiwan in the mid-nineteenth century. In this period, Taiwan has undergone a circuitous course of nation-state building, in which the Taiwanese nation-state as a Western-style political superstructure was built on the previously formed social fabric, i.e., the dual constitution of Taiwan.

Academic Relevance

Empirical Representation

Taiwan represents an active case of an ongoing worldwide phenomenon. Taiwan as a nation-state in the making is not an anomaly in the contemporary world but an active case of an ongoing worldwide phenomenon. While the earliest birth of nation-state that can be traced back to the late-eighteenth-century Western Europe, the generation of new nation-states is still an ongoing worldwide phenomenon to date.

Many of them take the form of secessionism or sub-state nationalism that have developed in the established states in Western Europe and North America. For example, Scotland and Wales in the United Kingdom, Catalonia and Basque in Spain, Flanders in Belgium, Quebec in Canada, and even Bavaria in Germany as well as Texas and California in the United States. There are some similar cases in Asia too, such as Okinawa in Japan, Mindanao in the Philippines, Ache and West Papua in Indonesia, as well as Kachin State, Karen State and Shan State in Myanmar.

There are some more cases representing more complicated approaches that cannot simply be subsumed under the above category of secessionism or sub-state nationalism, such as the Kurdish people spreading in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria as well as the case of Taiwan.

It is fair to say that we are still living in an age in which many nation-states are on the way to coming to being. Empirically, Taiwan as a *de facto* nation-state which is striving for its *de jure* statehood represents a case of these belated nation-states in the making.

Historical-Political Importance

The case of Taiwan is of a particular historical-political importance. Of these contemporary nation-states in the making, the case of Taiwan is of a particular historical-political importance. The twentieth century was characterized by a historical trend that empires had disintegrated into multiple nation-states. The majority of the current nation-states in the world actually came into being through this approach during the last century. This historical trend had manifested itself in three waves. The first wave emerged in the aftermath of the First World War, with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Russian Empire, and the German Empire. The second wave appeared after the Second World War, with the breakup of the three major Western European overseas colonial empires, that is, the Dutch, French, and British ones. The third wave took place following the end of Cold War, as the result of the breakdown of the Iron Curtain and the Soviet Union.

However, in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, we have witnessed the emergence of a countercurrent running in the direction just opposite to the historical trend of the twentieth century. Some successor states, which inherited the most imperial legacies and heritages from the former empire, have shown a strong feeling of nostalgia for glory and power in the good old days. In recent years, there have emerged some versions of strategic thinking on rebuilding an imperial regime across the extensive Eurasia and even reaching Africa. Among others, Russia's Eurasianism, Turkey's Neo-Ottomanism, Iran's Islamism, and China's Tianxia Order (the Order under the Heaven) are the most notable.

With a common dream of rebuilding a new empire and taking revenge on the Western powers, it is questionable whether the strength of the aforementioned four states match their respective ambitions. Be that as it may, among the four visions of imperial revival, the case of China is particularly conspicuous for the resilience of its imperial structure and the ambition it has displayed.

What makes the Chinese case distinct from any of the abovementioned empires is that the realm of its imperial predecessor, that is, the Manchu Qing Empire, has been largely preserved over the entirety of the twentieth century, in which all its counterparts in the world had crumbled, one after another, into smaller units. Bluntly put, unlike its counterparts, the Chinese Empire, which was inherited and reframed by first Chinese nationalists and later Chinese communists, had survived the three waves of empire

disintegration in the twentieth century.

In addition to its exceptional resilience showed in the last century, we have witnessed an inflating ambition demonstrated by the reviving Chinese Empire in the early stages of the new century. Meeting no credible resistance, this ambition began with the transfer of Hong Kong and Macau, two trading posts acquired and developed by Britain and Portugal for centuries, to China at the turn of the twenty-first century.

What is more eye-catching in recent years is the "Belt and Road Initiative," a global infrastructure development strategy adopted by the Chinese government in 2013 to expand its sphere of influence through two paths, one through landlocked Central Asia to the Middle East and Eastern Europe and the other through Southeast Asia to South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The naming of "One Belt, One Road" in itself is a deliberate allusion to the two conventional routes, one by land and the other by sea, through which the ancient "Chinese" empires were connected to their tributaries.

This Chinese vision of imperial revival is arguably among the most ambitious, as it attempts not only rebuilding a Eurasian empire, as the other three also claim to do, but also directly challenging the maritime hegemony of the United States, especially in the Indo-Pacific Region. A strategic aim has been reiterated by Chinese President Xi Jinping, saying that "*The Pacific Ocean is big enough to accommodate both China and the US*." With a view to extending its military power to the Western half of the Pacific, Chinese ships and warplanes routinely patrol around the Senkaku Islands, Taiwan Strait, and the Spratly Islands. It has also deployed advanced anti-ship and anti-air missiles on military bases constructed on artificial islands. China's strategic intention is apparent: in order to challenge the maritime hegemony of the United States and create a Chinese sphere of influence on sea, it is necessary to turn the three important international waters, i.e., the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea, into Chinese inland seas.

The current situation poses a historical-political question that is still pending: will the Chinese countercurrent really put an end to, and even reverse, the historical trend of empire disintegration that was characteristic of the twentieth century? Or, is it simply a transitory illusion created by the excitant-like foreign capitals and technologies that have been introduced into China during the last three decades?

As this Chinese countercurrent is seeming to reverse the defining historical trend of the twentieth century, Taiwan happens to locate right in the middle of the surging

flow, just like a blocking stone. Beyond all expectations, Taiwan has not become another Hong Kong or Macau. As two inshore trading posts, Hong Kong and Macau had broken away from the orbit of the previous "Chinese" empires for a long time, much earlier than Taiwan did – Macau beginning in the mid-sixteenth century, Hong Kong in the mid-nineteenth century, and Taiwan at the turn of twentieth century. However, at the turn of twenty-first century, Hong Kong and Macau were brought in the Chinese countercurrent without credible resistance if not willingly, despite their centuries-long experiences of being politically and economically dissociated from the previous "Chinese" empires.

When it comes to the attitude toward the Chinese countercurrent, Hong Kong and Macau are by no means exceptional. As we saw in the last three decades, most neighboring countries of China preferred jumping on the bandwagon, while major Western democracies were more than willing to appease the expansionist Chinese Empire with a view to gaining a larger share of economic benefit. In this regard, Taiwan, an offshore island republic whose *de jure* statehood is yet to be widely recognized in the international system, does have shown an unusual degree of resistance throughout the last three decades.

In the context where the Chinese vision of imperial revival is putting into practice, it is still a pending question that whether Taiwan would eventually become one of another "lost pieces," just like Hong Kong and Macau, to be reattached to the reviving Chinese Empire or the first domino that might set off a chain reaction leading to the disintegration of the forcible-feeble Chinese Empire. In this sense, Taiwan serves well as a touchstone of the actual strength and intensity of the Chinese countercurrent.

If we may agree with this estimation that Taiwan does serve as the touchstone of the Chinese vision of imperial revival, a puzzle would immediately come into our mind: why and how Taiwan has shown an unusual degree of resistance that is much stronger than that of Hong Kong and Macau, even in a hard time of three decades when most neighboring countries and major Western democracies have preferred jumping on the bandwagon or appeasing the reviving Chinese Empire? Or, simply put, where does this exceptional resistance come from?

As many studies have indicated and measured, it is the rise of a Taiwanese national identity that has politically and psychologically underlain that resistance. Without quarrelling with the previous studies about this argument, I would like to emphasize

that the rise of any specific identity is by no means "groundless" – identity formation must be grounded upon existing socio-political realities that had been formed through prior historical processes. Following this rationale, I suggest going deep into the macro-historical-structural processes through which a Taiwanese national identity becomes something ideologically conceivable and politically desirable. That is to say, in order to solve the aforementioned puzzle, we are actually seeking to explore the historical process in which a *de facto* Taiwanese nation-state has formed – or, to put it shortly, the Taiwanese national history.

Theoretical-Methodological Relevance

Taiwan represents an extreme case that is methodologically appropriate for the theory-building purpose. However, the real challenge for us lies not in simply writing out a Taiwanese national history but the question of how to do it, as the intellectual legitimacy of doing a national history for any belated nation is seriously challenged today. Thanks to the tremendous influence of poststructuralism and postmodernism in the past three decades, the intellectual milieu has been in general hostile to any project of subject formation, be it political or intellectual. In an age that nearly all (new) projects of nation-formation are intellectually de-legitimated as reactionary and oppressive, any effort to imagine a national history will easily run into big trouble. Wu Rwei-ren (2013b) terms this intellectual adversity "*a moral-intellectual predicament of late nationalism*," meaning "many would like to have an imagined community of their own but few want the trouble of writing its biography."

As a belated nation, Taiwan is also situated in this common intellectual adversity from which all the belated nations in the world are suffering. It is, nevertheless, in this unpleasant adversity that I see the merits and potentials in the case of Taiwan for theoretically and methodologically getting out of this moral-intellectual predicament of late nationalism. Unlike most scholars of Taiwan studies adopting the strategy of doing either a *de facto national history* or even a *national history in denial* so as to avoid running into trouble, I resonate with Wu's appeal for raising this tacit premise to a conscious level and to address the difficulty directly by theorizing it.

Therefore, the genuine question for me becomes: how to "properly" devise a framework of understanding, explaining, and interpreting for doing a national history for a belated nation-state. What I mean by saying "properly" is that we should not go

back to an essentialist approach for doing national history, which had prevailed in the nineteenth century and even lasted to the twentieth century, but instead strive to work out a non-essentialist approach that could better serve the purpose of writing a biography for the belated nation which are suffering from the intellectual adversity.

An essentialist approach is no longer considered "appropriate" or "acceptable," not only because it will violate the political correctness in the contemporary intellectual circles, but also for the negative political consequences it may have and the academic implausibility it entails.

Instead of understanding political subject as a historical formation that is neither self-evident nor immutable, an essentialist approach tends to take a particular *ethnie* or a set of ethnic-cultural attributes or even some previously formed political entities as the core of historical narrative, around which a specific national subject is said to take form. In taking an essentialist view, one will, consciously or unconsciously, come up with a monomyth or some heroic narratives for certain human group who are taken as the "protagonist" of history while disproportionally downplaying or even negatively portraying the other "minor actors" in the same story. That is to say, an essentialistically-written history will bring about oppressive or exclusive effects on the latter, inevitably raising doubts and challenges, both academic and political, related to the question of "whose history it is." In other words, a national history narrated from an essentialist perspective is more likely leading to division and suppression than integration and inclusion. Seen from the academic perspective, an essentialist approach for doing national history is equally implausible, for it unavoidably constitutes a narrow and overly-filtered lens that conceals the richness and variety of historical texture much more than it can illuminate.

Now that an essentialist approach is undesirable, both politically and academically, we may ask: is there a non-essentialist alternative that could better serve the purpose of articulating a national history in non-oppressive, non-exclusive, and even non-linear ways? And, more importantly, how could we make it if it is indeed possible?

In my view, when it comes to working out a non-essentialist approach for doing a national history of a belated nation-state, Taiwan is a methodologically appropriate, if not the best, case for this theory-building purpose. This judgement is underlain by the two historical particularities of Taiwan. For one thing, Taiwan has served as an interface of three civilizations, that is, Austronesian, European, and Chinese civilizations; for

another, Taiwan has experienced five successive foreign rules in a very short time span of mere three to four centuries.

With these two historical particularities, Taiwan is arguably an extreme case that carries the highest degree of difficulty for researchers to work out a non-essentialist framework for doing a national history for a belated nation-state.

On the one hand, it demands a wide range of knowledge of the three civilizations of drastically different natures and origins from researchers. On the other hand, it asks researchers to devise a set of conceptual vocabulary and theoretical framework that should be able to overcome the difficulty caused by its historical experiences of successive foreign rules.

When it comes to dealing with the case of Taiwan, researchers will find themselves caught in an unfavourable twofold difficulty: first, they have to figure out some ways to secure certain degrees of continuity and consistency necessary for writing the Taiwanese national history from the discontinuity of Taiwan's political history; second, they will find that there is no appropriate political subject that can be taken as the predecessor of the national subject of Taiwan when foreign rulers are excluded and, furthermore, that these foreign rulers had been mutually conflicting with one another.

So far as I know, few if any countries in the world carry a higher degree of difficulty for researchers to write a non-essentialist biography of themselves. To address the difficulties inherent in the case of Taiwan, it indeed demands a very high standard of ability of abstraction and narration from researchers.

However, the selection of Taiwan as the object of analysis in a single-case study can be highly rewarded. In my view, it has at least two merits. First, a non-essentialist approach for writing national history will be proved possible, if I can work out a set of conceptual vocabulary and theoretical framework that is competent to fulfil the task to write a non-essentialist biography for Taiwan as an extreme case that carries the highest degree of difficulty. Second, since this non-essentialist approach was developed out of an extreme case that carries the highest degree of difficulty, it could easily apply to or be appropriated to writing a non-essentialist biography for other belated nation-states in the world, perhaps with some modifications.

What is more, provided that this theory-building task is fulfilled successfully, it can not only help the belated nation-states get out of the above-mentioned "moral-intellectual predicament of late nationalism" but also serve as a double-edged sword for

all the established states in the world.

On the one hand, it could function like an "intellectual drill" for the current secessionisms or sub-state nationalisms developing within the established states. By consulting or appropriating this intellectual drill, they could articulate their own non-essentialist versions of national history that are intellectually more justifiable and politically more sophisticated than those of the established states from which they want to break away.

On the other hand, it could be employed in a reverse direction. The established states could also take a strategic non-essentialist turn in the historiography of their own national histories and try to reconstruct it along a more pluralistic and inclusive line. By doing so, they could discursively undermine the legitimacy of secessionisms or sub-state nationalisms and, therefore, politically mitigate the centrifugal forces within their current borders.

Methodology

In 2012, one year before I came to Germany, I had spent one year to carry out ethnographic investigations in a variety of aboriginal tribes in Taiwan. During my fieldwork, I had carried out participatory observation in the daily communal lives as well as in the aboriginal church organizations, which are the most important institutions in the aboriginal society. In the process, I had conducted more than seventy intensive interviews, all of which had later been turned into word-for-word transcripts, amounting to around one million words in total.

Before I really went into and lived in the aboriginal communes, the aboriginal society on Taiwan was still a mystery to me. My miserable amount of knowledge about it came from a few studies or reports, which I even did not really understand at that time. In the process, I became no longer an outsider – as you may note, I have a middle name called "Ljavakaw." That is a name bestowed by a chief of a Paiwan tribe when I was adopted as her son into her clan. The name signifies how deep I had involved in the aboriginal society when conducting the fieldwork.

After immersing myself in the aboriginal surroundings, my ability to comprehend the general aboriginal situation and the related studies was greatly enhanced. This experience granted me a deep and clear vision on the aboriginal affairs and history,

which is tremendously helpful for me to fulfill this task, that is, to theoretically construct a new framework for understanding the history of Taiwan that proportionally restores the role of Austronesian aborigines in the process of nation-state formation.

Moreover, I had also conducted archival study and qualitative textual analysis. Between 2016 and 2018, I had paid several visits to the Center of Historical Materials of the Taiwan Seminary in Taipei, the Archives of the PCT in Tainan, and the library of the Yu-shan Seminary in Hualien. All of these three institutions belong to the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan.

During these visits, I was granted access to the immense amount of original materials that appeared in PCT's internal documents and publications. The internal records of the Church not only cover the church affairs but also serve as a valuable channel to understand the development of society and politics in Taiwan that has been recorded since the second half of the nineteenth century.

By digging into these historical documents, my ability to comprehend the related historical studies and the ways they were conducted was greatly enhanced. With the help of archival study and qualitative textual analysis, I had published two journal articles regarding the role and influences of the Church in the emergence and development of the Taiwanese nationalism and the aboriginal nationalism. I take these two articles as the pilot studies, both of which provide important theoretical and empirical groundings for this dissertation.

Chapter One

The Trilogy of Historiography in Writing the Taiwanese National History

1.1 In the Relay of Writing the Taiwanese National History

At the Second World Congress of Taiwan Studies held at SOAS, London, in 2013, Wu Rwei-ren, a Taiwanese scholar of comparative politics renowned for his studies on colonialism and nationalism, delivered a paper entitled "The Meta-History of History," reflecting on the prominent late historian Tsao Yung-ho's well-known thesis of "History of the Taiwan Island" (hereafter, HTI).[1] In his study, Wu (2013b: 3) gives Tsao's thesis of HTI credit for being "the first discursive attempt at meta-history about Taiwan born in academia," as it "provides significant clues – not solutions – to the first possible strategy of doing *Taiwanese national history* in a *non-essentialist* way."

Widely celebrated as it may be, the theoretical significance of Tsao's thesis of HTI was not carefully examined following its articulation in the early 1990s, nor were its implications and insufficiencies elaborated. Eventually, twenty years later, a scholar of comparative politics Wu Rwei-ren, rather than an "orthodox" academic historian, made some profound philosophical/meta-historical reflections and criticisms on the thesis of HTI.

With his reflections and criticisms, Wu has, in my opinion, greatly pushed forward Tsao's historiographical case for doing a non-essentialist Taiwanese national history by theoretically amending the aporias and weakness inherent in HTI. Regrettably, Wu's undertaking on reflecting and advancing HTI from the angle of the philosophy of history resonated little in academic circles. To the best of my knowledge, there has been no written comment on or response to Wu's reflections on Tsao's HTI. Wu (2013b: 2) himself extrapolates possible reasons for the lack of theoretical follow-ups to Tsao's HTI in the paper, conjecturing that the first reason is related to "the deeply rooted and entrenched tradition of what Hayden White called anti-theoretical and anti-

[1] The HTI was first articulated briefly in 1990 in an interview with Tsao, instead of appearing as a regular academic article. See: Tsao, Yung-ho (1990) 台灣史研究的另一個途徑—「台灣島史」概念 [An Alternative Approach for the Studies of Taiwan History: The Concept of "History of the Taiwan Island"]. *Newsletter of Taiwan History Field Research*, 15: 7-9. This interview was later adopted into a collection of Tsao's studies. See: Tsao, Yung-ho (2000) *台灣早期歷史研究續集* [The Sequel of the Studies of the Early History of Taiwan]. Taipei: Linking Publishing.

philosophical empiricism of the discipline of history as a whole in Taiwan, as in elsewhere" [emphasis Wu's]). If Wu's speculation is correct, the same reason, can, I believe, be also applied to explain the lack of resonance towards his reflections on HTI.

Taking the solitary intellectual journey in search of, as Wu (2013b: 3) concisely puts, "articulating Taiwanese history as a national history through a non-essentialist, non-oppressive, non-exclusive, and even non-linear way," both Tsao and Wu worked as two lonely prophets, whose messages, intellectually inspiring and politically relevant as they remain, have attracted few if any followers, as well as open opposition. Coming forward of my own accord to take the baton from these two forerunners in the relay of writing a non-essentialist Taiwanese national history, I hope the present study can make a modest contribution to the unfinished cause initiated by Tsao and taken on by Wu, by putting forward a civilizational-constitutional thesis of Taiwanese national history – or, to put it simply, a constitutional history of Taiwan.

Historiographical Challenges in Writing Taiwanese National History

In giving due credit to Tsao by taking HTI as the first possible strategy of doing a non-essentialist Taiwanese national history, Wu insightfully highlights that the gist of HTI actually concerns an unsolved historiographical question of how to do the national history of Taiwan adequately. Or, to rephrase this question in a personifying way, how can we properly write the biography of the imagined community called Taiwan?

Generally speaking, those who attempt a national history are unable to avoid two challenges: the first is directed to the intellectual ability to address the historical particularities of the specific imagined community in question, while the second involves the intellectual legitimacy of writing national history at that time – or, the political correctness of the then historiography. When it comes to doing a national history for any belated nation today – for example, Taiwan in the present study, the two challenges loom large for both intellectual ability and legitimacy.

With the respect to the challenge to intellectual ability, historians find themselves caught in an unfavorable situation that, with Taiwan's experience of successive foreign rulers, there is no appropriate political subject that can be taken as the predecessor of the national subject of Taiwan when foreign rulers are excluded. As for the challenge to intellectual legitimacy, the project of writing a biography for this belated nation, Taiwan, is an inopportune task, for it is, as Wu (2013b) correctly points out,

unfortunately placed in the contemporary intellectual milieu permeated by the tremendous influence of post-structuralism and postmodernism, hostile to and suspicious of, if not cynical about, intellectually forging a subject, be it in national or other forms.

1.2 History of Taiwan Island

The significance of Tsao's HTI exactly lies in, as Wu (2013b: 3) indicates, its initiative to address the twofold difficulty in writing Taiwan's national history by viewing "Taiwan as an independent stage of history where the geographical condition as an island fundamentally shaped the trajectory of its history." Wu (2013b: 3) translates and quotes the gist of HTI as follows:

> "Within the basic spatial unit of Taiwan island, [it takes] the peoples on the island as its main subject of investigation, examining the various relationships Taiwan established with the outside world through ocean over *longue duree* and the various positions and roles of Taiwan in the global trend and international politics during different periods of time…"[2]

On the basis of treating Taiwan island as an independent historical stage, Tsao claims in a later essay[3] that "the geographical position as an island has oriented Taiwan culturally towards the ocean, even though it had been dominated for a long time by a continental power (Wu 2013b: 4)." Furthermore, in the same essay he adds a preliminary "integration thesis among multiple ethnies" to his original thesis of HTI. I quote once again Wu's (2013b: 4) concise summary and precise translation of the integration thesis as follows:

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[2] This key paragraph, which was originally in Chinese and translated by Wu into English, is cited word by word according to Wu's translation.

[3] Tsao, Yung-ho (1998) 多族群的台灣島史 [The Multiethnic History of the Taiwan Island]. *Historical Monthly*, 129: 93-95. This assay was also adopted into a collection of Tsao's studies. See: Tsao, Yung-ho (2000) *台灣早期歷史研究續集* [The Sequel of the Studies of the Early History of Taiwan]. Taipei: Linking Publishing.

> "On the stage of Taiwan Island, many different actors came, played their parts, and left. It is the stage, the island itself, *not the successive regimes*, that provides the necessary continuity of history. Moreover, it is peoples of multiple ethnic origins coming to the island at different times that constituted the society and subject of historical study. Eventually they came to form a community of life due to their common aspiration for freedom and democracy."

In identifying Tsao's ingenuity of decentering the state, the Han Chinese people, and mainland China in writing the history of Taiwan with his HTI, Wu (2003b: 4) indicates the "four main characteristics of HTI that point to its non-essentialist nature," which can be summarized as follows [emphasis Wu's]. First, by de-centering the state, i.e., by shifting the focus of narrative from state to society, it was able to avoid the pitfall of *statism* and provide a continuity in social history, making HTI essentially a discourse of *social or societal history.* Second, by de-centering the Han Chinese people as main actors and shifting the focus of narrative from anthropo-centrism to *topo-centrism*, i.e., by treating Taiwan as above all a space, it avoids the conceptual quagmire of defining a Taiwanese *ethnie*, and in doing so it is able to accommodate plural ethnic groups into a common space. Third, by decentering the Mainland China, i.e., by shifting the focus of narrative from the history of land to the *history of ocean*, it manages to escape from the continental orthodoxy of modern Chinese historiography. Fourth, this topo-centric thesis provides an *empirical grounding for Tsao's fundamental assertion that Taiwan is an independent stage of history*, since the island of Taiwan was indeed woven into the global maritime history at the age of mercantilism long before it was incorporated by the continental Chinese empire in late seventeenth century.

However, Tsao's strategy, in Wu's eyes, succeeds only partially. On the one hand, Wu (2013b: 5, 8) recognizes Tsao's achievement in "suggesting some crucial elements for constructing a non-essentialist historical narrative of Taiwan as a nation," while on the other, he hits the nail on the head by arguing that "Tsao skipped political history altogether and adopted purely social and geographical discourses only to encounter a fatal weakness of having to justify his fundamental assertion of Taiwan island as an independent stage of history with a narrative of political history."

Despite the merits of the non-essentialist approach, Tsao's evasion of political history, Wu continues, must undermine the logic of the HTI itself. The evasion makes

HTI a self-defeating thesis, for it is indeed premised on an assertion conceptually positing Taiwan island as an independent stage of history, which is actually neither a self-evident truth nor an immutable fact, but a historical formation that can only be warranted and justified by a narrative of political history. In other words, Wu considers – insightfully, in my view – Tsao's strategy of evading political history as counterproductive, for the strategy undermines the foundation of HTI by leaving the epistemological premise of the thesis without any historical justification.

Both reaffirming the non-essentialist motif of HTI and addressing its inherent weakness, Wu (2013b: 7) suggests "reintegrating a narrative of political history into the thesis of HTI, but one that is restructured along the non-statist spirit of the original HTI by absorbing and integrating insights from other disciplines of social sciences such as the ideas of non-linear causal mechanisms, social bases of politics, and anthropological observations and interpretations of aboriginal political traditions." Simply put, Wu's suggestion is to construct a non-essentialist political history and then integrate it with the non-essentialist social history already revealed in the original HTI. To perform these tasks, he regards absorbing and employing insights developed in other disciplines of social sciences as helpful and even necessary.

By doing so, Wu (2013b: 7) claims that we may come up with "a non-statist, non-teleological and multiethnic narrative of the formation of *a state* coterminous with the geographical boundaries of Taiwan and *a people* capable of forming collective will," by which "Tsao's assertion, or epistemological premise, that Taiwan island forms an independent stage of history is finally justified." When proclaiming the two goals of depicting the formation of a Taiwan-wide state and a people with collective will in non-essentialist ways, Wu is actually setting two intertwined research agendas, which may be understood as empirically exploring the two dimensions, the political and the social, of Taiwanese national history. The political dimension concerns the question of how a Taiwan-wide state has been formed, while the societal dimension revolves around the process of how a people with collective will has come into being out of variegated and conflicting human groups.

One important merit in Wu's suggestion on improving Tsao's HTI is that the suggested guidelines are not derived from abstract inference; instead they are extracted from his prior practices in historical writing. In the ninth footnote of the paper offering the abovementioned guidelines, Wu does refer to one of his previous works (2013a)

entitled “Nation-State Formation at the Interface: The Case of Taiwan,” in which he demonstrated how his theoretical amendments to HTI can be put into practice. I think it is only fair to see how good the guidelines really are by examining Wu’s own thesis on nation-state formation. By doing so, we are able to evaluate to what extent Wu fulfilled the two tasks he set out, and thereby assess how far and in what ways Tsao’s thesis was advanced by Wu.

1.3 Interfacial Nation-State Formation in Taiwan

Taking on the non-linear evolutionary view, Wu (2013a) puts forward a historical-institutionalist thesis on nation-state formation in Taiwan, which, compared with Tsao’s thesis of HTI, is much more theoretically self-conscious and methodologically sophisticated. Neither denying the discontinuity of political history occasioned by successive foreign rules nor eschewing political history completely as Tsao does, Wu instead argues that the island-based stateness and the island-wide citizenry that form Taiwan as a nation-state – at least, a *de facto* one for the time being – had been formed cumulatively under discontinuous foreign rulers. Wu’s thesis can be encapsulated in the second subheading of his study: “interfacial nation-state formation in Taiwan (hereafter, INSF).”[4] In the following paragraphs, I would like to raise four main characteristics of INSF that point to the rationale behind Wu’s thesis.

First, Wu begins his thesis by adopting the geopolitical perspective, from which Taiwan is defined as “an interface between powerful states” – or, as he later rephrases the term metaphorically, “*a fragment of/f empires*,”[5] portraying Taiwan as a peripheral

[4] Wu’s thesis of INSF first appeared in an earlier conference paper presented in 2007, became complete in 2013, and was eventually published in a symposium in 2020. See: Wu, Rwei-ren (2007) “Discontinuous and Cumulative Nation-State Formation: A Political-Historical Interpretations of Democracy in Taiwan,” Paper presented at the International Conference on After the Third Wave Problems and Challenges for the New Democracies, Taiwan Think Tank, Taipei, August 13-14; Wu, Rwei-ren (2013a) “Nation-State Formation at the Interface: The Case of Taiwan,” Paper prepared for the International Conference on Taiwan in Dynamic Transition, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada, May 24-26; Wu, Rwei-ren (2020) “Nation-state Formation at the Interface: The Case of Taiwan,” in Ryan Dunch and Ashley Esarey eds., *Taiwan in Dynamic Transition: Nation-building and Democratization in a Global Context*, pp. 47-79. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

[5] Wu’s concept of Taiwan serving as “a fragment of and off plural empires” appeared first in 2004 and was adopted in a collection in 2014. See: Wu, Rwei-ren (2004) “Fragment of/f Empires: The Peripheral Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism,” *Social Science Japan*, 30 (December), pp. 16-18; Wu, Rwei-ren (2014) “Fragment of/f Empires: The Peripheral Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism,” in Shyu-tu Lee and Jack F. Williams eds., *Taiwan’s Struggle: Voices of the Taiwanese*, pp. 27-34. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman &Littlefield.

fragment repeatedly torn apart from an imperial center only to be attached to a new one. Here we can see how Wu comes to address the inherent weakness of HTI in lacking a narrative of political history. Contradicting Tsao's thesis of HTI which attempts to evade politics, Wu immediately puts forward a view of geopolitics at the start of his thesis. Formulating his HTI with an aim to highlight that as early as the first half of the seventeenth century Taiwan's history had been woven into global maritime history during the age of mercantilism, Tsao's arguments, nevertheless, almost completely overlook, if not deliberately eschew, the geopolitical aspect of the global maritime history of mercantilism. With this negligence, the geopolitical implication of the very fact that Taiwan has been involved in global economic and political struggles since the dawn of its history is left unknown. Wu redeems this deficiency by starting his thesis with a view of geopolitics, thereby unearthing the macro-historical-structural root of the discontinuity of Taiwan's political history. According to Wu, it is the geopolitical character of Taiwan as "an interface between powerful states" – or, metaphorically put, "a fragment of/f empires" – that has served as a structural factor continuously inducing the successive foreign rules since the seventeenth century. Unlike Tsao who tends to sidestep the difficulty in writing Taiwanese national history caused by the discontinuity of its political history, Wu instead faces up to politics by treating the geopolitical character of Taiwan as an exogenous yet unavoidable factor in nation-state formation in Taiwan.

Second, in order to integrate the political and social history, Wu (2013a: 3) takes a historical dialectic view of the political (state) and the social (society), arguing that "the nation-state formation in Taiwan is an unintended outcome of long processes of state- and nation-building *from above* and popular struggle *from below*." Simply put, the nation-state formation in Taiwan was viewed as a process in which state and society have reciprocally influenced and shaped each other. Wu (2013a: 5) then elaborates on his succinct dialectical argument as follows. He begins by noting that "all five successive regimes from without embarked upon some projects of state-building and/or nation-building with a view to consolidating its rule of Taiwan since the early seventeenth century." Then the thesis induces a negation – so to speak, the antithesis, as Wu contends that "these aggressive state actions in turn triggered a variety of popular protests and contentions among the inhabitants of Taiwan." Eventually comes out a synthesis to form a new proposition whereby the two conflicting ideas, i.e., the

abovementioned thesis and antithesis, are reconciled, as Wu maintains that "together, the state- and nation-building from above and the popular struggle from below created inadvertently a sovereign territorial state on Taiwan that enabled both democratization and concomitant nationalization of the state through democratization." In taking a historical dialectic view of the formation of a Taiwan-wide state and a people with collective will, Wu's thesis actually implies a research agenda that attempts at integrating the political with the social. That is to say, immediately after embedding his narrative of political history in geopolitics, Wu carries out his second task, i.e., the integration of the political and social histories, by putting forth a dialectical frame for understanding the making of the Taiwanese nation-state.

Third, in unearthing the macro-historical-structural root of successive foreign rulers from the geopolitical perspective, and by articulating the dialectically-constructed thesis that integrates the political and social histories, Wu is able to characterize the nation-state formation in Taiwan as a process that was "discontinuous but cumulative – discontinuously ruled but cumulatively formed." With this ingenious characterization, Wu's thesis on INSF becomes a convergence of two qualities: on the one hand, he turns INSF into a non-essentialist thesis, while on the other hand, he overcomes the difficulty caused by the discontinuity of Taiwan's political history by depicting, in an institutionalist fashion, the process of the nation-state formation as being *cumulatively formed* even under discontinuous political rulers. In this sense, Wu's theory kills two birds with one stone. The thesis of INSF is made theoretically non-essentialist in nature; in addition, it demonstrates that a properly-constructed Taiwanese national history can be both continuous and consistent. Up until this point, I consider Wu is quite successful – at least, at the theoretical level – in two aspects. Wu provides a solution to the two difficulties in writing the Taiwanese national history concerning intellectual ability and legitimacy by developing a non-essentialist thesis capable of securing certain degrees of continuity and consistency necessary for writing the biography of a nation. Wu also addresses the weakness inherent in Tsao's HTI by completing the task of constructing a non-essentialist political history and integrating political and social histories.

Fourth, in order to make his thesis empirically verifiable and analytically falsifiable, Wu further operationalizes his characterization of the nation-state formation in Taiwan as a discontinuous-yet-cumulative process in both the state (the political) and

society (the social) aspects. To operationalize this process at the state level (the political), Wu first shifts the object of analysis by conceptually replacing state with *stateness*. By doing so, he redirects our attention from the successive foreign regimes imposing discontinuous rule upon Taiwan to the *stateness* of institutions initiated, inherited, and expanded by each foreign regime built on Taiwan. Furthermore, he adopts the four criteria Charles Tilly and his colleagues (Tilly 1975: 27, 34) used to define a modern state[6] to measure the cumulation of *stateness* in Taiwan. For the social (society) aspect, Wu employs the same strategy to conceptually change the object of analysis so as to examine how a *citizenry* has been forged in Taiwan through the interplay between state actions and popular struggles by adopting the three conditions identified by Tilly (2007: 23) as favorable to democratization in his late work.[7] Together, in redirecting our attention to the cumulation of stateness and the making of citizenry by conceptually shifting the object of analysis, Wu is successful, in my view, in making INSF an operationally workable thesis, and by doing so, his characterization of the nation-state formation in Taiwan as a discontinuous-yet-cumulative process is made empirically verifiable and analytically falsifiable.

Before putting forth my own reflections and criticisms on Wu's thesis of INSF, it is helpful to take an inventory to assess how far he has pushed forward Tsao's thesis of HTI. To remedy the inherent weakness of HTI in eschewing political history, he brings a narrative of political history back into Taiwanese national history by embedding his thesis in geopolitics. Furthermore, to carry out the second task he himself suggests, Wu takes a historical dialectic view of the political (state) and the social (society) so as to integrate the political and social histories. Next, in taking the abovementioned geopolitical and dialectic views, he characterizes the nation-state formation in Taiwan as a process of being discontinuously ruled but cumulatively formed. In this way, his thesis of INSF is made non-essentialist like Tsao's thesis of HTI, but at the same time capable of securing continuity and consistency necessary for writing Taiwanese national history. Finally, by absorbing insights from the social sciences, a strategy Wu

[6] 1) consolidation of territorial control, 2) differentiation of government from other organizations, 3) acquisition of autonomy (and recognition thereof) by some governments, 4) centralization and coordination.

[7] 1) the integration of interpersonal network of trust into the public politics of the state, 2) the insulation of categorical inequality from public politics, and 3) the autonomy of alternative power centers with respect to public politics.

himself suggests for doing the Taiwanese national history in general and for improving Tsao's thesis of HTI in particular, he methodologically demonstrates how to operationalize his thesis by conceptually shifting the object of analysis to the cumulation of *stateness* as well as the making of *citizenry*, so as to make his INSF into an empirically verifiable and analytically falsifiable thesis.

Taking these four interlocking accomplishments into consideration, it is fair to say that when it comes to doing the Taiwanese national history, Wu's thesis of INSF is both theoretically sophisticated and methodologically sound. While I do consider INSF as insightful and valuable, I feel obligated to proffer my critiques on it and, more importantly, to put forward an alternative thesis that, I believe, can contribute to the enterprise to which the two forerunners, Tsao and Wu, have committed themselves. The critiques and the alternative thesis can be understood together as my salute to Wu for his peerless efforts in pushing forward Tsao's thesis of HTI and as my willingness to take the baton from Wu, as he did from Tsao, in the relay of writing a non-essentialist Taiwanese national history.

1.4 Critiques on Wu's thesis of INSF

Concealing the Pith and Marrow of HTI

My first critique is directed at the geopolitical perspective proposed by Wu, from which Taiwan was metaphorically portrayed as "a fragment of/f empires." Articulated earliest in 2004, in recent years this geopolitical metaphor of Taiwan has been widely accepted in both public discourses and academic works as the proper macro-historical-structural framework, or the point of departure, for narrating Taiwan's history.[8]

[8] As for academic works, Wakabayashi (2014: 34, 71) and Komagome (2019: Introduction) are two notable cases, in which the two Japanese authors indicated their citing of Wu's concept of (Taiwan serving as) "a fragment of/f empires" as the starting point of their analyses of Taiwan history. See: Wakabayashi, Masahiro (2014) *戰後臺灣政治史：中華民國臺灣化的歷程* [The Postwar Political History of Taiwan: The Process of the Taiwanization of the Republic of China]. Taipei: National Taiwan University Press; Komagome, Takeshi (2019) *「臺灣人的學校」之夢：從世界史的視角看日本的臺灣殖民統治* [The Dream of (Establishing) a "School of Taiwanese's Own": Looking the Japanese Colonial Rule over Taiwan from the World-Historical Perspective]. Taipei: National Taiwan University Press.

As for public discourses, the most representative case is that the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, following Wu was invited to given a speech in one of the church conferences, incorporated Wu's concept of (Taiwan serving as) "a fragment of/f empires" into the memorandum about and the introduction of its most important platform for ecumenical activities as a discursive framework for Taiwan's history and international isolation. See: Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, the Introduction of the Taiwan Ecumenical

Insightful as it may be, what concerns me most about this geopolitical view is that it inadvertently blurs, or even conceals, the very essence of Tsao's thesis of HTI.

Tsao's dedication to what he termed "the early period of Taiwan history" is driven by, as he professed on different occasions, his intellectual excitement towards the history of the seventeenth-century Taiwan where encounters, collisions, interactions, and mutual influences among Austronesian, European, and Chinese civilizations took place. As far as the interplay of plural civilizations is concerned, seventeenth-century Taiwan was indeed an unprecedented period in the island's history. The gist of Tsao's thesis of HTI – namely, to understand Taiwan as a historical stage where multiple historical actors came and left or stayed – is a conception founded exactly on this unprecedented seventeenth-century condition of Taiwan, i.e., three civilizations that had emerged and developed in the different regions of the world began to intersect with one another on Taiwan island. Obviously, Tsao's thesis of HTI implies a peculiar world-historical view, which is, in my opinion, is broader and profounder than the geopolitical view taken by Wu. From this world-historical perspective, the seventeenth century marked the heyday of encounters between the three civilizations on Taiwan island.

Wu is successful, I think, in redirecting our attention to the exogenous, macro-historical-structural factors that have constrained and shaped the nation-state formation in Taiwan. In a sense, we should understand Wu's geopolitical view portraying Taiwan as "a fragment of/f empires" as an "analytical metaphor" that holds "poetic soundness," otherwise an act to make geopolitical equivalence between the five successive foreign rulers of extremely different political qualities and geopolitical weights, be they called "powers" or "empires," could hardly be convincing when placed under historical scrutiny. Unless we view this idiosyncratic expression as only a poetic metaphor of politics, it would appear bizarre to make a geopolitical equivalence between a chartered company (the Dutch VOC), a stationed conglomerate of pirate-merchants (the Kingdom of Tungning founded by the House of Kongxia), a pre-modern world empire (the Qing Empire), a nation-state in the process of formation and expansion (Japan in its late Meiji, Taishō, and prewar Shōwa eras), and a global informal empire (the post-

Forum for Justice and Peace (TEF), https://reurl.cc/jqd9Ym.

WWII United States) by labelling them all "empires" to which Taiwan was successively attached and detached.

But making a "poetic analogy" is not the fatal fault in Wu's geopolitical view. More regrettably, this geopolitical view conceals the pith and marrow of HTI more than it illuminates. By taking the geopolitical view portraying Taiwan as "a fragment of/f empires," Wu is actually squeezing the rich texture of history involving three civilizations into a linear narrative frame, in which Taiwan resembles a war trophy repeatedly passed between empires/powers. Through this geopolitical lens, the individual geopolitical players with distinct qualities are seen as unitary actors playing political games at the agent level; however, the much more abstract, systematic factors, which I call the "web of civilization" that the geopolitical players adhered to and depended on, are out of the geopolitical horizon. To put it metaphorically, the geopolitical view tends to focus on the "spiders" while being blind to the "cobwebs" that they adhere to.

To rescue the precious world-historical vision implied in Tsao's HTI from Wu's narrower and overly-filtered geopolitical lens, I suggest a systematic understanding of civilization: to understand each single civilization as an anthropic system with its own idiosyncratic ways of organizing collective lives. From this perspective, the aforementioned Austronesian, European, and Chinese civilizations can be understood as three types of anthropic systems distinct from one another in organizing collective lives. By doing so, one can avoid being trapped in the fallacy of methodological nationalism caused by the geopolitical view, a conceptual frame in which the relevant geopolitical players are presumed to be self-contained, independent actors politically distinct from and hostile to one another rather than considered as the agents of different civilizations. Switching to the world-historical view that suggests a systematic understanding of civilization, we see the mutually conflicting geopolitical actors could be the agents of the same civilization. As far as seventeenth-century Taiwan is concerned, the Dutch VOC and the Spanish troops, despite their mutual hostility, should be taken as the agents of European civilization that was then in the process of its global expansion into a worldwide international system. By the same token, both the House of Koxinga and the Qing Empire were agents that rose at the peripheries of Chinese civilization despite the antagonism between them. In the same vein, the warring

Austronesian communes that lived on the Taiwan island for thousands of years were the agents of Austronesian civilization.

By taking this world-historical view suggesting a systematic understanding of civilization, we are enabled to forsake the linear understanding that periodizes Taiwan history in line with the durations of the successive foreign rulers, and instead to broaden our horizon by viewing the history of Taiwan as a nonlinear, piecemeal, and overlapping process under which Taiwan island has been, by parcels, *weaved* into the three civilizations, and through which the Taiwanese nation-state has gradually come to existence. In doing so, we may restore Chinese civilization, whose weight and significance has been disproportionally overstated in the conventional historical narratives, into its rightful place in Taiwanese history. I believe that this approach is consistent with Tsao's intellectual mission to do Taiwanese national history.

A Lopsided Approach

My second critique concerns Wu's dialectically framed research agenda. My point is that, despite claiming to integrate the political and social histories by examining the dialectics between the political (state) and the social (society), his dialectically-framed thesis of INSF implies a lopsided approach that leans towards political (state) aspect and only advances Tsao's embryonic formulation of social history to a quite limited extent.

Tsao's thesis of HTI, as Wu correctly indicates, is "a view or, to be precise, an embryonic theory that has never be fully elaborated (Wu 2013b: 3)." From my point of view, HTI is embryonic in two aspects. The first is that, as Wu points out, it lacks a narrative of political history necessary for warranting and justifying its premise positing Taiwan island as an independent historical stage. Moreover, what is left untold by Wu is that even the formulation of Taiwan's social history revealed in HTI is nothing but a rudimentary assertion about "gradual integration."

The assertion can be encapsulated in one sentence: given different human groups came and left at different times, those who stayed embarked on a course of gradual integration, eventually forming, in Tsao's own wording, a community of life or, to borrow Wu's words, a people capable of forming collective will. Pastorally delectable as it may sound, this "gradual integration" assertion is both wishful and teleological. Despite its attractiveness, it was far from the historical reality.

Taiwan island as a historical stage where, as Tsao emphasizes, human groups with different historical-political characteristics have arrived and stayed has been naturally conducive to the rise of inter- and/or intra-group conflicts and struggles. More often than not, social integration in such a conflict-prone condition could neither take place spontaneously nor proceed on a harmonious course. That is to say, the making of the national subject (in my wording), or a community of life (in Tsao's wording), or a people capable of forming collective will (in Wu's wording) was a process marked by uncertainties that should not be glossed over by the simple assertion, i.e., gradual integration.

Then, we may ask: how far has Wu carried forward Tsao' embryonic formulation of Taiwan's social history with his thesis of INSF? My answer is that: flawed by its lopsided approach that leans towards the political (state) aspect, Wu's dialectically-framed thesis of INSF, although much more sophisticated than Tsao's "gradual integration" assertion, is far from satisfactory when it comes to doing the Taiwanese national history.

To being with, Wu's thesis of INSF is a spatially blind narrative lacking a geographical horizon. In taking a dialectical view claiming to look into "the *state* actions of *shaping* the society and the popular struggle *triggered* by the *state* actions," Wu (2013b: 4) is casting his sight, in fact, only upon the place where the existence of the state and the influence of the state apparatuses were materialized to the extent that the local inhabitants could no longer remain unperturbed. In other words, this is a very state-centered view. It should be noted that the dialectics between state and society, as Wu puts it, is a purely ideational, abstract expression rather than based on any historical, empirical examination. In taking this dialectical view, the parts of the island where the state power did not reach were naturally left out of his analytical horizon.

Looking the history of Taiwan through the geographical lens, we will note that a fairly large proportion of Taiwan is left blank in Wu's analyses due to the limitations inherent in his dialectical view. Simply put, the stateless territories – that is, the parts of the island where the state could neither project its coercive power nor enforce its jurisdiction effectively – are made analytically absent in Wu's narrative of the nation-state formation in Taiwan, in spite of their actual long-term coexistence with the territories where a state resided. To be more temporally and spatially specific, the geographical expansion of state's control over Taiwan island was a long historical

process across nearly three centuries. It was in the first half of the seventeenth century that the first-ever state – more precisely, a proto-state established by a chartered company, i.e., the Dutch VOC – was brought into being on the southwest plains; from then on, the scope of state rule expanded, slowly but steadily, southward and northward. As late as the second half of the nineteenth century, the state's effective control was still weak in the East Rift Valley and absent in the central mountainous regions. These two regions, together amounting to seventy percent of the island territorially, were not put under state's direct control, both in name and in effect, until the first quarter of the twentieth century. In short, confining his vision to the state-ruled territories, what Wu comes up with is a geo-historically lopsided narrative, in which the large parts of the island beyond state control are analytically excluded.

What makes the geo-historically lopsided narrative analytically more unbalanced is that even within the limited territories where a state resided, Wu measures the transformation of a state-ruled society with a yardstick taking state as the point of reference. As noted previously, in order to measure the formation of a citizenry in Taiwan, Wu (2013a: 4) employs three criteria proposed by Tilly: 1) the integration of interpersonal network of trust into *the public politics of the state*, 2) the insulation of categorical inequality from *public politics*, and 3) the autonomy of alternative power centers *with respect to public politics* [emphasis mine]. Taking a close look at the three criteria, we may be soon aware that each of them takes public politics as the point of reference to assess the degree of social integration. Since public politics is inconceivable without presuming the existence of a state – or, to put it differently, public politics takes shape only in the wake of the making of the state, it is fair to say that the three criteria Wu adopts to examine the degree of social integration in Taiwan, in fact, all take the existence of the *state* as the precondition of social integration.

In this regard, despite claiming to examine the dialectics between the political (state) and the social (society), Wu treats the political and social aspects of Taiwan history asymmetrically. When employing the three criteria proposed by Tilly, Wu is examining to what extent the society had gradually been integrated *by* and *into* the rule of state. In other words, he is analyzing how the state *had made* the society rather than the dialectics between state and society. In this sense, the society was analytically deemed not as the antithesis to but a byproduct of the state. Looking through this analytically lopsided lens, the society could be anything but something with agency and

its own internal logic. As Tsao's "gradual integration" assertion on Taiwan's social history appears overly wishful and teleological, Wu's thesis of INSF suffers from unduly downplaying the subjectivity and internal dynamic of the society in question as a result of its geo-historically lopsided and analytically unbalanced approach towards state and society.

An Inbuilt Settler Bias

My third critique is relevant to an often-seen "settler bias" that is, regrettably, also inherent in Wu's thesis of INSF. The settler bias works in this way: when it comes to the aftermath of the seventeenth-century Taiwan characterized by the encounters of the three civilizations, most narrators of Taiwan history – Wu is no exception in this regard – would automatically cast their sights only, for unstated reasons, on the settlers and the expanding settler society while erasing the aborigines and the shrinking aboriginal society nearly completely from their horizons, as if the latter, for unknown reasons, suddenly ceased to exist on the island as the migration of the settlers revived in the eighteenth century. In other words, the settler bias tends to view the post-seventeenth-century Taiwan history as a history only of settlers.

To be fair, besides Wu's thesis of INSF, the settler bias has afflicted on most popular narratives and academic studies of Taiwan history.[9] Elaborately formulated as it may be, Wu's thesis of INSF is not immune to the often-seen settler bias. Nevertheless, unlike the other narrators whose settler bias is the result of unwitting negligence, Wu's failure to prevent his thesis of INSF from being trapped in the same bias is necessitated by his dialectically-framed approach. More precisely, the settler bias implied in Wu's thesis of INSF is a methodological inevitability resulting from his lopsided focus on the political (state) aspect that I highlighted previously.

Let us put aside the other narrators who share the same bias for the time being. As far as INSF is concerned, the reason why Wu turns a blind eye to the stateless aboriginal society, which had actually been in a hostile coexistence with the expanding settler

[9] For example, Tonio Andrade (2008), Evan Dawley (2018), and Liu Yi-chang et al. (2019), to name but a few. See: Andrade, Tonio (2008) *How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century*. New York: Columbia University Press; Dawley, Evan N. (2018) Finding Meaning in Time and Space: Periodisation and Taiwanese-centric History. *International Journal of Taiwan Studies*, 1(2): 245-272; Liu, Yi-chang et al. (2019) *典藏台灣史* [The Repository of the Books of Taiwan History]. Taipei: Taiwan Interminds Publishing Inc.

society for centuries, is the same reason that causes him to make the stateless territories analytically absent. Since they were both "stateless," they are hence beyond the horizon of Wu's focus on the presence and exercise of state power. In a sense, omitting the stateless territories and overlooking the stateless aborigines are two sides of same coin. Adopting this lopsided approach with an inherent settler bias, Wu (2013a: 4) claims to "review how the two early states [referring to the Dutch VOC and the Kingdom of Tungning] turned *an aboriginal Taiwan* into *a Chinese colony*" [emphasis mine]. Misled by his settler bias, Wu comes up with the assertion clearly contradicting the very fact that, given sustainable settlements had been established only in rather limited areas of the southwest plains under the Dutch rule and extended in the form of small-size enclaves to the central plains under the rule of the House of Koxinga, most of newly cultivated fields were abandoned after the downfall of the Kingdom and most of their retainers, troops, and refugees that had sought shelter in Taiwan were forcefully relocated by the Qing back to the mainland.

Considering the abovementioned historical fact, it is fair to say that the social fabric of the late-seventeenth-century Taiwan and its immediate aftermath was far from "being turned into a Chinese colony" from its originally aboriginal – that is, Austronesian – landscape as Wu presumes. The inbuilt settler bias induces a misperception that subconsciously mistakes the settler part for the whole of Taiwan, with which the role the settlers had played is disproportionally magnified and the aboriginal existence is downplayed, if not erased, in the historical horizons of the narrator.

In Wu's thesis of INSF, the aboriginal existence as well as the once island-wide yet shrinking Austronesian tribal landscape are treated as merely the backdrop to either the settler expansion or the successive foreign rulers. Theatrically put, the aborigines were set to appear in Wu's analysis as merely walk-ons without agency, arranged to stand at the deepest, shadowed area of the historical stage as the play called the "interfacial nation-state formation in Taiwan" is played out. Needless to say, Wu's own recommendation (2013b: 8) to absorb "anthropological observations and interpretations of aboriginal political traditions" in the writing of Taiwanese national history becomes nothing but a check, regrettably, yet to be cashed in his own work.

The settler bias has two negative consequences, one concerning the narrating of Taiwan's history in general and the other involving Wu's thesis of INSF in particular.

With regard to the former, the settler bias tends to distort our proper sense of proportion in narrating the general history of Taiwan and doing the Taiwanese national history. With regard to the latter, the settler bias, with which the aboriginal component of Taiwan's history is left analytically blank, leads Wu astray from the most conspicuous and cherished motif in Tsao's HTI that seeks to uncover and restore the long-concealed, multiple and diverse ethnic origins of the Taiwanese nation. In going astray from the quintessence of Tsao's HTI, Wu (2013b: 6) also becomes oblivious to his own appeal "to extend the time span of Taiwanese political history backwards to include the political life of various aboriginal peoples having inhabited the island hundreds or even thousands years earlier than the Han settlers." What is worse, this self-induced obliviousness contradicts Tsao's intellectual intent and political aspiration behind the articulation of HTI to rediscover and restore the oceanic nature of Taiwan and its "Austronesianness," both of which have long been politically suppressed and discursively concealed.

1.5 The Tripartite Periodization of Taiwan History

In the previous section, I have suggested a systematic understanding of civilization for preserving the world-historical insight radiating from Tsao's HTI but concealed by the overly-filtered geopolitical lens of Wu's INSF. In understanding civilization as an anthropic system with its own idiosyncratic ways of organizing collective lives, we may further conceptualize constitution as a subset of civilization or, put another way, civilization as a superset of constitution. In this sense, constitution can be understood as a subset that specifically points to the socio-political properties and configuration of a civilization. As a subset, all elements of constitution are also elements of civilization, and both the upper and lower limits of constitution are established and encapsulated in civilization.

When two or more different civilizations encounter each other and develop more and deeper intercourses, systematic incompatibility will unavoidably loom large in terms of how collective lives are organized in these distinct systems. In other words, systematic incompatibility will manifest itself in particularly intense ways in the dimensions of social fabric and political superstructure. These two dimensions, social fabric and political superstructure combined, constitute what I call "constitution" in this

study. In other words, “constitution” refers to the fundamental socio-political configuration. Following the encounter between civilizations, at first confrontation and competition are inevitable, while piecemeal negotiation and partial fusion can be expected too in the long run when the civilizational intersection persists for a long enough time. That is to say, civilizational intersection may bring about constitutional transformation or change.

In taking this civilizational–constitutional view, we are able to move beyond the deeply ingrained understanding of Taiwan history whose periodization is done in line with the durations of the successive foreign rulers. Instead, with the systematic understanding of civilization and constitution, our horizons may be broadened by viewing the history of Taiwan as a nonlinear, piecemeal, and overlapping process in which Taiwan island has been gradually *weaved* into multiple civilizations in varied ways at different stages, and through which the constitution of Taiwan has transformed correspondingly.

Looking through the civilizational–constitutional lens, Taiwanese national history can be divided into three periods, termed as the Short Seventeenth Century, the Long Eighteenth Century, and the Lasting Nineteenth Century in order. Each of the three periods is characterized by a particular pattern of civilizational intersection that took place on Taiwan island and that had distinct impacts of the constitutional transformation of Taiwan.

First, the Short Seventeenth Century, spanning only around four decades between the mid-1620s and the early 1660s, marks the historic first encounter of Austronesian, European, and Chinese civilizations on Taiwan island. In the first-ever encounter of the three civilizations, the constitutional prototype of contemporary Taiwan – that is, a Western-style political regime established on top of the tense coexistence of aborigines and settlers – was previewed, albeit on a smaller scale, on the island.

Second, the Long Eighteenth Century signifies an interval of nearly two hundred years between the first presence and the second arrival of European civilization in Taiwan. Between the mid-seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, Taiwan had witnessed confrontations, fusion, and hostile coexistence between Austronesian and Chinese civilizations in the absence of European civilization. In this historical window created by the withdrawal of the Dutch VOC in the early 1660s, the dual constitution

consisting of a stateless Austronesian tribal society and an imperial Confucianized settler society took shape in Taiwan.

Third, the Lasting Nineteenth Century, characterized by the second intersection of the three civilizations following the reentry of European civilization into Taiwan in the mid-nineteenth century, has undergone a circuitous course of nation-state building, in which the Taiwanese nation-state as a Western-style political superstructure has been established upon the previously formed dual-constitution social fabric of Taiwan.

Chapter Two

The Short Seventeenth Century

2.1 An Austronesian Island and Its Constitution

For thousands of years prior to the seventeenth century, Taiwan island had been wreathed in the primordial abundance of Austronesian civilization. Based on the evidences from linguistic, biological, and archaeological studies, scholars from different academic fields have converged on an "out of Taiwan" hypothesis, arguing that Taiwan was the "Austronesian homeland" from which the ancestors of the present-day Austronesian-speaking peoples embarked on a prehistoric migration, at around 3000 to 1500 BCE, dispersing to the islands of the Indo-Pacific. The current vast Austronesian region, also known collectively as Austronesia, geographically includes Taiwan, Island Southeast Asia, Micronesia, coastal New Guinea, Island Melanesia, Polynesia, and Madagascar.

The Austronesian constitution on Taiwan island can be encapsulated as "an island-wide stateless tribal society," an order that took shape from time immemorial. The known Austronesian population on the island as a whole, according to the seventeenth-century Dutch records, amounted in total to around 100,000; the number of lowland communes on the plains reportedly reached hundreds, while those located in the central mountainous regions and eastern Taiwan were mostly left uncounted. For better understandings of the Austronesian constitution on Taiwan island prior to the European presence, this island-wide stateless tribal society, I suggest, can be anatomized from two aspects, that is, the social fabric and the political superstructure.

In terms of the social fabric of the Austronesian constitution, primitive communes spread across the island constituted the basic units. The size of the known lowland communes reportedly ranged from several hundred people to 3,000 at the most, while that of highland communes was largely unknown – a reasonable conjecture was that the latter would be smaller than the former considering the narrower living spaces due to the precipitous terrain and the supposed lower agrarian potentialities of these areas.

Variegated in form as they were, the primitive communes were commonly characterized by a low degree of functional differentiation. Most communes maintained a communally-based subsistence economy centered on hunting-gathering and/or slash-

and-burn agriculture, with an exception known as Basay who lived on craftsmanship and barter in the northeast littoral.[10] These modes of subsistence economy implied that most of them were leading a life in-between sedentariness and nomadism: they were not completely sedentary as they did move to secure new hunting grounds or fertile farmland, and they did not move as frequently and regularly as nomadic peoples. In terms of kinship and inheritance, both matrilineal and patrilineal were often seen, with some cases being close to bilineal and still others based not on lineages but on corporately-organized dwellings, an analogue to what Claude Lévi-Strauss (1982; 1987) called "*sociétés à maison*" (house society). Primitive religions that mixed the worship of ancestral spirits with animism in varied ways were prevalent on the island, and most communes had females, or people of both sexes, trained to be spiritualists. Usages, customs, and religious notions closely intertwined with one another and commonly constituted the unwritten laws binding on the communal members. Headhunting was regularly practiced not only as a combat skill used in communal self-defense and inter-communal vendettas, but also as a rite of passage for men into adulthood and/or a way to acquire the heads of enemies to be used in religious sacrifices.

A commune itself constituted a self-governing unit in which the structure of power and authority was highly decentralized. Most recorded communes were led collectively by the heads of clans or a specific stratum of elders, with some exceptions in which a hereditary chief was constituted as the leader. But even in the latter cases the chief was by no means a supreme ruler – his, or her, power and authority could only be exercised by closely observing the unwritten laws constituted by communal customs and religious beliefs. While the council of elders and/or the chief (if there was one) were authorized to execute the routine affairs and to deliberate upon the important affairs for the commune, the final decisions on important affairs could be only made in the general assembly in which all qualified warriors were expected to participate. "All qualified warriors" included almost all adult men, as in the communes adulthood was usually defined by a man's ability to serve as a hunter in everyday life and act as a warrior

[10] Kang Peter (2003) 十七世紀上半的馬賽人 [The Basay in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century]. *Taiwan Historical Research*, 10(1): 1-32; Chen, Tsung-jen (2012) 十七世紀前期北臺灣水域社會的商品及其交易型態 [the Commodities and Pattern of Trade along the Coasts of Northern Taiwan in the early Seventeenth Century] in Lin Yu-ju ed., *比較視野下的臺灣商業傳統* [The Commercial Traditions in Taiwan: A Comparative Perspective], pp. 479-518. Taipei: The Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica.

during wartime. As properly practicing and observing customary laws was a symbol of a commune's social autonomy, these hunter-warriors were the guarantee of commune-based political autonomy.

In this sense, the members of a commune actively participated in the communal affairs and, correspondingly, were also highly constrained by their own commune. In other words, an individual could hardly quit his or her own commune of origin; or, put differently, one's voluntary or involuntary (for example, being banished) breakaway from the commune almost equated to a death sentence, for the individual had little chance of survival in the severe natural environment and as a target for hunting by other communes. In this sense, Austronesians had enjoyed what Benjamin Constant (1819) called "the liberty of ancients."

Numerous and variegated, self-governing but lowly functionally differentiated, the primitive communes constituting the social fabric of Austronesian Taiwan had achieved only a thin layer of political superstructure. Although the communes, both large or small, were situated in a complicated regional network consisting of feud, friendship, intermarriage, exchange of goods, low-intensity warfare, and so on, an island-wide political superstructure had never come into being. However, there were several regional trans-communal political superstructures.[11] According to the Dutch records, a chiefdom[12] and several trans-communal alliances[13] already existed before the agents of European civilization set foot in Taiwan in the early seventeenth century. However, it seems that the chiefdom and the alliances as region-wide political superstructures were still at a rudimentary stage, commonly characterized by a low degree of formalization and a high degree of instability. Neither the chiefdom nor the alliances had evolved into a functionally differentiated organization capable of effective rule –

[11] Ang, Kaim and Yan Huang (2017) *解碼臺灣史 1550-1720* [Decoding the History of Taiwan 1550-1720]. Taipei: Yuan-Liou Publishing Co., Ltd.

[12] A chiefdom based on dozens of communes called the "Kingdom of Tja'uvu'uvulj (*大龜文王國*)" that had existed in the southernmost mountainous Hengchun Peninsula. See: Tsai, Yi-ching (2009) 荷據時期大龜文（Tjaquvuquvulj）王國發展之研究 [The Development of the "Kingdom of Tjaquvuquvulj" in the Dutch Period]. *Taiwan Indigenous Studies Review*, 6: 157-192.

[13] A supra-communal alliance, known as the "Kingdom of Dadu (*大肚王國*)" in contemporary Taiwan and called the "Kingdom of Middag" by the then Dutch records, was among the most widely known. Having formed in the central western plains, it comprised twenty-seven communes at its heyday. The alliance had survived the expedition by the Dutch VOC and the massive attack by the Kingdom of Tungning, but eventually disintegrated under the Qing rule in the early eighteenth century. See: Kang Peter (2003) 環境、空間與區域：地理學觀點下十七世紀中葉大肚王統治的消長 [Environment, Space, and Region: the Rise and Decline of the Kingdom of Middag in the Seventeenth Century from the Geological Perspective], *Humanitas Taiwanica*, 59: 97-116.

so to speak, a sociologically-defined state, let alone a modern state defined, in the present study, as a highly centralized institution with a fiscal-military machine as its core.

The absence of an island-wide political superstructure above the level of the commune and the underdevelopment of the region-wide political superstructures can be explained by the long-term exemption of this Austronesian island from the credible threats and invasions coming from without. The lack of external threats facilitated a state of equilibrium, or metastability in the language of physics, among the warring yet largely equally-matched communes on the island. The warring communes situated in the state of equilibrium/metastability naturally felt no necessity or pressure to create a political superstructure or "upgrade" existing underdeveloped political superstructures to enhance the mechanisms and institutions for abstracting resources and mobilizing manpower. Moreover, certain important material or nonmaterial "catalysts" that proved, in other places, conducive to the endogenous formation and upgrading of the political superstructure, such as writing systems, more integrative religions, and advanced military hardware, were also not introduced into Taiwan due to the island's long seclusion. No doubt the lack of motivations and the absence of favorable conditions would reciprocally diminish the attempts and efforts to establish a political superstructure or upgrade the existing underdeveloped ones. As one can well imagine, lacking a well-developed political superstructure, the primitive Austronesian communes were inevitably at a great disadvantage in their encounters with the agents of European civilization who arrived abruptly in the seventeenth century.

2.2 The Seventeenth-Century Watershed

Taiwan's long-term state of being unperturbed by other civilizations that had emerged and developed in the rest of the world can be explained, I believe, by the island's geographic location. Located in the far-east part of Eurasia, separated by a wide strait from the East Asia mainland, and placed right the middle of East and Southeast Asia island arcs, i.e., the so-called "first island chain," Taiwan's adequate geographical separation from Eurasia meant that it was not subject to the influences of Northeast Asian Confucianism and the spread of the Southeast Asian Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islamism for many centuries. Except for some fisherman, seasonal tillers, and traders

who had occasionally visited and stayed for short periods along the coasts of the island since the fifteenth century, successive empires that emerged on the East Asian mainland and numerous kingdoms or sultanates in the Southeast Asian archipelago rarely considered Taiwan as a territory whose conquest and occupation were economically worthwhile or militarily feasible.

Geopolitically, Taiwan had long happened to be the common "outer sphere (*圈外*)"[14] – to borrow this term used by the prominent Japanese thinker Karatani Kojin (2014) in his monograph on the structure of empire – of the kingdoms, sultanates, and empires that had emerged in Northeast and Southeast Asia for a dozen of centuries prior the seventeenth century. That is to say, Taiwan happened to be a place remote enough to be free from the conquest or influence of these political powers. It was this contingent geopolitical character of being located at the outer sphere of empires that had kept this island purely Austronesian for such a long time. In this sense, I fully agree with Canadian anthropologist Scott Simon's (2012) description of Taiwan as "*Formose comme terre d'Océanie* (Formosa as the land of Oceania)."

However, the arrival of the agents of European civilization – in the case of Taiwan, the Dutch VOC and the Spanish troops – in the early seventeenth century changed the storyline entirely. The European occupations on the island triggered a chain reaction that caused the House of Koxinga and the Qing Empire, two contemporaneous forces rising from the different peripheries of the East Asian mainland, to feel it necessary to take over Taiwan in their own interests in the latter half of the seventeenth century. In other words, the arrival of the two agents of European civilization induced the reactions from two agents of Chinese civilization to take over Taiwan. It was indeed a watershed moment, at which the geographical character of this long-secluded "hermitage" located at the "outer sphere of empires" was diametrically turned into what Wu Rwei-ren metaphorically terms "a fragment of/f empires." As Wu argues, this change of Taiwan's

[14] Karatani (2014: 107): "the geopolitical structure of empire consisting of four categories: core, margin, sub-margin, the out of sphere. The margin tended to be assimilated into to the core. But sub-margins, unlike margins that directly bordered on an empire-civilization, were able to pick and choose which elements they would adopt from the empire-civilization. If they were too distant from the civilization, they would remain a tribal society; if they were too close to the civilization, they would likely either be conquered or absorbed. People who wanted to evade the control or influence of the core withdrew beyond the margin or submargin to the out of sphere, in other words, to mountain or frontier regions, where hunter-gatherer society was able to survive." See: Karatani, Kojin (2014) *The Structure of World History: From Modes of Production to Modes of Exchange*. Translated by Michael K. Bourdaghs. Durham: Duke University Press.

geopolitical character was the macro-historical-structural factor that induced successive foreign rulers and, therefore, the root of the discontinuity in Taiwan's political history. Without quarrelling with Wu about his insight, I would like to add that, besides the geopolitical implication, the seventeenth century also served as a watershed moment in Taiwan's history in both civilizational and constitutional terms.

Taiwan as the Interface of Multiple Civilizations

Taiwan's history, from its very beginning, was (part of) world history. What this assertion means is that Taiwan had actually entered its own historical – or, more precisely, proto-historical – era as the result of its being drawn into the then forming and globally expanding international system driven by European agents in the early seventeenth century. From the civilizational perspective, the arrival of the agents of European civilization had two unintended consequences for Taiwan.

First, it was the European presence on Taiwan in the seventeenth century that had actually interrupted the seeming inevitability that this Austronesian island would be turned into a piece of either Japanese or Islamic civilization. At the turn of the seventeenth century, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the second "Great Unifier" of Japan in the late *Sengoku Jidai* (*戦国時代*, Age of Warring States), had attempted a southbound expansion toward Taiwan, by waging a war of conquest if necessary.[15] In the meanwhile, Muslim merchants had, via Malay Archipelago, already reached Mindanao on which several sultanates had been established. It seemed that, all things being equal, an invasion into, and consequently an occupation of, this Austronesian island carried out by either Japanese samurais or Muslim sultans, or both of them, was only a matter of time – it might reasonably take place by the turn of the seventeenth century, or some decades later. These two scenarios, nevertheless, were not brought into full play. The Austronesian island became neither another larger, further south Japanese Okinawa nor the northern analogue of the Islamic Mindanao, simply due to the historical contingency that the agents of the globally expanding European civilization happened to reach East Asia at that time. In order to secure the advantageous shipping routes, Spanish troops and the Dutch VOC took control of Luzon and Formosa respectively. These occupations

[15] Lin, Wei-Sheng (2003)「豐臣秀吉高山國招諭文書」條目 [Toyotomi Hideyoshi's Manifesto on the Kingdom of High Mountain], in *臺灣歷史辭典* [Dictionary of Taiwan History], pp. 1319-1320. Taipei: Yuan-Liou Publishing Co., Ltd.

turned out to be a blockage right in the middle of the Japanese southbound and Islamic northbound expansions.[16] That is to say, the path of Taiwan to be turned into either a southern part of Japanese feudalism or an East Asian piece of the Islamic world was actually blocked by the agents of European civilization, becoming two of many unrealized historical possibilities in Taiwan history. In this sense, the arrival of European civilization in the seventeenth century indeed had an unintended "lock-in" effect upon the constitutional history of Taiwan by excluding, or substantially delaying, the Japanese and Islamic influences in the following centuries.

Second, besides blocking the paths of Japanese and Islamic civilizations, the European presence on Taiwan in the seventeenth century had also initiated the historical process of introducing Chinese civilization into this Austronesian island. More specifically, it was the Dutch VOC that had solicited migrants from all walks of life – such as merchants, tradesmen, peddlers, craftsmen, peasants, laborers, masons, and fishermen – from the southeast littoral of East Asian mainland, first to help build fortifications and later to develop sugar plantations. While some fishermen and tradesmen from the southeast littoral of East Asian mainland had actually paid seasonal visits to or stayed regularly in Taiwan prior to the European presence, Dutch protection enabled agrarian settlements to be established for the first time on this Austronesian island, where previously inhabitants had expelled perceived invaders through the practice of headhunting. Consciously or unconsciously, what the Dutch VOC had actually introduced into this Austronesian island was a tiny portion of the enormous agriculture-based populace that constituted the social fabric of Chinese civilization. Bluntly put, the earliest introduction of the human constituents of Chinese civilization into Taiwan was a concomitance of the European presence on this Austronesian island, just as the African presence in Americas was a concomitance of the European plantations there.

[16] In a sense, the globally expanding European civilization was pretty a double-edged sword for Japanese samurais and Muslim merchants. On the one hand, the worldwide trades operated by Europeans and the introduction of advanced European firearms, at first, promoted and indeed accelerated the reunification of Japan as well as the spread of Islam and the expansion of regional trade in the Muslim world, while on the other, the fierce competition, especially between the Spanish and the Dutch, for evangelization and getting commercial footholds in East Asia later triggered the reunited Tokugawa Japan's turn to seclusion policy and blocked up the northbound expansion by Muslim sultans by taking over Luzon and Taiwan. In other words, the globally expanding European civilization in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries looked Janus-faced in the sense that it first enabled but later intercepted the Japanese and Islamic expansions in maritime East Asia.

Although the Dutch solicited migrants from the East Asia mainland out of convenience, Taiwan could hardly be restored to its original state as a purely Austronesian island after large numbers of migrants were granted entry and agrarian settlements founded. What was worse and more unexpected for the Dutch was that these migrants settled in Taiwan under Dutch protection actually coaxed Koxinga, a formidable pirate-merchant, to replace the Dutch VOC as their ruler by force. In hindsight, the Dutch VOC planted the seeds of its downfall at the very beginning when it allowed the human elements of Chinese civilization to migrate to the island, as its eventual forced withdrawal from Taiwan can be explained – at least, partially – by the synergy between the settled migrants and Koxinga's troops.

2.3 A Preview of the Contemporary Constitution of Taiwan

The agents of the globally expanding European civilization, of which Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands were of most significance at that time in Asia, had, via Indian or Pacific Ocean, arrived in East and Southeast Asia with a view to conducting inter-regional trade across the two extremes of Eurasia. Of the three main agents, the Dutch and the Spanish had taken over parts of northern and southern Taiwan respectively. Although both the Spanish troops and the Dutch VOC tended to avoid setting foot inland far from the coast at first, they were eventually drawn into the complicated entanglements with Austronesian communes when seeking to get reliable footholds and secure a stable subsistence. Passive as both of them were, the Dutch had achieved a moderate success in establishing relatively stable rule for a longer duration of nearly four decades, while the Spanish, at best, had secured a shaky domination over the northern Austronesian communes over less than two decades. As the Dutch left a much clearer imprint on the constitution of the Austronesian island, I will center the examination of the constitutional consequences of the first-ever encounter among the three civilizations on the case of Dutch rule.

In doing so, I would like to point out that the constitutional prototype of contemporary Taiwan, i.e., a Western-style political regime established on top of the tense coexistence of aborigines and settlers, had been previewed in the Short Seventeenth Century. As an unintended consequence of weaving Austronesian, European, and Chinese civilizations together, this prototype constitution took shape as

a scalene triangle, in which the Dutch VOC as the foreign ruler held a dominant position at the top, with the settlers and the aborigines ruled in separate and different ways at the bottom. Although the Dutch VOC as the agent of European civilization withdrew from Taiwan in the mid-seventeenth century, this triangular political structure remained, with the minor modifications that the role of the Dutch VOC was replaced by subsequent foreign rulers, namely the House of Koxinga, the Qing Empire, the Japanese Empire, and the émigré KMT-dominated ROC under the American protection. In the following paragraphs, I will examine the genesis of the triangular configuration underlying nation-state formation in Taiwan over the last four centuries.

The Double Bifurcation of the Austronesian Constitution

Taking a panoramic view, the establishment of Dutch rule on Taiwan bifurcated the originally island-wide Austronesian constitution – to put it more precisely, it was a process of "double bifurcation."

The primary bifurcation appeared as the differentiation between the state-ruled territories and the stateless Austronesian areas as the presence of Dutch rule had geographically divided the island-wide stateless tribal society into two parts: one was the southwest plains under Dutch rule, while the other geographically much larger part remained stateless.

The Dutch rule was manifested by what I call a "proto-state," which meant a state in reality, but not in name. The Dutch contingent stationed on Taiwan was composed mainly of two kinds of peoples. One was soldiers, whose number waxed and waned from a low of 180 in the early days to a high of 1,800 shortly before Koxinga's invasion. The other included the governing personnel (e.g., the governor, the councilors, military officers, senior merchants, church ministers, provosts, public prosecutors, and political administrators) as well as the supporting staff (such as schoolteachers, scribes, interpreters, clerks, craftsmen, sailors, surgeons, nurses, and market traders). It is not difficult to come at a conclusion that, when looking at its constituents, the Dutch contingent stationed on Taiwan was functionally specialized to rule and even equipped with a fiscal-military machine. Despite possessing the fundamentals of being a state, it was, nevertheless, a state neither in name nor in its own right. Rather, it was an outpost of the overseas headquarters established by a chartered joint-stock company, namely the Dutch VOC.

At the core of the VOC lay the board of directors known as the Lords Seventeen (*Heeren XVII*). The Lords Seventeen were based in the Dutch homeland and maintained overall control over and the ultimate say in company policies. The so-called "High Government," i.e., the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies (*Raad van Indië*), established in Batavia (modern-day Jakarta, Indonesia) as the company's Asian headquarters, "were invested with judicial powers, handling judicial duties on behalf of the States General and provincial courts, and protecting the safety and wellbeing of all employees and free burghers according to the laws and customs of the mother country (Heyns and Cheng 2005: 11)."[17]

As one of the outposts set up by the Headquarters, the Government of Formosa (*Formosanse Landtregeringe*) was authorized to legislate, collect taxes, wage war, and declare peace on behalf of the Dutch VOC and was therefore by extension the newly established Dutch Republic. The Council of Formosa (*Raad van Formosa*) functioned as the decision-making body of the Formosan Government, in which the Governor of Formosa (*Gouverneur van Formosa*), his second-in-command, the highest-ranked military officer in Formosa and two senior merchants were *ex officio* members (Heyns and Cheng 2005: 47-51).

All the councilors were employees of the VOC, and the government constituted by these employees was organized in a collegial form, even though the Governor was instituted as the head of government. Although directly appointed by the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies, the Governor served as, at most, first among equals in the Formosan Council. As the executive organ charged with everyday affairs of governance, the Governor did have some discretion while lacking the power to override the decisions made collectively in the Formosan Council without being held accountable by the Headquarters in Batavia and ultimately by the board of directors in the Dutch homeland (Yang 2000: 73).[18]

The executive power represented by the Governor was still at the rudimentary stage, as evidenced by the absence of an executive-specific competent bureaucracy headed by the Governor as well as the highly limited discretion in the recruitment of

[17] Heyns, Pol and Wei-chung Cheng (2005) *荷蘭時代台灣告令集、婚姻與洗禮登錄簿* [Dutch Formosan Placard-book, Marriage, and Baptism Records]. Taipei: Tsao Yung-ho Foundation of Culture and Education.

[18] Yang Yan-jie (2000) *荷據時代台灣史* [The History of Taiwan under the Dutch Rule]. Taipei: Linking Publishing.

the governing personnel that was entrusted to the Governor. Owing to the absence of a legitimate mechanism for local recruitment, all the functionaries and supporting staff were supposed to be hired by and sent from the Headquarters in Batavia at the request of the Governor or the Council. As a result, the Governor was forced to rely heavily on the missionaries regarding the affairs of the allied communes and use soldiers to collect residence permit fees imposed on the Chinese settlers. However, the missionaries and the soldiers had their own administrative organizations (i.e., the ecclesiastical system of the Dutch Reformed Church and the mercenary groups hired by the VOC) and were therefore, at best, under the Governor's command only indirectly. In this regard, the executive power represented by the Governor was quite limited, even though the Dutch proto-state as a whole was almost completely autonomous from the ruled society, be they the allied communes or the agrarian settlements.

It was noteworthy that the presence of the first proto-state in Taiwan history, in itself, was a "colonial specialty," as it could be brought into being only in the colonies in which the VOC was able to, and needed to, overwhelm the various human groups living there – a situation greatly diverging from the Dutch homeland. No analogue of that kind of proto-state, i.e., a functionally specialized and centralized apparatus designed to rule and equipped with a fiscal-military machine, could be found in the early Republic of the Seven United Netherlands, a loosely united and highly decentralized confederation formed in 1581 by several Dutch provinces to resist the centralist and absolutist reforms carried out by Habsburg Spain.

The secondary bifurcation had taken shape within the state-ruled territories, in which the Dutch ruler had applied two distinct yet interlocking modes of governance to the pre-existing Austronesian communes and the newly established agrarian settlements respectively. As Taiwanese historian Cheng Wei-chung (2004; 2019) indicates, the former were incorporated into the Netherlands-centered feudal system through being coopted as Netherlandish state (*Nederlandtsche staat*), while a medieval "free city" mode of governance, reified in the form of Zeelandia City (*Zeelandia stad*), was imposed on the latter. In other words, as the result of the transplantation of the principles of European feudalism to this far, overseas Austronesian island by the Dutch VOC, a political regime took shape in a form that could be termed "one (proto-)state, two systems" within the geographically smaller state-ruled part of Taiwan in the Short Seventeenth Century. Analytically, the two systems under the same Dutch proto-state

can be characterized as "feudalistic incorporation" and "semi-absolutist rule" respectively. Through these two characterizations, we are able to shed light on the constitutional consequences of the Dutch rule on Taiwan.

2.4 Feudalistic Incorporation

The formal incorporation of the Austronesian communes into European feudalism through being coopted as *Nederlandtsche staat* begun with the conclusion of the Mattauw Peace Treaty in 1635, where the Dutch successfully took vengeance on Mattauw, the most powerful commune on the southwest plains, for their ambushing and slaughtering more than sixty soldiers of the VOC six years previously. Learning about the Dutch defeat of the dominant Mattauw, nearly thirty communes in the surrounding area came immediately to seek peace and form alliances with this newly rising hegemon by concluding treaties with the Dutch modelled after the Mattauw precedent. This pattern of forming Dutch–aboriginal alliances – winning over many others by subduing one or a few of regionally dominant communes – repeated itself in several waves in the following two decades as the Dutch extended its military might northward, southward, and eastward from the southwest plains, the core region of its rule. In the late Dutch period, the number of the allied communes, called "united villages" (*verenigde dorpen*), a deliberate allusion to the "United Provinces" of the Netherlands, had increased to more than one hundred.

As far as the allied communes are concerned, the constitutional consequences of being coopted as *Nederlandtsche staat* were twofold: first, a European-style feudalistic political superstructure constituted by the Austronesian vassalage and the Dutch lordship was created; second, the allied communes were to be transformed, by a combination of compulsion and persuasion, in the image of their European counterparts. The creation of the new political superstructure and the transformation of the allied communes are outlined below.

The Creation of a European-Style Feudalistic Political Superstructure

The deed of concluding a treaty between the Dutch VOC and the Austronesian communes itself gave, consciously or unconsciously for both sides, a kind of legal recognition to the *de facto* self-governing communal entities. With that recognition, the allied communes were formally incorporated into European feudalism as Dutch

protectorates. By concluding treaties with the Dutch, the allied communes symbolically recognized the States General of the Netherlands as their protector, handing over their lands and the rights based on the lands to the Dutch, while in practical terms, the Austronesian vassals claimed vassalage under the Governor of Formosa sent by the Dutch VOC who served as the proxy of the States General. The Governor prudently appointed representatives put forward by the allied communes themselves – in most cases, the elders of each commune would come to the fore – as his vassals, and regularly reaffirmed the appointments if the appointed representatives performed their duties well. The ceremony, designed to highlight the Dutch lordship and affirm the Austronesian vassalage, was carried out in an event called *Landdag* – literally "country day," referring to a regional assembly. Held annually in the core region of the Dutch rule and with lesser frequency in the farther regions, this event was constituted by a variety of highly symbolic activities, including holding a banquet arranged by the VOC for the invited Austronesian vassals.

In this highly symbolic event, the invited Austronesian vassals, that is, the appointed representatives of the allied communes, were treated as equals under the same Dutch overlord, as implied by the way they were arranged in the banquet to sit side by side at a long table under the line of sight of the Governor who sat on an elevated platform. Obviously, it was an effort to politically subsume the allied communes, which usually interrelated with one another in irregular, unequal, and highly mutable ways, via their personified representatives, into a flat, merely two-layered feudalistic network, with the communes on an equal footing in the lower layer.

Allied communes were incorporated into the Dutch rule as "minor allies" in a feudal sense. The political status of the allied communes can be observed from three aspects: military might, levies, and land entitlement. First, the allied communes were allowed to preserve their military might – so to speak, the ultimate guarantee of political autonomy for both large and small communes. Instead of disarming or demilitarizing the warlike communes, the Dutch overlord instead used them in its own interests. As stipulated in the treaties, the Governor and the allied communes were bound together as an offensive and defensive alliance. The allied communes were, thereby, asked to abstain from carrying out vendettas against one another or waging war against the VOC and others under the Dutch protection. In doing so, as Tonio Andrade (2008), an historian of East Asian history and early modern European colonialism, indicates, the

foundation of *pax Hollandica* was laid, paving the way for the subsequent creation of sugar plantations and the concomitant agrarian settlements. Finally, and most importantly, in joining the offensive and defensive alliance, the allied communes were obliged to undertake *ad hoc* military duty, usually fulfilled by joining forces with the VOC musketeers to campaign against the recalcitrant communes (e.g., the Lamey Island Massacre of 1636 and the twice punitive expeditions to Farvolong in 1637 and 1638) and the rebellious settlers in the vicinity of the core region (most notably, the Gouqua Faet/Kueh Huâi-it Rebellion in 1652), or even against the Spanish footholds in northern Taiwan in 1642. As the deep-rooted vendettas between antagonistic communes were now prohibited under the *pax Hollandica*, the allied communes took delight in joining in these military operations, for the Austronesian warriors who participated in the expeditions would be rewarded materially and granted an exceptional permission to perform the headhunting rituals that they still highly regarded.

Second, although the imposition of levies may have contributed fiscally, levies were, first and foremost, a political token of submission to the ruler. As Dutch protectorates, the allied communes paid nominal tribute when requested and performed no corvée for the Dutch overlord. As stipulated in the Mattauw Peace Treaty concluded in 1635, Mattauwers were asked to send the Governor two grown pigs annually, one male and the other female, as an indemnity and a token of submission to the Dutch overlord. Trivial in amount as it was, this symbolic annual tribute, was nevertheless waived four years later. Moreover, no requirement for doing corvée was stipulated in the Treaty, except the obligation to attend court hearings when summoned, which was more a judicial requirement than a corvée.

The immunity from tribute and corvée was given to the allied communes mainly because the Dutch overlord did not consider the imposition of the levies as cost-effective, or even feasible. On the one hand, the Dutch waived the payment of the annul tribute, as it contributed fiscally very little to the VOC but risked provoking armed resistance from the allied communes, while on the other, they had a sober awareness of how unrealistic it was to count on the born-free and warlike hunter-gatherers to perform corvée as docile peasants did.

Third, the land entitlement of the allied communes was recognized, respected, and reasonably protected by the Dutch overlord. Inasmuch as land is always among the most politicized sort of property, the various forms of land ownership point to the

nature and foundation of many varied political regimes. As a thalassocracy, the Dutch VOC generally lacked an interest in land appropriation and occupation. While the allied communes did swear allegiance to the Governor by symbolically[19] devoting their lands to the States General, this highly performative deed was merely a common feudalist practice of affirming the protectorate between the Dutch overlord and the Austronesian vassals, rather than an aggressive act to deprive the vassals of their lands. That is to say, the land entitlements of the Austronesian vassals were recognized by their Dutch overlord.

Furthermore, the Dutch passivity in appropriating lands was also revealed in their respect for the Austronesian modes of land tenure that took shape in various forms of commune-based collective ownership, "communal ownership" for short. Different from the modern type of ownership that is characterized by exclusive rights and control over the well-delimited lands, the Austronesian communal ownership took the form of spheres of influence with blurred boundaries, allowed multilayered usage rights, and emphasized the commune-based guardianship of lands. The Dutch did not seek to proactively challenge or enforce "reforms" on this system of land ownership, and, following their own struggle against Habsburg Spain for their feudal liberties and rights, seemed to be in sympathy with the Austronesian communal ownership whose principles and characteristics had much in common with the then European feudal mode of land tenure.

Lastly, the beneficial rights of the lands, which the allied communes as the beneficiaries were supposed to enjoy, were also reasonably protected by the Dutch overlord. This protection was revealed in two of Dutch policies regarding the migrant hunters and farmers solicited by the VOC. One was that the Dutch authorities called off the sale of the dear-hunting licenses to the Chinese hunters due to concern that the latter's excessive and indiscriminate hunting endangered the reproduction of sika deer, whose furs were highly lucrative for the Austronesian communes in the sales to the company. The other was that the Dutch authorities, when informed of the migrants' thirst for the lands for developing plantations, did not simply override the land entitlement of the allied communes in the core region, but gave a green light only to

[19] The allied communes symbolically devoted their lands to the States General by ways of handing over a little pinang tree and a little cocoa tree planted in earth from their communes to the Governor. See: Andrade, Tonio (2008) How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century. New York: Columbia University Press.

lands claimed by no commune or even facilitated, via the intermediation of the company, the leasing of some of the communal lands to the migrant farmers, by which the relevant communes were entitled to receive rent from the leaseholders.

Communal Transformation: A European Lesson under the Dutch Tutelage

In addition to a European-style feudalistic political superstructure constituted by the Dutch lordship and the Austronesian vassalage, there was an ongoing project to shape the allied communes in the image of their European counterparts as a perquisite for their incorporation into European feudalism. In concluding the treaties that acknowledged the Dutch lordship, the allied communes, especially those in the core region, had a European lesson to learn under the tutelage of the Dutch tutor. In the eyes of the Dutch authorities, this was the "white man's burden" – to borrow this term from one of Joseph Kipling's poems written at the turn of the twentieth century – to "civilize the unwilling savages," while for some zealous Dutch missionaries it was a sacred task to "save the savage souls." The communal transformation promoted with an intent to "civilize or save the savages" implied a reformatting of the Austronesian customary laws exercised by the allied communes in everyday life. In other words, this was an intervention to modify the constitutional base of the stateless Austronesian tribal society. In the sense of seeking to bring about a fundamental change to the Austronesian constitution on this island, it was an act much more radical than creating a European-style feudalistic political superstructure above the allied communes.

It should be noted that the Dutch control and influence over the allied communes varied with the distance from the core region: the farther away an area was, the lower the level of effective control and tangible influence over the allied communes. As the VOC's actual capability and authority decreased with distance from the core region, it was the allied communes in the core region on which the Dutch were most willing, and indeed able, to enforce highly interventionist policies. The Dutch interventions led to a transformation of the communes which can be analytically differentiated into three dimensions: stratification, Christianization, and sedentarization. While all three dimensions of transformation were still at a rudimentary stage when the VOC withdrew from Taiwan in the early 1660s, nearly all aspects of the customary laws that defined the Austronesian way of life were influenced by the highly interventionist policies

implemented by the Dutch authorities. In the section below, we specify the three dimensions of communal transformation.

Stratification

By appointing and regularly reaffirming the communal representatives as the vassals of the Governor, the Dutch authorities were creating a privileged estate within the classless communes in the core region.[20] Prior to the emergence of the privileged estate, the allied communes did have their own "age grades," that is, a system of age stratification, through which obligations as well as rights were assigned to communal members, many socio-political functions carried out, and collective life in a commune organized. However, this system of age stratification was by no means a system of estates, but the stages of social life through which everyone was expected to pass. Given the fact that most of the appointed representatives were the elders put forward by the allied communes, the Dutch authorities were actually turning the top tier of the preexisting communal system of age stratification into a European-style privileged estate.

The appointed representatives of the allied communes as the vassals of the Governor were charged with the task of overseeing and guiding their own communal members. In this sense, the communal members were taken as the "subjects" under the authority of their own appointed representatives rather than the Governor. Although this was a type of feudalistic indirect rule, it was also a form of training for the European-style feudal hierarchy to be imposed on these Austronesian communes which were characterized by a low degree of functional differentiation and a high degree of egalitarianism in terms of the internal structure of power and authority. In short, the feudal practice of appointing and regularly reaffirming communal representatives as the vassals, in itself, would naturally bring about a rudimentary stratification within the weakly stratified communes.

In addition to manipulating symbolism by bestowing upon each of the appointed representatives a robe together with a rattan cane as a symbol of delegation as well as a Prince's Flag (*Prinsenvlag*, the flag of William the Silent) to be displayed in their

[20] This tendency of stratification unavoidably contradicted the internal order of the communal alliance in the central plain and the chiefdom in the southernmost peninsular. Therefore, the Dutch practices of appointing and regularly reaffirming some elders of each commune as the vassals of the Governor more often than not were passively resisted or even openly defied in these two regions.

own communes, the Dutch authorities make every endeavor to strengthen this rudimentary stratification and, thereby, enhance the authority of the Dutch in the minds of communal members. As depicted vividly by Cheng Wei-chung (2004: 75-87), Johannes van der Burch, the incumbent Governor of Formosa in 1637, took a highly performative approach to make a judicial intervention when learning the murder of an elder, who was an appointed representative and therefore one of the Austronesian vassals of the Governor. The Governor personally took command of the arrest of the murderer and his accomplices. Backed by more than one hundred musketeers, he then summoned and presided over an *ad hoc* court constituted by the elders from the communes involved and other neighboring communes, announced a verdict based on the judgement collectively made by the elders in the court according to their customary laws, and executed the murderer and most accomplices in public while pardoning two accomplices himself without consulting the elders.

This judicial drama meticulously performed by the Dutch authorities had two particularly noteworthy implications. First, through the highly performative judicial approach, the Dutch authorities were actually demonstrating a European-style legal court characterized by trial by peers and execution in public. As he intervened in person by stopping the conventional Austronesian way of seeking justice that encouraged self-help avengement and allowed ambush and lynching,[21] the Governor was deliberately showing the righteous judicial mode that was supposed to apply to cases involving his Austronesian vassals in front of the rank-and-file communal members. Second, by summoning the elders, presiding over the court, announcing the verdict, executing the murderer and the accomplices in public, and even arbitrarily pardoning two accomplices without consulting the present elders, the Governor was actually injecting the minds of the Austronesian audience with a notion that his authority far surpassed that of the elders. In other words, he was sending a message that although the elders were the privileged estate that emerged in the process of rudimentary stratification, there was a much higher authority above these newly instituted communal authorities.

[21] While it was acceptable, and indeed practiced, to settle a dispute under the elders' arbitration by paying material indemnity for an offense, or even a murder, the Austronesian customary laws also encouraged self-help avengement and allowed ambush and lynching, inevitably leading to reciprocal revenge by killing, individually or collectively. In a sense, the ultimate guarantee of justice in the Austronesian tribal order was to resort to force in the form of vendetta or communal war.

Christianization

Among the three dimensions of communal transformation, Christianization was the most profound, and therefore the most radical, approach, through which the unwritten Austronesian customary laws constituted by a mixture of usages, customs, and religious notions were to be greatly modified. While it is unclear to what extent the Austronesians' conceptions of God (or gods) and the universe had been reshaped following the propagation of Christianity, the changes of communal usages and customs were highly visible. Following the banishment of 250 female shamans called *Inibs* to the foothills that paved the way for mass conversions, the missionaries endeavored to remake the allied communes in the core region in the images of the Dutch Protestant parishes by suppressing some conspicuous aspects of the Austronesian way of life that were considered as religiously detestable or socially improper, such as headhunting, mandatory abortion (by massage) for women under 37, frequent marital infidelity, no observation of the Sabbath, and public nakedness. The modifications of the Austronesian customary laws even affected the ways marriage and family were organized. In addition to turning the Austronesian-style wedding into church wedding, the missionaries tried hard to replace the Sirayan practices of "visiting marriage" – a custom that allowed a man to sleep with a woman in secret at night before marriage while asking wife and husband to live separately at their respective households after marriage – with the Christian ethics that highlighted premarital chastity and the post-wedding cohabitation of wife and husband.

The literation of at least two Austronesian languages, i.e., Siraya and Favorlang, was a concomitance of Christianization, as the translation of Lord's Prayer, Apostles' Creed, Ten Commandments, and one or two Canonical Gospels in the New Testaments as well as a few locally-compiled litanies, hymns, and catechisms was completed by zealous missionaries. It was for the first time in Taiwan history that some of the oral Austronesian vernaculars had been turned into written languages, although only a few inhabitants had acquired a good command of them before the Dutch withdrawal. The landscape of some communes was even changed as the result of establishing chapels, elementary schools, dormitories, and even an aborted seminary, in which experiments were made with teaching children the Dutch language and Bible lessons.

Sedentarization

As noted previously, most of the known Austronesian communes in seventeenth-century Taiwan led a semi-sedentary and semi-nomadic life as a result of maintaining a communally-based subsistence economy centered on hunting-gathering and/or slash-and-burn agriculture. That is to say, they did move to secure new hunting grounds or fertile farmland but did not practice frequent and regular nomadism.

The reason for the Dutch authorities to encourage sedentary cultivation among the allied communes in the core region was twofold. First and foremost, it was for security reasons, in the belief that an agricultural lifestyle would lead to a reduction in militancy. Second, it was a remedial measure taken by the Dutch authorities in the hope of redeeming the allied communes' difficulties resulting from the swiftly decreasing quantity of sika deer caused by the Chinese hunters' excessive and indiscriminate hunting.

Although this policy may have been well intentioned, attempts to promoting a sedentary farming lifestyle contradicted the conventional sexual division of labor and was therefore viewed as an offense against Austronesian customary laws. According to Austronesian customs, agriculture was women's work, while men were expected to hunt prey rather than performing the labor-intensive agricultural drudgery in the fields (Shepherd 1993: 366).

2.5 Semi-Absolutist Rule

The birth of *Zeelandia stad* was premised on the founding of *pax Hollandica*, a process involving the pacification of Austronesian communes and their subsequent cooption into the Dutch-centered feudalistic network. Faced with the armed opposition of militant Austronesian hunter-gathers who regularly practiced headhunting rituals, this earliest commercial-agrarian colony could not have been brought into existence in Taiwan without the protection of the VOC.

This basic fact had two constitutional consequences: one had an immediate effect on the municipal governance of *Zeelandia stad*, while the other yielded its results in the Long Eighteenth Century. First, the "free-city" mode of governance as an inherent component of European feudalism slipped readily into a "semi-absolutist rule" when transplanted to Dutch Formosa where the VOC served as the undisputed ruler of the city. Second, under Dutch protection, intensive farming – in particular commercial

agriculture producing not for subsistence but inter-Asiatic trade – took place on this hunting-gathering island for the first time in history. Tiny in scale as it was initially, the establishment of the enclave-like agrarian settlements ushered in a new era characterized by the hostile coexistence of two distinct historical-political human groupings, i.e. Chinese settlers and Austronesian aborigines, foreshadowing the emergence of the dual constitution of Taiwan in the Long Eighteenth Century.

The municipal governance of *Zeelandia stad* was of a Janus-faced disposition, manifesting two contrasting characteristics. To be more precise, it was a conjunction of judicial self-rule and legislative supremacy, with an "overlord provision" that the latter preceded the former.

The coexistence of multiple courts that applied to different groups of people – or, different estates in feudalistic language – embodied the spirit of "judicial self-rule" in its "free-city" tradition. The citizenry of *Zeelandia stad* consisted mainly of three kinds of people: VOC employees, the so-called "free burghers" (*vrijburger*), and Chinese citizens. The free burghers referred to those who chose to stay in Dutch Formosa following the expiration of their work contracts with the VOC. Chinese citizens did not equate with the swiftly growing Chinese population in Dutch Formosa[22] – they were actually a distinct estate composed mainly of Chinese merchants and contractors, serving as the headmen, usually called deferentially as *Cabessas*, among the rank-and-file Chinese settlers. In economic terms, these Chinese merchants and contractors were either engaging in international trade with the VOC or solicited by the Dutch authorities, to whom most of construction works (e.g., building fortresses and harbors) and production (e.g., opening up rice fields and developing plantations) were outsourced. Politically speaking, only this group/estate of *Cabessas* could be counted as the citizens of Zeelandia City, while the dependent populations, such as the auxiliaries, employees, peasants, and contracted labors, brought into Taiwan by the merchants or contractors, albeit in numerical majority, were not eligible for citizenship.

[22] Before the Dutch set foot in Taiwan there was already a number of Chinese tradesmen living on the island, estimated at some 1,000–1,500 people. Most of them almost seasonal residents in Taiwan, coming to fish or barter daily commodities for deer products with the Austronesian communes. However, this earlier arriving group of Chinese tradesmen were either expelled by the Dutch authorities or coopted into the Dutch system in the process that the *pax Hollandica* was founded. As the Company begun to encourage the active immigration of Chinese settlers to Dutch Formosa in the 1640s, Taiwan witnessed a rapidly growing number of the Chinese migrants, which by the end of the Dutch was estimated in total to be 15,000–30,000.

Corresponding with the diverse human groupings in the city, at least three sorts of courts were instituted. These courts collectively constituted a plural juridical regime in which cases presented by different groups were put on trial according to their respective customary laws.

The first was the Council of Justice (*Raad van Justitie*), a court of law set up specifically for VOC employees, to which both civil and criminal cases were presented. This court was the highest court in Dutch Formosa, serving as a court of appeal for cases presented to the Bench of Aldermen.

The second was the Bench of Aldermen (*Raad van Schepenen, Magistraat*), a court of law established for hearing the criminal cases and the material civil suits involving the free burghers and Chinese citizens. The seats of this court were filled by respected and leading citizens of the city, of which two were reserved for *Cabessas*, the Chinese headmen.

The third was the meeting of *Cabessas*, a lesser formal court of law made up of around ten Chinese headmen for settling disputes among the Chinese settlers. Besides taking seats in the Bench of Aldermen and the meeting of *Cabessas*, these Chinese headmen also served as the intermediaries between the Chinese populations and the VOC in two ways. First, they were invested with the privilege to advise on the cases involving the Chinese settlers presented to the Formosan Council; second, they also played roles as "envoys" to China on behalf of the VOC.

While the ways the multiple courts operated indeed embodied a spirit of judicial self-rule, the plural juridical regime as a whole was surmounted by a "legislative supremacy" revealed in the rapidly growing body of the decrees issued by the Formosan Council. Along with the day-to-day operations of the multiple courts, the Dutch authorities did not hesitate to regulate the daily lives of the Zeelandia citizenry by resorting to the legal practice of passing resolutions in the Council and promulgating them on the placards written in both Dutch and Chinese. In taking into account the VOC charter, the consecutive instructions, the Roman-Dutch law at home, and even the local customs, the promulgation of placards was intended for addressing the urgent needs and issues of municipal governance that were regarded as unsuitable to be left to the jurisdiction of the courts. Even in the embryogenesis of the city between 1629 and 1643, as many as 106 placards had been issued, which could be subsumed under five main categories: taxation, safety, commerce, hunting, and miscellaneous (Heyns and Cheng

2005). A reasonable conjecture is that there were more placards to be promulgated in the latter, flourishing period of the city between 1643 and 1662. However, the placards of this later period scattered in the Resolutions of the Formosan Council and the Daily Records of the Castle Zeelandia and were not complied and published as a "placard book" (*plakaatboek*) as in the earlier period.

What this "rule by placards" actually revealed was the superiority of legislative resolutions over the judicial autonomy of the three courts, as shown by the fact that the decrees issued by the Council and stated on the placards preceded, or even overrode if necessary, the customary laws cited in each of the courts. It should be noted that the Formosan Council that issued the placards, although organized in a collegial form, was not a representative body – it was constituted by the five governing employees sent from the VOC headquarters in Batavia rather than by the representatives of different human groupings, or estates, that constituted the Zealandia citizenry. Therefore, the "free-city" tradition would inevitably be turned into what I call a "semi-absolutist rule," as the spirit of judicial self-rule reified as the plural juridical regime was not repudiated but surmounted by the legislative supremacy represented by the Council's decrees.

In fairness, the making of the semi-absolutist rule was not out of the arbitrariness of those in office, but a reflection of a movement in the European homeland that sought to collate and compile the customary laws practiced in the Low Countries in the image of Roman law. The fervent drive to Romanize the Dutch customary laws was nonetheless defensive in nature: it was born out of the Dutch resistance to the centralist legal reforms pushed forward by the Habsburg monarchs, who wielded their legislative power by issuing decrees with the aid of a Secret Council (*Geheime Raad*) in Brussels where anonymous jurists drew up the placards. That is to say, it was an oxymoronic movement that the Dutch sought to resist the centralizing legal practices of Habsburg Spain through the approach that they centralized Dutch legal practices themselves. This movement resulted in the collation, compilation, and publication of a series of placard books and codes, including the Batavian Statutes published in 1642 and the Formosan Placard Book complied in 1643, eventually turning the customary laws widely practiced in Low Countries into the legal system known as the "Roman-Dutch Law" (*Römisch-Holländisches Recht*). It is noteworthy that this movement was by no means an isolated phenomenon taking place only in Low Countries, but a centuries-long historical trend that was triggered by the rise of absolute monarchies in Europe and then

realized, in a proactive or reactive manner, to varied extents in different European countries or regions. Looking from this broader perspective, the semi-absolutist rule reified in the municipal governance of *Zeelandia stad* could be understood as an extension of the then European trend to this far away overseas colony.

A Flock of Sheep Kept in Order to Be Fleeced

So, what was the political status of the Chinese settlers under the semi-absolutist rule? Unlike other works on Dutch Formosa which either gloss over or fail to provide a definitive answer to this question, Tonio Andrade (2008) puts forward a noted revisionist[23] thesis of "co-colonization," strikingly depicting the Chinese settlers as a minor partner of the Dutch VOC in the process of colonizing Taiwan. The thesis of co-colonization is founded on one of his main arguments that the Dutch VOC could not establish a colony on Taiwan without the active participation of the Chinese settlers, including their investment of capital, importing and/or exporting goods, facilitating (part of) inter-Asiatic trades, undertaking subcontracted construction and plantation works, as well as providing raw materials, agricultural techniques, and a source of labor.

Even though I agree with Andrade's point that the various Chinese contributions were essential for the establishment of Dutch Formosa, I consider his characterization of the Chinese settlers as a minor partner of the Dutch VOC in colonizing Taiwan – as he terms it "co-colonization" – as misleading. This error, in my view, is the inevitable result of his one-sided emphasis on the economic-fiscal contributions made by the Chinese settlers to Dutch Formosa while completely overlooking the political-military characteristics of the settlers. By failing to take into account their political-military characteristics, this lopsided characterization of the Chinese settlers sounds, to me, as absurd as claiming that African slaves and European slaveholders together conducted a project of "co-colonization" in the Americas in which the former served as a minor partner of the latter, and no less amusing than commenting that a captured anthropologist was actually participating in the process of "co-cannibalization" as a minor partner of a group of cannibals.

[23] Andrade's thesis of "co-colonization is revisionist in two senses: it represents, on the one hand, a revisionist argument against the Eurocentric view of world history that tended to one-sidedly highlight the prevalence of European colonists in the overseas colonies and, on the other, a revisionist thesis contradicting the nationalistic view of Chinese history that used to portray China or Chinese as simply a victim of Western powers.

I am not implying that the Chinese settlers found themselves in a condition as unfavourable as slaves or the fictitious captured anthropologist, nor that the Dutch VOC ever played a role in Taiwan resembling slaveholders or anthropophagus in any sense. It is, however, evident that their physical work in the plantations did not make African slaves a minor partner of European slaveholders in the non-existent "co-colonization" of the Americas, nor would the fictitious captured anthropologist be turned into a minor partner when eaten by a group of cannibals through a process of what I banteringly call "co-cannibalization."

What I would like to highlight through the absurdity implied in the exaggerated analogies is that, when it comes to the political status of the Chinese settlers in Dutch Formosa, a one-sided focus on their economic and fiscal contributions will lead to misleading conclusions.

With regard to the political status of the Chinese settlers, I have two suggestions, with which we may shed light on this issue. First, I believe it is necessary to take into account the political-military characteristics of the Chinese settlers by observing them from the three aspects mentioned previously, i.e., military might, levies, and land entitlement (or, ownership in the case of the Chinese settlers). Second, as the Austronesian aborigines as a whole were the other human group who had interacted widely with the Dutch authorities, it is useful to compare the political status of the Chinese settlers with that of the Austronesian aborigines in Dutch Formosa.

To begin with, we have to note that at the start of the making of Dutch Formosa, the Chinese settlers entered into a relationship with the VOC through an approach entirely different from that of the Austronesian aborigines. The Dutch–Austronesian relationship was created through peace treaties that put an end to the state of belligerency and cemented offensive and defensive alliances, whereas the Dutch–Chinese relationship was founded on business contracts for trading goods or services.

In early modern Europe, the differentiation between political and commercial entities had not yet become evident. The Dutch VOC itself was exemplary of a type of corporation that was both political and commercial in nature, as evidenced by the fact it often simultaneously conducted trade and waged war. In other words, it could generate and maintain a new order, such as Dutch Formosa, that allowed trade on favorable terms to the corporation. It is no exaggeration to say that this kind of

corporation acted like a corporate state in the socio-political milieu of European feudalism.

This had not been the case in East Asia. In the socio-political context of Chinese despotism, merchants or commercial entities could hardly act as political entities, with the few exceptions such as Koxinga as well as his forerunners and analogues who were officially declared to be outlaws or rebels. In other words, under the rule of the highly despotic empires that successively emerged on the East Asian mainland – for example, the Ming and, to a lesser extent, the Qing – merchants armed with militia and weapons would be, sooner or later, viewed as hostile forces by the despotic state. The one and only way they could be legalized was to submit to the imperial court and allow their organizations to be demilitarized or appropriated for official use.

This despotic environment was conducive to the multiplication of merchants who were more willing to pay for the order offered by any competent ruler than to defend their commercial activities and interests by force. In other words, they were highly passive in political terms – in most cases, they would flourish in a state of political stability and be devastated by political turbulence, while it was inconceivable for them to create an order by and for themselves. The Chinese merchants and contractors solicited by the Dutch VOC were no exceptions. In Dutch Formosa, they were free riders in terms of generating and keeping order, or put another way, they were more willing to buy the VOC-guaranteed order than create an order themselves.

Under the *pax Hollandica*, the Formosan Council decreed that all passengers disembarking at the city should be disarmed, and citizens were only allowed to possess firearms with a license. Unsurprisingly, the Chinese merchants and contractors agreed readily with this requirement for doing businesses in Dutch Formosa, and in doing so, they were reduced, voluntarily or involuntarily, to the status of purely commercial actors.

Since the Chinese settlers had accepted the condition of being disarmed, the resulting disparity in military strength between the settlers and the Dutch ruler made the brutal suppression of the Gouqua Faet/Kueh Huâi-it Rebellion of 1652 the only foreseeable outcome: one third of the settler population, around 5,000 people, were allegedly involved in the rebellion, of whom up to 4,000 were killed by a joint force of 120 well-equipped Dutch mercenaries and 600 aboriginal headhunting warriors in the process of pacification.

Two things in this incident were particularly noteworthy. First, departing significantly from the feudalistic warfare waged against the recalcitrant Austronesian communes that in general caused only light casualties, the Dutch authorities undertook a merciless slaughter of the rebellious settlers. Second, unlike the invariable practice of concluding a treaty with the Austronesian communes engaged in combat with the Dutch troops when their small-scale, feudalistic warfare came to an end, the Dutch authorities did not do the same following the crackdown on the Gouqua Faet/Kueh Huâi-it Rebellion that caused much heavier casualties.

These two facts, when considered together, were a mirror of the political-military vulnerability of the Chinese settlers. As a result of accepting the condition to be disarmed, the rebels' lack of armaments clearly explains why the large-scale rebellion turned into a one-sided slaughter of the rebellious Chinese settlers. I believe, however, another equally, if not more, important reason was that the rebellious Chinese settlers, despite greatly outnumbering the Dutch-Austronesian joint force, did not constitute a belligerent, with which a truce could be negotiated and a peace treaty could be concluded. In this sense, the pacification carried out by the Dutch-Austronesian joint force was more a policing action than an act of warfare between two belligerents. Since one of the parties in the battle failed to make themselves a belligerent, it was impossible to properly negotiate and effectively enforce a truce. Due to these two weaknesses of the rebellious Chinese settlers, that is, a great disparity in military strength and the failure to make themselves a belligerent, the pacification inevitably became a massacre.

Diverging greatly from their usual practice of waging small-scale feudalistic campaigns against the Austronesian communes, the Dutch authorities apparently faced neither physical obstacles nor psychological difficulty in massacring the rebellious Chinese settlers. Putting aside normative judgments for the time being, the occurrence of the massacre revealed the political fragility of the Chinese settlers in Dutch Formosa, which contrasted with the relative strength of the Austronesian aborigines. As noted previously, each and every Austronesian commune, be it large or small, constituted a recognized political entity in peacetime and a ready-made belligerent in wartime, with which the Dutch could, and did, negotiate truces and conclude peace treaties. Acting in their capacity as political entities or belligerents, the allied communes were allowed to preserve their military might and join together with the Dutch overlord in offensive and defensive alliances. These facts show that each of the allied communes in Dutch

Formosa was treated as a political subject, with their political autonomy guaranteed by their military power and treaties with the Dutch.

But this was not the case for the Chinese settlers. Due to their inability or unwillingness, the Chinese settlers, although numerically much larger than any single Austronesian commune, failed to constitute one or more political entities in peacetime, much less fight in the capacity as belligerents in wartime. In other words, the Chinese settlers were not a political subject in Dutch Formosa, and therefore naturally lacked any political autonomy.

Now let us turn to the other two aspects. Unlike the allied Austronesian communes that enjoyed a feudalistic land entitlement that was recognized, respected, and reasonably protected by their Dutch overlord, the Dutch authorities applied a quasi-capitalistic land ownership according to Roman-Dutch Law to the Chinese settlers. Based on the land survey and registration carefully conducted by the Dutch authorities, Chinese settlers were issued with land ownership certificates after 1647.[24] In this way, the long-lasting Austronesian understanding of land as a sphere of influence in which commune-based collective lives were organized was replaced with a commercial-agricultural institution taking land as a tradable asset as well as a means of production. Without doubt, this specialized use of lands brought about enormous increases in agricultural productivity and, concomitantly, enhanced the taxability of the Chinese settlers.

Contrary to the exemptions from tribute and corvée cautiously granted to the Austronesian communes, the Dutch authorities imposed miscellaneous levies on the Chinese settlers without hesitation. These levies included revenues collected directly by the tax office in the *Zeelandia stad*, such as customs, fees for various licenses, the house and land transactions tax, fees for residence permits and their monthly renewal, as well as other levies collected indirectly through the tax-farming system that sold the rights to collect various levies and license fees for certain activities (e.g. slaughtering pigs) as well as the franchise for exclusively conducting trades with one of the allied communes.

[24] Heyns, Pol (2002) *荷蘭時代台灣的經濟、土地與稅務* [Economy, Land Rights and Taxation in Dutch Formosa]. Taipei: Tsao Yung-ho Foundation of Culture and Education.

In the 1650s, the taxes paid by the Chinese settlers amounted to nearly a half of the annual revenue from Dutch Formosa.[25] The Dutch authorities were apparently very satisfied with the taxability of the Chinese settlers, whom were even described as "the only bees on Formosa that give honey" by Governor Nicholas Verburg (Andrade 2008). It was noteworthy that part of the annual revenue raised by taxing the Chinese settlers was transferred to subsidize the construction of schools and chapels for the Austronesian aborigines and to pay for the expenses of hiring missionaries and teachers stationed in the allied communes. In other words, the official expenditure on the "well-being" of the Austronesian communes was mostly raised by taxing the Chinese settlers.

These two interlocking institutions, i.e., the quasi-capitalistic land ownership and the miscellaneous levies, constituted an integral economic-fiscal mechanism through which the sustainable and effective exploitation of the Chinese settlers could be assured. Considering the great deal of surpluses and revenues squeezed out of them together with their political-military vulnerability resulting from the failure to make themselves a political subject, one may reasonably conclude that the Chinese settlers as a whole served neither as a "minor ally" of the Dutch overlord in feudal sense as the allied Austronesian communes did, nor as a "minor partner" in the process of co-colonization as Tonio Andrade suggested. Instead, they can be understood figuratively as "a flock of sheep that were kept in order to be fleeced."

[25] For example, by 1653, the Dutch revenue from Taiwan was estimated at 667,701 gulden 3 stuiver and 12 penning, in which the profits made through trading amounted to 381,930 – that is, 57 percent of the total revenue. In other words, 43 percent of the total revenue was raised by imposing various levies on the Chinese settlers.

Chapter Three

The Long Eighteenth Century

3.1 The Double Duality

The Long Eighteenth Century signifies a long interval of around two centuries between the first presence and the second arrival of European civilization in Taiwan. It was in this long interval that Taiwan was turned into an island of "double duality" – that is, a civilizational duality comprising both Chinese-ness and Austronesian-ness together with a constitutional duality entailing the settler-tribal dual constitution.

From a civilizational perspective, the island of Taiwan happened to be the northern limit in Asia where the agents of the globally expanding European civilization could effectively project their military might and secure their rule in the Short Seventeenth Century. Successively withdrawing from Taiwan in the Age of Mercantilism in the mid-seventeenth century, the agents of European civilization did not come back until the heyday of imperialism in the mid-nineteenth century. Particularly, the withdrawal of the Dutch VOC from Taiwan unintendedly created a political vacuum in which this Austronesian island had been "shunted" out of the track of the globally expanding European civilization and drawn into the orbit of the regionally prevailing Chinese civilization. With the absence of European civilization, Taiwan witnessed direct confrontations and partial fusions between the newly arrived Chinese civilization and the long-standing Austronesian civilization, ending up an island of dual civilization at the end of the Long Eighteenth Century.

In this regard, Taiwan, although reputed to be the "Austronesian homeland," was unique in the sense that among its analogues in Austronesia, it became the only interface between Chinese and Austronesian civilizations. Temporally speaking, it was a process that began very late, much later than the time when Island Southeast Asia became Islamized, let alone the even earlier adoption of Hinduism and Buddhism, and a bit later than the era when the Pacific Islands were placed under the sphere of influence of European powers. A late starter as it was, Taiwan had eventually been turned into an island of Chinese-Austronesian duality by two mutually conflicting agents of Chinese civilization arising from different peripheries of the East Asian mainland – the House

of Koxinga emerging from the southeast littoral and the Qing Empire coming from the northeast Manchuria.

Ironically, it was under the rule of these two forces which emerged from the peripheries of the East Asian mainland and therefore were supposed to be less "Chinese," that Chinese civilization had taken root in this originally Austronesian island. While they took over Taiwan in their own interests, their successive periods of rule facilitated the settler expansion on the island in different ways, eventually resulting in an island-wide dual constitution consisting of a stateless Austronesian tribal society and an imperial Confucianized settler society.

Temporally and geographically, the seeds of the settler society had been sowed on the southwest plains in the second half of the seventeenth century, grown to cover all of the western littoral and plains in the eighteenth century, and eventually extended to the northeast Yilan Plain in the first half of the nineteenth century. As more and more lowlands were submerged by the settler population, the tribal society had gradually shrunk into the eastern and central mountainous areas.

Constitutionally speaking, the emergence of the island-wide settler-tribal duality involved a double yet counter-directional course: the decay of the Austronesian tribal constitution had proceeded in synchrony with the solidification of a frontier settler constitution on the lowlands of the island. In other words, the imperial Confucianized settler society had actually expanded at the expense of the shrinkage of the stateless Austronesian tribal society. Along with, and indeed due to, the consolidation of the settler society on Taiwan, the "unholy trinity" of imperial examination, Confucianism, and Han characters that culturally emblematized Chinese civilization and functionally underpinned Chinese despotism secured a cultural-political hegemony on this originally stateless and pre-literate Austronesian island. That is to say, it was as late as in the eighteenth century that Taiwan started to be drawn into the so-called "East Asian cultural sphere" or the loosely-defined "Confucian world" – a time much later than the eras when Korea, Vietnam, and Japan had to varying degrees adopted the aforementioned "unholy trinity."

In the following sections, I will first analyze the commonalities and particularities of the successive Zheng and Qing rule over Taiwan, which virtually embodied two versions of Chinese despotism, and then examine how the double yet counter-directional course, i.e., the making of a frontier settler society and the decay of the

lowland Austronesian constitution, had unfolded in the political-cultural context of Chinese despotism.

3.2 Two Versions of Chinese Despotism

Looking through a world-historical lens, Chinese despotism is an East Asian variant of what is generally called "oriental despotism,"[26] a form of government characterized by the supremacy of a despot underlain by a well-developed bureaucracy that had frequently emerged in the histories of Egypt, Persia, Byzantine Empire, Ottoman Empire, and India. Having waxed and waned on the East Asian mainland throughout one and a half millenniums after the first reification in the form of the Qin Empire (221-206 BC), Chinese despotism as a highly repressive mode of domination had been taken to the new heights of severity in the period of the Great Ming between 1368 and 1644. Besides the common defining characteristic, i.e., a bureaucratic rule headed by a paramount despot, what made this East Asian variant culturally distinguishable from its analogues in eastern Eurasia and politically unparalleled in the degree of bureaucratization was its inbuilt "unholy trinity" of imperial examination, Confucianism, and Han characters that functionally underpinned the whole system.

The "Unholy Trinity" of Chinese Despotism

As an integral set of state assemblage, the inbuilt "unholy trinity" was functionally inseparable and mutually supplementary. Chinese despotism was incomparable with its analogues in eastern Eurasia in terms of the thorough realization of a meritocratic system of selecting candidates for the state bureaucracy. Started in earnest by the noted Empress Wu Zetian during the mid-Tang period (690–705) and reaching maturity in the Song period (960–1279), the Chinese imperial examination developed further into a system characterized by its excessively meticulous exam-fraud prevention in the Ming period (1368-1644). It was arguably the earliest mature system in world history that was designed for choosing bureaucrats by merit rather than by birth and, more importantly, implemented by using written examinations as a tool of selection.

Through the imperial examination, the prospective functionaries were selected by

[26] Wittfogel, Karl August (1957) *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

a series of arduous exams that tested knowledge of the classics of Confucianism. It should be noted that the Confucian contents used in the exams, especially when it came to the later periods of Ming and Qing, greatly diverged from Confucius' personal teachings, as recorded in the Analects of Confucius (*論語*), which upheld feudal virtues and advocated restoring an idealized system of feudalism *à la* Western Zhou. Bluntly put, it was more a test of the examinees' loyalty to the empire and their familiarity with the official ideology that emphasized the supremacy of the emperorship, the subjects' submission to the emperor, and the centralization of administration than a genuine examination of Confucian learning. Politically speaking, the "Confucianism" that was adopted in the imperial examination could be properly understood as an inbuilt ideational component of the empire – or, as the noted Hong Kong sociologist Ambrose Yeo-chi King (1992; 1996) nicely characterizes it, "state Confucianism."[27]

Together with the imperial examination serving as the institutional form and Confucianism as the ideological content, Han characters completed the "unholy trinity" by serving as the writing system exclusively used in the imperial examination and the state bureaucracy. Neither a spoken language nor a local vernacular, Han characters actually functioned as an ideographic system, with which the recruited functionaries who actually spoke various different local languages could communicate with one another. In this sense, they served a somewhat similar function to Latin in the western Roman Empire or Greek in the Byzantine Empire.

The Zheng Despotism

It was not until the House of Koxinga deliberately imposed a miniature of the Ming Dynasty on Taiwan that Chinese despotism first appeared on this Austronesian island that had been stateless since time immemorial. Modelling itself on the Ming regime that marked the historical height of Chinese despotism, the House of Koxinga imposed an excessively bureaucratic political superstructure on Taiwan, far outstripping that of its Dutch predecessor in the degree of bureaucratization. At the upper part of political superstructure was a central government organized in the typical structure of "six

[27] King, Ambrose Yeo-chi (1992) 中國政治傳統與民主轉化 [Chinese Political Traditions and Democratic Transformation], in *中國社會與文化* [Chinese Society and Culture], pp. 110-127. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press; King, Ambrose Yeo-chi (1996) State Confucianism and Its Transformation: The Restructuring of the State-Society Relation in Taiwan, in Wei-ming Tu ed., *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

ministries" (*六部 liubu*) together with a variety of functional bureaus and agencies, while the local government as the lower part adopted the long-standing "system of prefectures and counties" (*郡縣制 junxianzhi*).

Along with the imposition of the overdeveloped bureaucracy emulating the Ming, the inbuilt unholy unity of Chinese despotism, i.e., imperial examination, Confucianism, and Han characters, was introduced to this Austronesian island for the first time too. Following the destruction of the schools and chapels established by the Dutch, temples for holding official ceremonies to worship Confucius as well as schools for both Chinese and Austronesian children that taught Han script and Confucianism were set up as measures to support the triennial civil service examinations, which were suspended on the East Asian mainland yet restored on this offshore island. Promising students would be sent to learn in the Imperial Academy (*國子監 Guozijian*), and were expected to take official posts after successfully passing the examinations, even though at the time the important offices were mostly staffed by Koxinga's former subordinates and the descendants of his commanders.

As two contemporaneous forces rising from the different peripheries of the East Asian mainland, both the House of Koxinga and the Qing Empire applied, by either imitation or inheritance, the mature Ming version of Chinese despotism to Taiwan. The Zheng rule over Taiwan, transient as it was, took on an even more aggressive and predatory quality than its Qing successor. Comparatively speaking, if Qing rule over Taiwan was a mirror of the overdeveloped Chinese despotism, the Zheng rule in Taiwan represented an acute version that was greatly intensified by its two inherent peculiarities.

The first was its "maritime-ness" that sprang from its pirate-merchant origin. For most of his lifetime, Koxinga acted as the head of a formidable pirate-merchant conglomerate that overran Asian waters. Following his sudden death in Taiwan, Zheng Jing, his eldest son and heir, inherited his maritime enterprises, but nonetheless transformed this massive seaborne gang into a territorial state based in the southwestern Taiwan. The founding of the Zheng state, formally known as the Kingdom of Tungning (*東寧王國 Tang-lêng Ô ng-kok*), literally embodied the transition from a "roving bandit" to a "stationary bandit," a suppositional process envisaged by American economist and political scientist Mancur Olson (2000) for the explication of the state and distinguishing between the economic effects brought about under different types of government.

Fixed to land as it was, the Zheng state as a stationary bandit still relied heavily on its old trick of conducting pirate-merchant businesses through maintaining its robust commerce-smuggling network consisting of what were known as "five wholesalers on the land" (*山五商 shanwushang*) and "five fleets on the sea" (*海五商 haiwushang*). In other words, the Zheng regime, despite its transformation into a land-based state, depended fiscally on the unimpeded operation of its inter-Asiatic trading operations between Japan, China, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia, even extending as far as to Persia. This is the reason why the Zheng regime was greatly undermined when the Qing sea ban and coastal evacuation policies first crippled the "five wholesalers on land" and, consequently, dragged the "five fleets on sea" down into an unprecedented depression.

The other peculiarity was its "émigré-ness," which was manifested in the composition of the "Zheng population," referring to those who were brought over or attracted by the House of Koxinga to Taiwan, and even more conspicuously revealed by the way the Zheng state legitimized itself. In the very short time-span during which the House of Koxinga took hold in Taiwan, more than 60,000 people flooded into this sparsely populated offshore island which had a population at the time of only around 100,000. Koxinga himself is estimated to have brought at least 25,000 troops to Taiwan, and by his heir Zheng Jing around 7,000. Not long after the founding of the Zheng state, some 30,000 refugees facing starvation as a result of the Qing coastal evacuation policy and about 1,000 former Ming government officials fleeing Qing persecution came to take shelter in Taiwan under the protection of the Zheng state.

That is to say, around half of the population of the Zheng state consisted of pirate-merchant troops, and the other half the political refugees and émigrés who arrived later. These two kinds of immigrants had a shared mentality: they came to Taiwan for temporary shelter rather than seeking to stay permanently. In other words, their migration to Taiwan was politically motivated, as a result of being either defeated or prosecuted by the Qing. In this sense, all of them could be taken as political émigrés, be they soldiers, sailors, merchants, peasants, officials, retainers, or any engaged in any other occupations.

As the Zheng regime on Taiwan was underlain by these two kinds of émigré population, it was only conceivable that the Kingdom of Tungning as a *de facto* power would seek to justify its founding and existence on this offshore island by upholding the Ming irredentism, i.e., a pledge to restore the Ming Court onto the East Asian

mainland. Viewed through a purely Machiavellian lens, if the House of Koxinga wished to whitewash its pirate-merchant origin, which was generally regarded as unlawful and degrading in the political-ideological milieu of Chinese despotism, dressing themselves up as Ming loyalists through certain highly performative ceremonies and practices, for example, nominally supporting and accommodating certain remnants of the Ming imperial clan in close proximity to the King's palace, presented a low-cost, popular, and compelling option.

The Zheng state did not abjure the irredentist claim and policies until its eventual downfall, although with hindsight contemporary scholars call into question the sincerity of and the true intention behind its upheld Ming irredentism. As long as it was underlain by the émigré populace, the Zheng state simply could not renounce the irredentist pledge without undermining its own legitimacy and stability. However, this irredentist formula for legitimization was actually a double-edged sword. In upholding the Ming irredentism, the Zheng state granted the émigré populace a feeble, if not false, hope, while, by doing so, tasking itself with a just cause that was too great to be fulfilled through its island-based military-political capacity. Obviously, it was not an ideology devised to justify the long-term peace and stability of Zheng rule in Taiwan, but an insecure promise made with a view to taking advantage of the acute nostalgia amongst the émigré populace. As time went on, and the Zheng state was tardy in carrying out the promised goal, the heated nostalgia would indeed countercharge.

The formula of legitimization became increasingly counterproductive in the long run, despite the short-term gain of whitewashing the pirate-merchant origin of the Zheng state. In the last years of the Zheng rule, an atmosphere of longing for an end to the desperate tug of war with the Qing that had consolidated its rule on the East Asian mainland prevailed among an émigré populace that was desperate to leave Taiwan, which they regarded as miserably underdeveloped and dreadfully savage, for their homelands. In hindsight, the Zheng state planted the seeds of its own downfall at the very beginning when it legitimized its establishment and existence by upholding Ming irredentism, as its eventual breakdown and forced relocation from Taiwan can be explained – at least, partially – by the collapsed morale of the émigré populace underlying the Zheng regime.

With the above two characteristics, i.e., "maritime-ness" and "émigré-ness," combined, the Zheng despotism, as a sea-oriented military-bureaucratic conglomerate

exiled on a relatively small offshore island, was structurally necessitated and militarily enabled to conduct much more intensive extraction in a much harsher and more ruthless way than its Qing successor, a continental empire based far away in Beijing.

To begin with, the Zheng state's reliance on the profitability of maritime trade would naturally weaken its willingness to engage in sustainable development on land. The land-based cultivation and production were considered by the Zheng state as, at best, supplementary source of revenue. For example, with a view to reducing military expenses while maintaining a large standing army at the disposal of the Zheng state, pirate-soldiers were ordered to claim farmlands for their own subsistence. As the pirate-soldiers generally lacked experience, skills, and even the desire to take up farming, the policy of opening up military colonies ended up with a failure in terms of agrarian production while stirring up a strong antipathy among the pirate-soldiers towards the unattractive prospect of performing agricultural drudgery in Taiwan.

Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the émigré populace underlying the Zheng regime, be they troops, the former Ming officials, the functionaries of the Zheng state, the remnants of Ming imperial clan, or the retainers serving the privileged elites mentioned above, were nonproductive in nature. Since these numerous nonproductive émigrés could only depend on the Zheng state for their subsistence, the thirst for various resources and the resulting tensions caused by the massive influx of immigration would be only aggravated. As it was underlain by the émigré populace, the Zheng state was more than happy to satisfy the needs of the dependent population at the expense of the interests, or even lives, of the original inhabitants.

Even worse, with 30,000 strong troops at its disposal, the Zheng state had an overwhelming military advantage over both the earlier arriving Chinese settlers and the reachable lowland Austronesian communes. That is to say, its vast army served as a ready-made instrument for realizing the super exploitation over the original inhabitants in Taiwan, and it did not balk at carrying out indiscriminate slaughter as shown in the following sections. This sort of short-term gain by draining the pond to fish could be justified, or even reinforced, by the irredentist formula of legitimization, pointing to the inherent quality of the Zheng state as a "stationed bandit."

The Qing Despotism

Differing completely from the Zheng regime confined in Taiwan, the extensive

Qing Empire, as the New Qing History scholars remind us, was a binary world empire consisting of two broadly-defined political systems of drastically different natures, i.e., the Inner Asian feudalism and the East Asian despotism, upon both of which the Qing emperorship was installed as the common peak. That is to say, using my own terminology, the Qing in itself was an empire of "dual constitutions."

The Inner Asian feudalism comprised a variety of feudal relationships, such as military alliances, religious patronage, intermarriage, protectorate, and trade partnerships between the Qing emperor and his relatives, allies, vassals, protégés, dependencies, or partners who were widely distributed over the extensive Inner Asian regions of the Qing realm, including Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet. The Lifan Yuan (*理藩院* in Chinese or *Tulergi golo be dasara jurgan* in Manchu) was set up as the competent agency in charge of overseeing the proper maintenance of these variegated, reciprocal yet unequal feudal relationships.

On the contrary, the East Asian despotism was a highly bureaucratic regime inherited directly from the Great Ming, as a result that the Qing replaced the latter, reluctantly or willingly, as the ruler of the "Eighteen Provinces" that constituted what was commonly known as "China proper." Much simpler and more hierarchical than its Inner Asian counterpart, the East Asian despotism can be politically understood as a pyramid constituted by, from the top down, the Qing emperorship, the Manchu-Mongol aristocracy, the officialdom, and the gentry. Administratively, the Qing's East Asian despotism was put into action through a four-level, highly bureaucratized political superstructure composed of, from the top down, provinces (*省 shěng*), circuits (*道 dào*), prefectures (*府 fǔ*), and counties (*縣 xiàn*), which as a whole was laid over China proper.

Despite their separate operations, there was a symbiosis between these two political systems: Qing emperors, as the commonly acknowledged leaders among his Inner Asian feudal allies, served as the provider and keeper of the basic order within the imperial realm, while the East Asian subjects had to pay for the maintenance of this basic order on which their physical existence was premised.

Laying offshore near the southeast littoral of the imperial realm, Taiwan was administratively established as a prefecture under Fujian Province because of their geographical proximity. It was as late as in the very last decade (1885–1895) of the Qing rule over the island that Taiwan was administratively promoted to be a province

as a countermeasure taken with a view to dispelling the rumored foreign attempts to take over this offshore island on which the scope of the Qing's effective jurisdiction was called into question. However, only a few years after being established as a province, the Qing ceded Taiwan to Japan as a war reparation without the least hesitation. This overall storyline of the Qing rule over Taiwan suggests that from the very beginning of its rule the Qing court expected nothing much of this underdeveloped frontier island, and that in such an extensive binary empire, Taiwan had been of trifling importance in both fiscal and political senses throughout the Qing period. I believe this is the reason behind the discrepancy that, despite the common policy of applying the overdeveloped Chinese despotism to Taiwan, the Qing rule over Taiwan tended to be slacker and more absorptive than its Zheng predecessor: in contrast to the rule of Zheng, Qing rule was neither structurally necessitated nor militarily enabled to carry out a constant and heavy exploitation on this frontier island that was geographically remote from the center of a pre-modern world empire.

The discrepancy in intensity between the Zheng and Qing versions of Chinese despotism then had a further implication: the successive Zheng and Qing rule, which together constitute what I term the "Long Eighteenth Century" of Taiwan history, were both conducive to the making of an imperial Confucianized settler society on this originally Austronesian island, though in different ways.

Figuratively speaking, the Zheng despotism had an effect upon Taiwan no different from an "acute herbicide" to be sprayed over the wilds with thick and variegated Austronesian vegetation, for it was under the very short yet highly repressive Zheng rule that a "de-Austronesianized zone" was created in the southwest plains of Taiwan, laying down a small but solid foundation favorable for the genesis of a frontier settler society on the island under the Qing rule. With a similar intent yet at a lower intensity, the Qing despotism functioned like a "mowing machine" with very low cutting heights, as it showed no tolerance to the potential political autonomy of its subjects and therefore deployed a Qing contingent consisting of soldiers and bureaucrats, with more military reinforcements sent from China proper when needed, to regularly "prune" the "plants" on the island, be they the preexisting Austronesian communes or the expanding settler groups, so as to prevent them from growing into actors that were politically autonomous from the imperial center.

3.3 The Creation of a De-Austronesianized Zone

Prior to the House of Koxinga taking over Taiwan, the constitution of Dutch Formosa, as elaborated in the former chapter, took shape in a form that could be termed "one (proto-)state, two systems" – that is, the Dutch VOC served as a proto-state, under which two distinct modes of governance, i.e., "feudalistic incorporation" and "semi-absolutist rule," were applied to the long-standing lowland Austronesian communes and the earlier arriving Chinese settlers respectively. This Dutch regime, in which the Austronesian aborigines and the Chinese settlers had actually attained different political statues and received varied treatments, actually embodied a constitutional principle that can be called the "Dutch feudalistic particularism." Before elaborating the constitutional consequences brought about by the Zheng rule, it is helpful to briefly recall how this Dutch feudalistic particularism worked.

Under the governing mode of "feudalistic incorporation," the allied Austronesian communes assumed the roles as minor allies of the VOC and their respective appointed representatives served as vassals of the Governor of Formosa. As *de facto* self-governing entities prior to the European presence, the allied communes were legally recognized by the VOC as political subjects in peacetime and ready-made belligerents in wartime, with which the Dutch authorities could, and did, negotiate truces and conclude peace treaties. Their political autonomy was both guaranteed by their own military might as well as treaties with the Dutch and also upgraded to a higher, trans-communal level as a result of their incorporation into a European-style feudalistic political superstructure constituted by the Austronesian vassalage and the Dutch lordship. Furthermore, their commune-based form of social autonomy was largely maintained while its concrete contents, i.e., the communal customary laws defining all aspects of the Austronesian way of life, underwent a process of reconstruction, voluntarily or reluctantly, in the image of their European counterparts. In short, the political autonomy of the allied Austronesian communes was recognized, guaranteed, and even upgraded to a higher level, while their commune-based social autonomy was largely maintained in form while being reconstructed in substance.

Under the municipal governance of *Zeelandia stad* where the medieval free-city tradition inherent in European feudalism slipped into "semi-absolutist rule" in this faraway, overseas colony, the earlier arriving Chinese settlers as a whole served

figuratively as “a flock of sheep kept in order to be fleeced” in Dutch Formosa. This characterization of the Chinese settlers is founded on three of their political-social characteristics. First, they did not constitute a political subject in Dutch Formosa, and therefore naturally lacked any political autonomy. Second, they did enjoy a limited degree of social autonomy: the Chinese settlers were granted a restricted scope of judicial self-rule that was institutionally reified through meetings of the *Cabessas* in which disputes were settled according to their own customary laws, while this judicial autonomy was surmounted by the decrees issued by the Formosan Council. Third, lacking political autonomy and having only limited social autonomy, the Chinese settlers in Dutch Formosa were readily and regularly “fleeced” by the Dutch authorities through miscellaneous levies.

Notwithstanding miscellaneous levies imposed on the Chinese settlers, two subtleties concerning the taxation should be pointed out. First, the miscellaneous levies as a whole were part of a law-based system operating in accordance to the decrees and resolutions made by the Formosan Council, rather than the arbitrary decisions of officials. Second, for the sake of ensuring a sustainable source of tax revenues, the Chinese settlers as “a flock of sheep” were not left to fend for themselves but rather “carefully reared in pens.” For example, the Chinese settlers were granted land and property certificates that were based on the land survey and registration meticulously conducted by the Dutch authorities, through which they enjoyed the legal protection inherent in the quasi-capitalistic land ownership that was guaranteed in accordance to Roman-Dutch Law. In a word, despite lacking political autonomy, the Chinese settlers under the Dutch’s semi-absolutist rule had limited social autonomy and enjoyed quasi-capitalistic legal protection of their land and property.

The livestock-like status, i.e., a flock of sheep kept in order to be fleeced, as well as their specific treatment, i.e., law-based taxation and quasi-capitalistic legal protection on lands and properties in accordance to Roman-Dutch Law, seemingly could not satisfy the Chinese settlers. This dissatisfaction culminated in their conspiracy to coax Koxinga to “liberate” them from the yoke of the Dutch VOC by force in the belief that life would be easier under the rule of Koxinga. This anticipation, however, proved to wishful thinking, and their imprudent plot against the Dutch rule revealed their ignorance of what would happen to them under Zheng rule.

The replacement of the Dutch regime with Zheng rule signified a constitutional

revolution on Taiwan. When imposing an epitome of Chinese despotism on Taiwan, the Zheng state was actually replacing the Dutch binary mode of governance with a unitary rule framed in the concentric core-periphery structure. At the very core of the unitary rule was "the capital and its environs" (*京畿 jingji*), referring to the area surrounding the King's palaces, where a prefecture (*承天府 Chengtianfu*) was set up and administratively subdivided into four urban wards (*坊 fang*). Surrounding this core area were two sub-prefectures (*天興州 Tianxingzhou* and *萬年州 Wannianzhou*) in the northern and southern plains respectively, under which twenty-four rural districts (*里 li*) were subsumed. Beyond the core area and its environs which was densely populated by the most privileged, the remoter peripheries were put under the authority of three bureaus of pacification (*安撫司 anfushi*), two of which functioned as garrisons to oversee, and to suppress when needed, the lowland Austronesian communes at the northern and southern frontiers, while the third one was set up on the Pescadores as the outpost against the Qing. Geographically limited yet structurally complete, this unitary rule organized in a concentric core-periphery structure was undoubtedly an embodiment, or a scaled-down replica, of the conception of "Tianxia order" (*天下秩序*, literally, the "order under heaven"), a Sinocentric worldview that highlighted the "distinction between Hua and Yi" (*華夷之辨 huayizhibian*), or put another way, the Sino-barbarian dichotomy.

Unlike Dutch feudalistic particularism which implied treating different groups differently, the Zheng unitary rule was carried out in conformity with a constitutional principle that can be termed "Zheng despotic equalitarianism," as both the long-standing lowland Austronesian communes and the earlier arriving Chinese settlers were politically levelled down to be equivalents of the docile peasantry on the East Asian mainland that constituted the social fabric of Chinese despotism. While it targeted both the Austronesian aborigines and the Chinese settlers without discriminating between them, this forceful enforcement of "downward equalization" actually impacted these two human groups differently. Simply put, compared to the earlier arriving Chinese settlers, the long-standing lowland Austronesian communes had been forced into a corner that was much more unfavorable or even devastating, as the latter had far more vested interests and inherent privileges to lose. In the following paragraphs, I will elaborate on the respective consequences brought about by the "Zheng despotic equalitarianism" to both of them.

Immediately after taking hold in Taiwan, the Zheng state overturned the Dutch quasi-capitalistic land ownership and established a tripartite pattern of land tenure consisting of official fields, private fields, and military camps' fields. Official fields, also known as the "king's fields," referred to the most productive farmlands, including the sugar plantations, that were developed from Dutch times and protected by the VOC and subsequently confiscated and distributed amongst the House of Koxinga and their clansmen. Private fields, also called "civil and military officials' fields," referring to certain developed or underdeveloped farmlands together with extensive undeveloped meadows in the core region of the former Dutch rule, were allotted to the other minor Zheng clans, high-ranked civil and military officials, and some previous Ming officials or gentries fleeing Qing persecution, whom were encouraged to occupy the lands as widely as they could. Military camps' fields referred to the military colonies spreading away from the core region as far as central Taiwan, in which the commanders and their rank and file soldiers were ordered to claim farmlands from uncultivated meadows and wastelands for their own subsistence. It should be noted that, even though the Zheng troops as a whole greatly outnumbered any single Austronesian commune, they were not sufficient in number to make up a continuous military-agricultural zone in the western plains, but were rather scattered as several dozens of islets surrounded by an ocean of lowland Austronesian communes.

The establishment of the tripartite pattern of land tenure pointed to the nature of the Zheng state as a stationed bandit. When it comes to the ways the lands were acquired and distributed, one may have difficulty in distinguishing the tripartite pattern of land tenure from an armed robbery followed by dividing up the booty on the spot. As noted above, the lands were acquired through either a militarily-backed confiscation (in the case of official fields) or a large-scale "enclosure movement" by force (in the cases of private fields and military camps' fields), while all the three types of fields were designated for either royal/official provisions or military supplies – that is to say, to satisfy the needs of the constitutive groups of the Zheng regime and, consequently, sustain the apparatuses of the Zheng state. Functionally speaking, the founding of the tripartite pattern of land tenure represented the institutionalization of spoils system, with which the roving pirate-merchant conglomerate and the émigré population were institutionally incentivized to settle down in Taiwan.

This institutionalized spoils system established amongst the newly coming armed

groups unavoidably operated at the expense of the interests, or even the lives, of the original inhabitants. For example, the category of official fields was created through the confiscation of the well-developed farmlands and plantations owned by either the Dutch VOC or the earlier arriving Chinese merchants/contractors or neighboring Austronesian communes. Putting aside the Dutch VOC which had already withdrawn from Taiwan, the Zheng state showed its impartiality in unscrupulously trampling on the land entitlements of the Austronesian communes that had been previously recognized and reasonably protected by their Dutch overlords as well as the land ownership of the earlier arriving Chinese settlers that had been carefully registered and guaranteed by the VOC.

As a matter of fact, Chinese despotism, be it the archetype that emerged on the East Asian mainland or the more aggressive Zheng version imposed on Taiwan, naturally showed no respect to the feudalistic or Austronesian mode of land tenure or the quasi-capitalistic property rights defined in Roman-Dutch Law. The earlier arriving Chinese settlers who coxed Koxinga to replace the Dutch VOC as their ruler simply lacked the foreknowledge of what the Zheng rule meant to them: even the livestock-like status as a flock of sheep and the accompanying quasi-capitalistic legal protection of their land and property under the Dutch rule were to be deprived without the least hesitation once the House of Koxinga took hold in Taiwan.

However, the sufferings and loses of the earlier arriving Chinese settlers needed not to be overstated. It is fair to say that they were restored to the previous state that they were quite used to: the Zheng state deprived them of privileges they only enjoyed during the rule of the VOC in Dutch Formosa that had lasted no longer than fifteen years. For those a handful of wealthy merchants owning lands and properties in the former Dutch Formosa, the Zheng's violation – or, more precisely, thorough disregard – of their ownership guaranteed in accordance to Roman-Dutch Law indeed caused a loss of wealth, but it was still a comfort for them that an amount of pecuniary loss could prevent them from perishing under the iron hoof of the vast army of the Zheng state. As for those numerous leaseholders and peasants who constituted the absolute majority of the settler population, it seemed to be no different for them to pay rents to or to work for either the House of Koxinga or the Dutch VOC or the land-lending Austronesian communes. Presumably, the earlier arriving Chinese settlers were largely content with this situation, as no resistance against the abolition of the Dutch quasi-capitalistic land

tenure was recorded.

But the same was not the case for the lowland Austronesian communes. If the deprivation from which the earlier arriving Chinese settlers suffered simply restored them to their original state, what the lowland Austronesian communes were deprived of was something they had long held, that is, their existence as self-governing political subjects. While the lowland Austronesian communes could be coopted into the Netherlands-centered European feudalism without the least difficulty, their long-standing political autonomy would not be tolerated in the Zheng despotism. The Zheng despotism as an overseas variation more repressive than its mainland archetype simply could not put up with the existence of any self-governing political subject under its rulership.

From the very beginning of their encounter, the Austronesian communes were subject to the arbitrariness of the Zheng despotism. As his siege to Zeelandia Fort was prolonged into an eight-month stalemate leading to starvation amongst his desperate 25,000 troops, Koxinga turned to forcefully extort food provisions from the neighboring Austronesian communes in the core region of the Dutch rule to feed his vast army, regardless of the promises he had previously made in order to win them over to his side against their Dutch overlord. If military expediency could readily override previous commitments even when the Zheng troops had not yet established themselves in Taiwan, this arbitrary extortion actually foreshadowed the denial of the Austronesian existence as self-governing political subjects by the Zheng state after it had stabilized its rule.

Under the unitary rule of the Zheng state framed in the concentric core-periphery structure that embodied a Sinocentric worldview highlighting the Sino-barbarian dichotomy, the Austronesian communes were put under, as noted previously, the authority of two garrisons called “northward and southward bureaus of pacification,” which functioned, as implied in the names, to oversee the remoter communes out of the core region in ordinary times and to suppress them if necessary. This military-administrative arrangement suggested that the Austronesian communes were now considered as latent rebels who should be kept under surveillance and crushed when suspected of being rebellious, rather than be taken as minor allies bound into offensive and defensive alliances as they were under the Dutch regime. Nor would the Austronesian elders be appointed as vassals under the Zheng rulership, but were rather

belittled as mere headmen among the savages to be pacified by bribery if possible, or by force if necessary. In other words, in the political superstructure of Zheng despotism, no place was reserved for the Austronesian communes, nor was there any channel to coopt the individual Austronesians into the Zheng regime.

The complete denial of the Austronesian existence as self-governing political subjects was made possible by the great disparity in military strength between the Austronesian communes and the Zheng troops. Unlike the small group of European mercenaries who intimidated the Austronesian communes mainly through the power of firearms (e.g., musketry and artillery), the Zheng terrorized the Austronesians with its massive number of soldiers – in particular, it appeared to be willing to suffer heavy casualties for advancing its causes. In 1670, Liu Guo-xuan, a general under the command of Zheng Jing, was ordered to open up military colonies in central Taiwan, triggering armed resistance from the communal alliance known as "Kingdom of Middag" that had formed prior to the Dutch presence in the central western plains. With reinforcements from Zheng Jing, Liu overwhelmed the communal alliance through superior numbers, drove some communes to the foothills, and even carried out a genocide-like indiscriminate slaughter on one of the resisting communes with only six making a narrow escape.

This military operation with a view to emptying out spaces for establishing agrarian settlements actually reflected an irreconcilable conflict of interest between the Zheng regime and the Austronesian communes. While the vast army necessitated an increase of agricultural production, it also enabled the Zheng state to sweep away the Austronesian communes and take control of their lands in cruel and brutal ways. The Dutch approach of taking out a lease on the lands claimed by the Austronesian communes seemed to have never occurred to the Zheng state. The feudalistic warfare between the Dutch troops and the Austronesian communes with only light casualties came to an end under the Zheng rule. Now, the Austronesian communes that could be reached by the force of the Zheng state faced a dilemma – either to surrender without a fight or to fight to the last man.

The communes that surrendered were tormented by the Zheng state. The "good old times" enjoyed as allied Austronesian communes to the Dutch, paying nearly no tribute to and performing no corvée for the Dutch overlord, were gone. The Austronesian communes that submitted themselves to the Zheng state in fear of the

deadly threat posed by the Zheng troops that greatly outnumbered the warriors available to each commune, had to pay an annual tribute and perform sundry corvée.

The annual tribute was extracted indirectly by continuing the Dutch institution called "*t' Verpachten van Dorpen"* (*賸社*), a system of auctioning franchises for exclusively trading with one of the allied communes to the Chinese merchants and tradesmen. Although the Dutch intent was to regulate and tax the Chinese merchants and tradesmen who were trading in deer products with the communes, the Chinese franchisees would constantly shift the costs of buying the franchise onto the communes with which they traded. When the costs were shifted, this income earned by auctioning the "communal franchise" to the Chinese merchants and tradesmen was actually turned into a sort of "indirect tax" imposed on the allied communes, even though this was not the original intention of the Dutch authorities. This even brought about an unsettled dispute between the Formosan Council and the High Government in Batavia about whether it was constitutional, according to the principles of European feudalism, that the Dutch overlord imposed an indirect tax on his Austronesian vassals.

However, the resulting income earned by auctioning the "communal franchise" apparently raised no concerns about constitutionality under the rule of the Zheng despotism. The Zheng state simply continued the Dutch institution while understanding this source of income in a way consistent with the conventional worldview of Chinese despotism as a tribute paid by the "uncivilized savages" who submitted willingly to the ruler at the center of the civilized world. That is to say, even though the Dutch institution was largely inherited by the Zheng, the nature of the resulting income was understood differently: in the Dutch feudalistic regime, it was originally a regulation as well as a levy imposed on the Chinese franchisees, though it was in effect turned into a constitutionally disputed indirect tax on the allied Austronesian communes. Under the Zheng despotic regime, the same institution and the resulting income were taken as the mechanism through which the neighboring lowland Austronesian communes annually paid homage, as a token of submission, to the despots.

Compared to the burden resulting from the "communal franchise," the unpaid forced labor was an even heavier yoke placed on the necks of these born-free Austronesians. Corvée was required by the Zheng regardless of gender. Men were required to serve as carriers of official palanquins or to convey goods and messages, while women were burdened with bamboo logging and wood chopping. Most

communes were on the verge of uprising, and some members or clans sought to shirk the corvée by leaving their communes of origin and moving to the foothills. The depopulation of communes, by death or escape, took place on a very large scale. The "Sinkan Six Communes,"[28] located right in the core region of the Dutch and Zheng rule and collectively amounting to 5,777 people in the late Dutch period (1655), lost between 58 and 85 percent its total population during the two decades of the Zheng rule; the "Fengshan Eight Communes,"[29] located to the south with a population of 9,065, lost between a quarter and 60 percent; the "Zhuluo Twenty Communes," located to the north with a population of 7,737, lost between 28% to 63% (Wu 2009: 23).[30]

In early Qing Taiwan, the core region of the previous Zheng rule was administratively subsumed under Taiwan County, the core unit within the earliest three-counties-under-one-prefecture (*一府三縣*) local administration under Fujian Province. In terms of administrative structure, it was officially recorded and claimed that there were no Austronesian commune under the jurisdiction of Taiwan County.[31] That is to say, following the two-decades subjugation, deprivation, population outflow, and even reluctant relocation of lowland Austronesian communes under the Zheng rule, a "de-Austronesianized zone" was already created in the southwest plains of Taiwan, laying down a small but solid foundation favorable for the coming genesis of a frontier settler society on the island under the Qing rule.

3.4 The Making of an Imperial Confucianized Settler Society

Compared to the Zheng rule that was confined in Taiwan, the Qing rule that "extended" to this offshore frontier, although also within the political-cultural framework of Chinese despotism, was much weaker in intensity, passive in nature, and of a higher absorptive capacity. With these qualities, this less intense Qing rule had a Janus-faced effect on the genesis of the settler society on Taiwan. On the one hand, it

[28] The six communes: 新港、蕭壠、麻豆、目加溜灣、大武壠、哆囉國

[29] The eight communes: 放索社（Pangsoya）、茄藤社（Saryen）、力力社（RiRi）、下淡水社（Marun）、上淡水社（Tapoyan）、阿猴社（Akauw）、塔樓社（Tarau）、武洛社（Vurak）。Today, these eight communes are academically subsumed by scholars under the category of Makatao (馬卡道族) in terms of the classification of the lowland aborigines.

[30] Wu, Tsong-min (2009) 賸社制度之演變及其影響 1644-1737 [The Evolution of the Village Franchise System in Taiwan, 1644-1737]. *Taiwan Historical Research*, 16(3): 1-38.

[31] It was officially recorded were 12 Austronesian communes under the jurisdiction of Fengshan County and 34 under that of Zhuluo County.

served as a better incubator – when compared with its Zheng predecessor – for a settler society to be brought into being on this offshore Austronesian island, while on the other hand, it established the limits under which the newborn settler society would be contained. That is to say, as a comparatively relaxed version of Chinse despotism, the Qing rule indeed granted the variegated basic communities in the imperial realm – in the case of Taiwan, referring to the locally formed settler clans and the preexisting lowland Austronesian communes – some room to develop or maintain certain degrees of social autonomy. Yet, at the same time, it showed no tolerance towards their potential political autonomy from the imperial rule.

In this sense, the Qing rule was no doubt a double-edged sword to both of the two main kinds of basic community in the emerging settler society on Taiwan. For the locally formed settler clans that had incrementally developed a degree of social autonomy from the bureaucratic rule of the empire, this meant a constant threat of an eventual purge carried out by the imperial authorities should they be considered, in the eyes of the local officials, as showing signs of behaving like a political subject with a certain degree of political autonomy. The preexisting lowland Austronesian communes that had gradually degraded into smaller fragments under the Qing rule could nevertheless carve out a niche for themselves in the political-cultural framework of the Qing despotism as long as they allowed their commune-based military might to be appropriated for official use and voluntarily reformatted their communes organizationally and culturally *à la* the neighboring settler clans, despite the official zero-tolerance policy toward their commune-based political autonomy. In a word, the Qing rule both facilitated and suppressed the locally formed settler clans, and deconstructed and absorbed the preexisting lowland Austronesian communes.

It was this Janus-faced nature of Qing rule that necessitated the regular suppression and pacification on the settler society in the making on this offshore frontier island. However, the Qing official historical records, as well as the contemporary public discourses uncritically accepting the official view, have tended to impute the frequent uprisings on the island to the incorrigible recalcitrance of the emerging settler society, as implied in the widely-known portrait of Qing Taiwan that mirrors the pejorative official account, saying “one riot every three years, one rebellion every five years” (*三年一小反 五年一大亂*).

A Tripartite Game

Driven by its peculiar formula of legitimization and the imperative for stabilizing its rule, the Taiwan-confined Zheng state took a series of proactive and forceful measures on this largely Austronesian island, e.g., establishing a highly bureaucratic political superstructure patterned on the Ming and dispatching its massive troops to open up new farmlands. In contrast to its Zheng predecessor, the Beijing-based Qing court took a much more passive approach to its rule over Taiwan.

From the very beginning, the Qing brought Taiwan into its imperial realm only as a precautionary measure to prevent the island from falling again in the hands of maritime powers such as the Dutch VOC or the House of Koxinga, both of which were viewed as a latent threat to the security of the continent-based empire. Unlike the creation of a de-Austronesianized zone that could be fairly imputed to the top-down policy imposed by the Zheng state, the making of an imperial Confucianized settler society on Taiwan was, relatively speaking, a bottom-up process, which can be figuratively understood as a tripartite game framed within the political-cultural framework of Chinese despotism, in which three major players, i.e., the Austronesian communes, the settler population, and the Qing contingent, were involved either voluntarily or reluctantly.[32]

The Qing court in general held a negative view of immigration from China proper into Taiwan for two reasons. First, it was concerned that the stability of the southeast littoral of China proper would be threatened as many outlaws considered Taiwan as a safe hideout to carry out criminal activities. Second, it worried that even the legitimate agricultural development conducted by the law-abiding migrants coming from China proper would unavoidably trigger widespread dissatisfaction among the existing Austronesian communes, inevitably burdening the empire with heavier costs of governance.

Although Taiwan appeared to be both a security concern and a fiscal encumbrance from the imperial perspective, it was a frontier island abundant in fertile, undeveloped land in the eyes of the settlers. Following the sharp drop of population in China proper

[32] In the linguistic context of Chinese despotism, these players were called "savages" (*番*), "subjects" (*民*), and "officials" (*官*) respectively. The three major players should be viewed as convenient analytical categories rather than unified actors. The three categories are justified by their objective socio-political positions in the political-cultural framework of Chinese despotism rather than by any implication that these three kinds of human groups had any distinctive common identity.

in the turmoil of the Ming–Qing transition, the political stability of the "High Qing" era enabled the population to double in the eighteenth century. The pressure of overpopulation in the southeast provinces sparked successive waves of immigration of Hoklo- and Hakka-speaking settlers, mainly from southern Fujian and, to a lesser extent, northeastern Guangdong, into Taiwan (Hsu 2008: 28). Even though the strict regulations on immigration into Taiwan were announced and reaffirmed several times by the Qing court, the enforcement was mostly ineffective due to its highly limited capacity of border control.

During the Zheng–Qing transition, Taiwan witnessed a great reduction of the settler population, as the House of Koxinga and most of their retainers, troops, and émigrés were forcefully relocated by the Qing back to the mainland. At the beginning of the Qing rule, the settler population on Taiwan reputedly reduced by half, with those remaining estimated at some 50,000–70,000 people (Hsu 2008: 13-14). However, intensive farming created the conditions for swift demographic growth, and the settler society underwent a population explosion through both immigration and reproduction over the following one and half centuries – the population increased to 440,000 in 1735, 660,000 in 1765, more than one million in 1794, and more than 2.5 million in 1838 (Hsu 2008: 27, 43, 59-60). Over the eighteenth century, the tremendous growth of the settler population through both immigration and reproduction eventually turned Western Taiwan into a terrain of intensive farming.

With a view to reducing the military and bureaucratic costs of governing Taiwan, the Qing court had, for most of its rule, responded to these developments with a "quarantine policy," deliberately setting the expanding and governable settler society apart from the shirking yet unknown tribal society by demarcating artificial borderlines that were marked by digging trenches, building mounds, erecting steles, or even deploying nearly one hundred of the lowland Austronesian communes as garrisons stationed between the mountainous hinterland and the western plains. The continuation of this ineffective policy can be largely explained by the limited amount of manpower and revenue that the Qing as a pre-modern agrarian empire was able to mobilize and raise. It is fair to say that the Qing contingent sent to Taiwan, compared to the extremely high ratio of the Zheng's émigré populace to the settler and aboriginal populations combined, was a sharp contrast in both the sheer size and its military capacity.

The Qing contingent was composed mainly of soldiers and bureaucrats, both of whom were to be stationed in Taiwan for only a short span of at most a few years. The soldiers consisted of a branch of the "Green Standard Army" (*綠營*), whose number had amounted to around 10,000 between the early eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries while from then on had gradually decreased to 2,000 in the late nineteenth century (Hsu 2005: 59-60). As a secondary policing force that was mostly made up of former Ming soldiers who had defected, this stationed force was intended primarily to protect government agencies and quell small-scale disturbances in Taiwan. It should be noted that the elite forces of the Qing military, i.e., the Manchu-Mongol Eight Banners, had never been deployed in Taiwan throughout the period of Qing rule over the island.

The bureaucrats belonged to the so-called "circulating officials" (*流官*), referring to bureaucrats sent directly by the Beijing-based imperial court to staff official agencies at the four levels of local government, from provinces down to circuits, prefectures, and counties. Two rules were strictly observed in the officialdom of Chinese despotism: one was "local avoidance" (*迴避本籍*), referring to the ban on officials from taking office in the province of their own origin. The other was "constant rotation" (*定期輪調*), ensuring that appointed officials were frequently redeployed in different posts. As they were prevented from serving in their places of origin and regularly transferred to different posts, these "circulating officials" were naturally neither motivated nor enabled to penetrate or protect the localities to which they were sent. In a sense, these two rules had the combined effect of institutionally incentivizing bureaucrats to become predators by maximizing the short-term, and usually illegal, gains levied from those under their rule during their very short tenures prior to being transferred to different post.

Due to its passive implementation and highly constrained capacity, the Qing's quarantine policy never functioned as intended to hold back the settler expansion. Instead the imperial authorities were forced to recognize the surreptitiously accomplished farmlands and the accompanying agrarian settlements as a *fait accompli*, thereby setting up administration and imposing taxation upon them. The net effect was a pattern whereby the Qing's state institutions were established on the island invariably one step behind the mostly illicit settler expansion. At the end of the Long Eighteenth Century – that is, as late as around the mid-nineteenth century, the settler society had already expanded geographically to cover almost all of the lowlands of Taiwan while

demographically outnumbering the tribal society by a large margin.[33] This drastic demographic change was accompanied with a constitutional transformation on the lowlands of Taiwan during the Long Eighteenth Century, which will be addressed in the following paragraphs.

The Three-Layered Land Tenure

The colonization of Taiwan, from its very beginning, was a highly commerce-oriented enterprise in terms of both production and consumption, which was characterized by Huang Fu-san (2012), a distinguished Taiwanese historian, as an "agro-commercial economy" (*農商連體經濟*).

In terms of production, the agricultural development in the early Long Eighteenth Century was carried out by "reclamation organizations" (*墾號*), which were mostly organized, in the form of either sole proprietorship or joint venture, by profit-seeking landlords and merchants, of whom many were absentee from the areas of reclamation, or even without dwelling in Taiwan. That is to say, the early reclamation in the Long Eighteenth Century was no different from the earliest intensive farming in the former Short Seventeenth Century, in the sense that both of them were driven mainly by profit rather than by subsistence.

In terms of consumption, with a view to profiting from alleviating the pressure of food shortages caused by the overpopulation of China proper, the agricultural output in Taiwan was mostly exported to the southeast littoral of the East Asian mainland in exchange for everyday items and handicrafts for use within Taiwan. Trade-oriented agricultural production had two consequences for this offshore island, in particular for the emerging settler society. First, rice overtook sugar as the primary agricultural commodity for export for the first time since the sugar plantations were established under the Dutch rule in the Short Seventeenth Century (Huang 2012: 12-17). Second, the inter-Asiatic multilateral trade that had once prevailed under the Dutch and Zheng rule was reoriented to the bilateral trade across Taiwan Strait from then on (Lin 2010; 2012).

[33] According to Chen (1979), the settler population constituted ninety-six percent of the total population in Taiwan in 1900, while the aboriginal population accounted for only four percent. See: Chen, Shao-hsing (1979) *台灣的人口變遷與社會變化* [The Demographic and Social Changes in Taiwan]. Taipei: Linking Publishing.

This agro-commercial economy was based on the expansion of paddy fields over the relatively underdeveloped central and north plains of Western Taiwan. Following the establishment of a multitudinous array of irrigation systems, Taiwan witnessed a landscape change whereby uncultivated meadows or dry farmlands were turned into paddy fields on a large scale, rendering the eighteenth century an appellation "the age of paddy field" in Taiwan history. Along with the expansion of paddy fields over the lowlands of Western Taiwan, a three-layered land tenure, commonly understood as "one field with two owners" (*一田二主*), correspondingly took shape.

This three-layered land tenure was formed through a course of "double farming out," which is outlined as follows. Before embarking on agricultural development, the reclamation organizations needed to apply for a "reclamation permit" (*墾照*) from local officials that dictated the place, the geographical scope, and the date for the completion of the reclamation. Those who were issued with the reclamation permits were called "proprietors" *(業戶*). The proprietors played two important roles in the process of reclamation. First, they were taxpayers from whom the local officials levied taxes directly. Second, with a view to increasing agricultural productivity, they usually served as the main sponsor and overseer of the hydraulic engineering of building canals and irrigation ditches.

In most cases, the proprietors did not till the lands themselves, but instead farm out their registered lands to "leaseholders" (*佃戶*), who were entitled to, as is customary, a permanent tenancy in virtue of their contributions of labor, farming techniques, and a small amount of money towards the reclamation. Inasmuch as paddy fields required greater labor input, more often than not the leaseholders would also farm out some or most of the leased lands to "peasants" (*現耕佃人*).

Two characteristics of this three-layered land tenure were particularly noteworthy. First, it was a "contract-based" system of land ownership and utilization. That is to say, both the proprietor-leaseholder and leaseholder-peasant relationships were founded on and specified in agreements between them. Generally speaking, the annual payment by the peasants to their leaseholders, called "small rent" (*小租*), as well as the yearly payment by the leaseholders to the land-lending proprietors, termed "large rent" (*大租*), were to be clearly stipulated in their respective contracts.[34] Second, it was a highly

[34] It should be noted that the two adjectives "small" and "large" here do not imply the amount of payment, but instead the nature of payment – the payment given to a leaseholder was termed "small

commercialized system of land ownership and utilization, in which land was taken as not only a means of production but also a tradable asset. To be more precise, in this system people did not actually sell and buy land, but instead certain "land-based derivatives" – for example, the proprietorship, the permanent tenancy (owned by leaseholders), and the peasant's tenancy – that had a value linked to the productivity of the land in question.

This contract-based and highly commercialized system was a significant contrast to the long-lasting Austronesian modes of communal ownership in which land, as noted in the former chapter, was understood as neither a means of production nor a tradable asset but as a sphere of influence with blurred boundaries in which commune-based collective lives were organized. Based on two completely different perceptions of land, these two systems, the three-layered land tenure formed recently by the settler population and the long-established Austronesian modes of communal ownership, actually resembled a pair of parallel lines that did not intersect with one another. For example, while the multilayered usage of lands could be allowed in the Austronesian system, the trading of lands – let alone the sale and purchase of land-based derivatives – was simply something inconceivable for those who lived under the Austronesian system. Conversely, the Austronesian emphasis on the commune-based guardianship of lands was incomprehensible to the settlers who had established the three-layered land tenure on the island.

As an institutional crystallization of a variety of asymmetric partnerships and collaborations in the profit-oriented agricultural enterprise, the three-layered land tenure was based on the decentralized undertaking driven by the spontaneity of the settler population that was in contrast to the tripartite pattern of land tenure imposed by the Zheng state with a view to serving state interests. The Qing authorities rarely intervened in the formation of the three-layered land tenure and simply recognized it as a *fait accompli* onto which administration and taxation were subsequently imposed.

rent" and to a proprietor "large rent," irrespective of how much the payment actually was. In most cases, "small rent" was paid in kind as a fixed proportion to the total amount of the harvest for the year, while "large rent," usually paid in money or kind, was a fixed amount that was agreed in the contract. Thanks to the greatly enhanced productivity of paddy fields, the variable small rent went up correspondingly and usually exceeded by far that of the large rent, leading to the growing wealth and prestige of leaseholders over time.

With rare interventions from the imperial authorities, this contract-based and highly commercialized system of land tenure had a natural tendency towards centralization of land ownership, a consequence of frequent land transactions among people in the local area. This tendency was arguably the economic determinant of the social fabric of this newborn settler society on Taiwan, under which most regions were composed of a small number of proprietors or leaseholders who acquired more and more lands (more precisely, land-based derivatives) and received the rent paid in kind and a large number of peasant smallholders who farmed for subsistence. In the following paragraphs, the making of the social fabric of the settler society will be examined.

From Reclamation Organizations to Settler Clans

If the stabilization of the three-layered land tenure could be taken as an economic indicator of the consolidation of the settler society on Taiwan, its maturity was manifested in the replacement of the reclamation organizations with the locally-formed settler clans as the mainstay of society. Figuratively speaking, the reclamation organizations functioned as "seeding machines," sowing the "seeds" of an agricultural society – that is, the aforementioned leaseholders and peasants – on this largely hunting-gathering island. As time went by, these seeds sprouted and grew into numerous settler clans in Taiwan, which constituted the basic communities of the emerging settler society.

In the early stages of reclamation, young, male, and unmarried migrant workers constituted the overwhelming majority of the settler population, many of whom many were pejoratively called *lô-hàn-kha-á* (*羅漢跤仔*, literally, lohan's feet), referring to the underclass of the settler society in the making who led lives as vagrants, idlers, gamblers, or drunkards and therefore were deemed as destabilizing factors. Except for some desperados who absconded to Taiwan, most of the early settlers behaved like migratory birds, going back and forth seasonally between the areas of reclamation in Taiwan and their places of origin on the southeast littoral of the East Asian mainland. Following the stabilization of the three-layered land tenure, the settlers increasingly embedded themselves in the agricultural production of this offshore island and thereby acquired a greater stake binding them to Taiwan than they had in their places of origin. This was particularly true for the leaseholders and peasants, for they were not like the absentee proprietors who more often than not merely dispatched their proxies to receive

rents in Taiwan. This process of settling down actually involved two modes of social integration. For analytical convenience, we refer to these two modes of integration as "zone-one integration" and "zone-two integration" respectively.

The zone-one integration revolved around consanguinity, eventually resulting in the multiplication of the locally-formed kindred settler clans on Taiwan. The core of a settler clan was an extended family consisting of three or more generations sharing undivided properties under the same roof. These settler clans were mostly organized in patriarchal and patrilineal forms on the basis of multigeniture with equal shares for legitimate sons. However, some matrilineal traits were blended into this patriarchal and patrilineal organization, albeit only expressed by way of symbolism, for example, the deliberately elevated status of the uncles on maternal side in wedding ceremonies and funerals. This was reputedly the legacy left by generations of intermarriage with lowland Austronesian women.

While the "shared inheritance among all male-line offspring" (*諸子均分制*) was practiced in most of these patrilineal settler clans, setting up separate households was generally discouraged, for it implied the division of properties that usually included farmlands. In the context of frontier colonization, it was essential to keep a clan and its properties unseparated to ensure future survival and prosperity. On the one hand, the labor-intensive agricultural production based on paddy fields necessitated pooling efforts to open up more farmlands, while on the other hand, the fierce competition in the tripartite game impelled clan members to join forces to protect their farmlands from being encroached by other settler clans and defend themselves from being revenged by the neighboring Austronesian communes for the loss of land. Normally, these settler clans, large or small, were led by a patriarch who took control of the clan's properties on behalf of the clan and took up matters with outsiders and officials in the interests of his clansmen.

The territoriality-based zone-two integration took place simultaneously or one step later than the consanguinity-based zone-one integration and entailed a geographically wider social integration realized through the common practices of folk religion. To gain advantage in the fierce competition in the emerging settler society, the neighboring settler clans tended to forge bonds with each other by enshrining a local deity and offering sacrifices to it. In other words, a territoriality-oriented and temple-centered social solidarity was forged upon on the consanguinity-oriented and bloodline-centered

clan solidarity yielded by the zone-one integration. In order to regularly display and reaffirm this higher and broader form of social solidarity through the various religious practices and activities, the largest and strongest clans in a region would take the lead to form the "association for deity worship" (*神明會*), under which the neighboring weaker clans and small peasant families were incorporated as minor members. This kind of territoriality-oriented and temple-centered social solidarity on a village-wide or even trans-village scale is denominated by some anthropologist and historians as the "sphere of offering sacrifice" (*祭祀圈*). In some cases, the "sphere of offering sacrifice" even developed into what is called the "sphere of religious belief" (*信仰圈*) that was geographically broader yet organizationally looser than the former (Lin 1988).

The Indigenization of the Settler Population

Along with the abovementioned two zones of integration, a change of cognitive framework – or, put another way, a transition between the old and new identities – took place among the settler population as they gradually settled down in Taiwan. This transition of identity is identified by the prominent Taiwanese historical anthropologist Chen Chi-nan (1990: ch.2; 1994) as a sign of the "indigenization" (*土著化*) of the settler population, mirroring the transformation of the settler society, as he phrases it, from an "immigrant society" (*移民社會*) into a "native society" (*土著社會*).

The settlers' indigenization, as Chen insightfully shows, was evidenced by two phenomena. One was the successive prevalence of two kinds of ancestral worship association,[35] which together emblematized the incremental indigenization of the settler population; the other was the emergence of the locality-oriented identities, which were perceivable in the frequent outbursts of the infamous "armed confrontations among rival groupings" (*分類械鬥*).

In the early stages of reclamation, the first-generation settlers tended to return their hometowns seasonally to sweep ancestors' graves and to offer sacrifices so as to emblemize their gratefulness to their roots and maintain their connections with the places of origin. As they gradually settled down and formed a family in Taiwan, the

[35] In the early twenty century, the Japanese jurists classified these two kinds of ancestral worship association as the "contract-based" and "lot-based" legal persons for ancestral worship (*合約字與鬮分字祭祀公業*) so as to accommodate them to the Japanese-imposed Western legal system.

settlers would turn to perform the rituals of ancestral worship locally instead of going back to place of origin.

What first came to prominence was a voluntary form of pseudo-consanguineous fraternity, which was organized for collective ancestral worship among the early settlers having a surname in common while lacking verifiable blood ties. By identifying and enshrining a late figure well-known in the place of their common origin as their common ancestor, and through regularly offering sacrifices to the common ancestor together, a sense of solidarity expressed in a pseudo-consanguineous form would be fostered among the early settlers who had no actual relationship by blood. No doubt this pseudo-consanguineous solidarity could render those who belonged to this kind of voluntary ancestral worship fraternity a competitive advantage in the early stages of reclamation over those who did not.

As time went by, the prevalence of the aforementioned voluntarist, pseudo-consanguineous fraternity was followed by the multiplication of non-voluntarist, kindred-based associations for ancestral worship. Unlike the former that was intended for promoting fusion among the early settlers who were actually not consanguineous, the latter was supposed to exclusively – and, in most cases, compulsorily – include all the putative members of a specific settler clan that was locally formed in Taiwan. By commemorating the earliest founder of the locally formed clan in Taiwan, and through regularly offering sacrifices to him together, the kindred-based association became an institutional nucleus, around which the coherence among the branches of the clan was maintained and the rights and obligations among the clan members were specified. If the prevalence of the voluntarist, pseudo-consanguineous fraternity pointed to the early settlers starting to settle down in Taiwan – that is, the initial stage of indigenization, the multiplication of the non-voluntarist, kindred-based association signified the mature period, in which the locally formed settler clans proliferated and attempted to consolidated themselves in Taiwan.

The change of cognitive framework was not only revealed in the institutional transformation related to ancestral worship but also in the emergence of the locally-oriented points of reference, among which the locally-oriented identities that appeared in the frequent armed confrontations among the settlers were the most conspicuous. In the early stages of reclamation, armed confrontations among the settlers mostly broke out between rival groupings that were based on the different places of origin. As time

went by, certain locally-oriented groupings based on neighborhood, marketplace, the locally formed clans, or even belief of different local deities appeared, and armed confrontations started to break out along the rivalries and enmities between these locally-oriented groupings. The fading away of the old identities based on place of origin and the emergence of the new, locally-oriented identities, when considered together, constituted a clear indication that the settler population became, as Chen phrases it, "indigenized," as they took the localities in Taiwan, instead of the places of origin, as the point of reference not only in everyday affairs such as ancestral worship but also in times of emergency such as armed confrontations.

3.5 The Decay of the Lowland Austronesian Constitution

Insightful as it may be, Chen's thesis on the indigenization of the settler population does not capture the whole picture of the formation of the settler society. As the Long Eighteenth Century signifies a two-century process in which most lowlands of Taiwan constitutionally underwent a process of "de-Austronesianization," the story is not complete without bringing the decay of the lowland Austronesian constitution into our horizons. The island-wide settler-tribal constitutional duality of Taiwan had come into being, as emphasized previously, through the double yet counter-directional course in which the decay of the Austronesian tribal constitution had proceeded in synchrony with the solidification of a frontier settler constitution on the lowlands of the island.

While the European-style feudalistic political superstructure constituted by the Austronesian vassalage and the Dutch lordship had been brought into being on the western plains in the Short Seventeenth Century, this rudimentary regime dissolved immediately after the withdrawal of the VOC from Taiwan. Consequently, the lowland Austronesian communes, which were previously interconnected through a trans-communal political superstructure, retrograded into their original state under the Zheng rule whereby every commune went its own way without a higher form of coordination. Following the dissolution of the nascent European-style political superstructure, the decay of the lowland Austronesian constitution in the latter phase of the Long Eighteenth Century, that is, the period of Qing Taiwan, was chiefly concerned with the degradation of the lowland Austronesian communes, i.e., the basic communities that constituted the social fabric of the Austronesian constitution, as a result of their

involvement, either voluntary or reluctant, in the tripartite game framed in the political-cultural context of Chinese despotism.

In contrast to the sudden and complete breakdown of the European-style feudalistic political superstructure, the degradation of the lowland Austronesian communes slowly crept across the lowlands of the island for the entirety of the Long Eighteenth Century. This two-century process of "de-Austronesianization" on most lowlands of Taiwan, in itself, was the result of competition between two different kinds of basic community, that is, the preexisting Austronesian communes and the locally formed settler clans. In hindsight, the overall pattern of this two-century process was that the preexisting Austronesian communes were replaced by the locally formed settler clans, following the former gradually degraded into fragments, of which some fled from the emerging settler society while others were absorbed into it. That is to say, the decay of the lowland Austronesian tribal constitution could be attributed mainly to their disintegration from within, rather than to the conquest by the settler clans. In a sense, it was much easier for the plowing peasant-settlers to submerge the militant Austronesian hunter-warriors by weight of numbers than to conquer them by sheer force.

Furthermore, the disintegration of the lowland Austronesian communes was an unintended consequence of their becoming drawn into the tripartite game embedded in the political-cultural framework of Chinese despotism. By deliberately using "becoming drawn into," what I am meant to indicate is that the lowland Austronesian communes were not necessarily conscious that they had already taken part in the tripartite game. Their unawareness resulted partly from the continuation of the taxation practice, known as "payment of the communal tax by the franchisee" (*代輸社餉*) that was inherited from the distorted Dutch institution of "communal franchise," and could be partly attributed to the local bureaucrats' "double-dealing" between the Qing court and the Austronesian communes.

As noted in the previous sections, the Zheng state had continued the Dutch institution of auctioning the "communal franchise" to Chinese merchants as a measure to raise revenue while perversely understanding the resulting income as a tribute paid by the "uncivilized savages" who submitted willingly to the ruler at the center of the civilized world. In other words, the commune-based taxation, commonly called "communal tax" (*社餉*), as the main token of symbolic submission to the ruler was, in fact, not paid by the communes directly, but instead by those who won bids for the

"communal franchise," known as the "communal merchants" (*社商*). Although it diverged from the Dutch intent, this arrangement was consistent with the conventional worldview of Chinese despotism. Through this distorted understanding of the Dutch institution, and with the accompanying practice of "payment of the communal tax by the franchisee," from an official point of view, the franchised communes were presumed to be already "submitting" themselves to the ruler.

As the plains in central Taiwan were still abundant in sika deer in the early stages of the Qing rule over Taiwan, the "communal merchants" who sought to trade deer products with the communes urged the new Qing ruler to continue the institution of "communal franchise" that was initiated by the Dutch VOC and inherited in distorted form by the Zheng state. With a view to stabilizing its rule over the island, the Qing court approved the continuation of the distorted Dutch institution as well as the accompanying practice of "payment of the communal tax by the franchisee." Because it was always the "communal merchants," rather than the franchised communes themselves, that actually paid the communal tax to either the Zheng or the Qing rulers, the communes did not necessarily come to realize that, from the perspective of the Qing authorities, they had already submitted themselves to the emperor. It was very likely that the franchised communes simply continued trading with the merchants as usual, without facing the dilemma of whether or not to submit themselves to the new ruler.

Since all dealings between the Qing court and the Austronesian communes were handled by local bureaucrats, the latter's "contributions" to this unawareness could not go unnoticed. In order to earn credit for successfully winning over the "savages" to imperial rule, thereby bolstering the prestige of the emperor, ambitious local bureaucrats were quite apt in double-dealings between the Qing emperor and the Austronesian communes. On the one hand, they deceived the Qing emperor by making him believe that the "savages" had willingly submitted themselves to imperial rule, while on the other hand, they hoodwinked the "savages" into understanding the "gifts" bestowed by the Qing state, which were actually a reward for their "sincere" submission, as a token of an emperor-commune alliance which actually did not exist, or even as a tribute paid to them by local bureaucrats.

It is fair to say that the Qing brought the Austronesian communes under imperial rule with an approach that was in significant contrast to the way the Dutch VOC had created a European-style feudalistic political superstructure constituted by the

Austronesian vassalage and the Dutch lordship. The Dutch system was founded on a series of feudal conventions that were unequal yet reciprocal, such as waging a feudalistic war with light casualties against the communes, concluding a treaty in which the rights and obligations of the relevant parties were stated explicitly, and regularly holding splendid ceremonies that were intended to highlight the Dutch lordship and reaffirm the Austronesian vassalage. Unlike the Dutch operations that were pretty open and aboveboard, the Qing brought the Austronesian communes under its rule through a much more obscured approach that was characterized by the expression of the condescending leniency of imperial rule, the continuation of a distorted Dutch institution, and bureaucratic double-dealings.

Aside from an unknowing symbolic submission to the emperor, as far as the lowland Austronesian communes were concerned, taking part in the tripartite game appeared to offer nearly cost-free access to some immediate benefits. The most obvious immediate benefit was that they could continue trading with the "communal merchants," who brought in various everyday items, handicrafts, and even firearms and ammunition that the communes were unable to make for themselves. This trade, however, implied a path of no return – once it had started, the communal members got used to the foreign commodities, began to count on them, and inevitably reached a point where they could not live without them. Compared to the continuation of the trade, the more alluring benefit was arguably that the communes were officially allowed to lease out their land to settlers for opening up paddy fields and were therefore entitled to receive rents from the leases. In other words, they could gain a fixed amount of the profits derived from agricultural development by simply leasing out parts of their lands. This institutional incentive was irresistible, particularly in the context of the rapid decline in the population of sika deer caused by excessive commercial hunting.

At the same time, the political price for receiving these immediate benefits by joining in the tripartite game was not an immediate concern to the Austronesia communes. Separated from the settler population, the Austronesian communes in Qing Taiwan were actually placed under a mode of governance that could be understood as a lesser form of the tusi system (*土司制度*, literally, the native chieftain system).

The tusi system was, by nature, a product of political expediency that had been

applied to the variegated ethnic groups[36] distributed widely in the southwest provinces of China proper for centuries due to the difficulties of the empires arising in the East Asian heartland in securing a stable rule over these remote mountainous areas. In the system, imperially-recognized chieftaincies were required only to submit symbolically to the emperor while retaining a great degree of autonomy, both political and social. With the symbolic submission of the native chieftaincies, the paramount constitutional principle of Chinses despotism – that is, no political entity under the emperorship was allowed to exist – could still hold true, while the actual impotence of the empire in bringing them under control was obscured by turning a blind eye to their actual political and social autonomy.

As a concession born out of practical necessities, the application of the tusi system was deemed as a constitutional deviation from Chinese despotism, which was supposed to be rectified when conditions were met. In other words, the native chieftaincies placed under the tusi system would be replaced by circulating officials (*改土歸流*) when the imperial court considered it necessary or feasible. Following its first implementation in the early Ming period under the reign of the Yongle Emperor (1402-1424), the policy of replacing native chieftains in the southwest with circulating officials was carried out on a large scale under the expansionist rule of the relentless Yongzheng Emperor, the third Qing emperor to rule over China proper who reigned from 1722 to 1735.

That is to say, a lesser form of the tusi system was actually applied to the lowland Austronesian communes on this offshore island in the time when the long-standing archetype of this concessional mode of governance was being abolished in the place of its origin, i.e., the southwest provinces of China proper. This coincidence of timing suggested that the lesser form of the tusi system could not possibly be a permanent mode of governance designed particularly for the Austronesian communes in Taiwan, but was intended as a makeshift transitional mechanism that would gradually tame these unruly "savages" and incorporate them into the conventional bureaucratic rule of Chinese despotism.

In addition to the anachronistic nature of its application in Taiwan, the absence of a hereditary chieftaincy among the lowland Austronesian communes also rendered them a much weaker bargaining power in comparison with their counterparts – or,

[36] They were the predecessors of what are commonly called *xīnánshǎoshùmínzú* (*西南少數民族,* literally, the southwestern minority nationalities) in the contemporary Chinese linguistic context.

predecessors, in temporal terms – in southwest China. As noted previously, the lowland Austronesian communes in Taiwan were generally characterized by a low degree of functional differentiation and a high degree of egalitarianism in terms of the internal structure of power and authority, with the most widely known exception of the "Kingdom of Dadu" (*大肚王國*). However, even this exception was little more than a loosely-united supra-communal alliance, which survived expeditions by the Dutch VOC and a massive attack by the Kingdom of Tungning before eventually disintegrating in the aftermath of a failed uprising against the Qing authorities, known as the "Taikasei Revolt" (*大甲西社抗清事件*, 1731-1732).

Although they stood at a much more disadvantaged bargaining position with the imperial power when compared to the southwestern native chieftaincies in China proper, the lowland Austronesian communes still enjoyed a much looser rule than the bureaucratic rule applied to the settler population on the island. Under the less intense form of the tusi system, the communes were not subject to bureaucratic rule carried out by the "circulating officials" sent by the Qing court from other provinces. Instead, one or several, depending on the size of the commune in question, of the heads of clans or the stratum of elders within a specific commune would be selected and appointed as "native officials" (*土官 tuguan*) with the task of overseeing their communal members. That is to say, aside from their symbolic submission to the Qing emperor and being asked to refrain from attacking the Qing contingent and the settler population, the communes could largely retain their political and social autonomy. Even the communal tax as the token of the symbolic submission, which indeed constituted an actual material cost, was paid, as noted previously, by the communal merchants rather than by the franchised communes themselves.

Innocuous and profitable as they seemed, the benefits inherent in the participation in the tripartite game entailed a series of unforeseeable consequences for the communes. One of history's few iron laws is that everything in the world has a cost – some costs should be paid immediately, while others may be deferred for a period, longer or shorter, but have to be paid eventually.

3.6 The Entrenchment of the "Unholy Trinity"

The internal contradiction of the Qing despotism loomed large in the context of the colonization of this frontier island. On the one hand, the subjects in Taiwan were asked by the empire to remain politically and militarily passive as they were in China proper, while on the other, the empire could hardly serve as a competent provider of order on this offshore island far away from the imperial center.

For those who were engaged in the reclamation of wastelands in central and northern Taiwan in particular, the Qing-guaranteed order was mostly unavailable. More often than not, the early settlers could not simply pay for an existing order that allowed agricultural development on favorable terms to themselves and had no choice but to defend their activities and interests themselves by force.

Lacking the protection of the Qing contingent and surrounded by the militant Austronesian communes, the reclamation corporations were forced to arm themselves and turn peasants into militias when necessary. Although they were not, and indeed could never be, recognized as political subjects in the political-cultural matrix of Chinese despotism, the reclamation organizations nonetheless had sufficient military might necessary for self-defense and survival in the early stages of colonization on the frontier island. However, in doing so, they were actually stepping into the political gray zone between the law-abiding loyal subjects and latent rebellious forces.

It was also noteworthy that in contrast to the tripartite pattern of land tenure imposed by the Zheng state, this profit-oriented agricultural enterprise was an outcome of the various decentralized undertakings driven by the spontaneity of the settler population. Unlike the Zheng state which established the tripartite pattern of official fields, private fields, and military camps' fields with a view to serving state interests, the Qing authorities rarely intervened in the formation of the three-layered land tenure while simply recognizing it as a *fait accompli* onto which administration and taxation were subsequently set up.

As it was driven by private actors rather than governmental entities, this three-layered land tenure did bear some resemblance to the preceding Dutch quasi-capitalistic land ownership, e.g., the characteristics of being profit-oriented, contract-based, and highly commercialized. Nevertheless, there was a decisive difference between these two systems. Simply put, they were embedded in two diametrically opposed political-cultural frameworks.

In Dutch Formosa, as an overseas extension of European feudalism, private

property as a legal concept was defined, recognized, enforced, and protected in accordance to Roman-Dutch Law. The settlers arriving in the Short Seventeenth Century were granted land and property certificates that were based on the land surveys and registration meticulously conducted by the Dutch authorities, through which they enjoyed the legal protection inherent in the quasi-capitalistic land ownership that was guaranteed in accordance to Roman-Dutch Law.

But this was not the case for those who came later in the Long Eighteenth Century and settled down in Qing Taiwan, an offshore extension of Chinese despotism. In contrast to European feudalism, private property was a concept that was null and void, if not simply absent, in the political-cultural framework of Chinese despotism, as it was a clear violation of one paramount constitutional principle that the emperor had the sole legitimate ownership of all lands in the imperial realm, which was typically upheld and justified by invoking one of the best-known ancient scriptures of the Classic of Poetry (*詩經*) which said that "all lands under heaven belong to the king" (*普天之下 莫非王土*).

While the sole landownership of the emperor was mostly in name only, it implied the absence of what Karl Marx termed *das Bürgerliche Recht* in the political system of Chinese despotism. This meant those who took on actual control or management of the lands did not have a full legal right to the disposal of their land and property. In theory, their land and property were deprivable if considered necessary or desirable by the imperial authorities. In practice, they had to face a constant threat of the arbitrary infringements upon their properties or even lives inflicted by the bureaucrats, who were, in reality, the personified extensions of the Beijing-based emperorship extending to the localities.

The only viable countermeasure against the bureaucratic arbitrariness available in the political-cultural framework of Chinese despotism was to integrate themselves into the ruling class by entering the officialdom or, at least, the gentry through gaining scholarly honors. This countermeasure was the dominant strategy for individuals in the emerging settler society, which, to a great extent, shaped the political nature of the newborn settler society on Taiwan as being both imperial and Confucianized.

Three Functions of the "Unholy Trinity"

From the perspective of the Qing court, the "unholy trinity" as an integral set of

state assemblage performed at least three functions. To begin with, it functioned to consolidate the Qing rule over China proper by coopting the cream of the crop of the ruled into the officialdom, that is, the bottom layer of the pyramid of Chinese despotism, to serve the imperial rule. At the suggestion of the defected Ming officials, the Shunzhi Emperor, the first Qing emperor to rule over China proper, restored the institution of imperial examination that had been suspended for years during the turmoil of the Ming-Qing transition. This act proved very helpful to solidify the imperial legitimacy, as it could justify the Qing as the legitimate successor of the Ming among its East Asian subjects, in particular among the literati. In theory, it was a mechanism open to all of the ruled and the only legitimate channel of upward mobility for them to ascend the ruling class. Since each province was granted a fixed quota of enrollment every year, it served as an absorptive and preemptive mechanism for safeguarding imperial stability, as the local elites who could potentially lead revolts in the localities could be coopted in advance into the Qing officialdom.

Moreover, it worked effectively to elevate the Qing emperorship in relation to the Manchu-Mongol aristocracy. The outcome of reviving the "unholy trinity" of Chinese despotism was the multiplication of the functionaries who were recruited through the imperial examination, promoted in a meritocratic way in the officialdom, and were at the disposal of the emperor rather than the nobilities. With the expansion of this type of exam-based bureaucrats, and as more and more responsibilities of governance were laid on their shoulders, the Manchu-Mongol aristocracy as the co-founders and a constitutional component of the Qing Empire were gradually undermined and marginalized.

Finally, it served as an integrative political-cultural bond that linked the variegated local societies in China proper with the Beijing-based Qing court. This linkage was realized through the political-cultural integration taking place among the local elites at two levels. The first-level integration occurred in the officialdom superimposed on China proper and centered on the imperial metropolitan Beijing, in which the recruited functionaries went on what Wakabayashi Masahiro (2020: 385-389), a distinguished Japanese scholar known for his studies on Taiwan history, calls "the pilgrimage of scholar-officials" (*士大夫朝聖圈*), a term coined through appropriating and rephrasing one of Benedict Anderson's (1983) most well-known metaphors, i.e., the "secular pilgrimage" of the creoles in Latin America. It was through this common imagined

spiral journey that the cream of the ruled coopted from within China proper were collectively injected with an empire-wide structure of cognition, a lingua franca used in the officialdom, and an identity with the empire.

The second-level integration took place at the interface between state and society – or, the "third realm" in-between government agencies and local communities, a notion put forth by the noted historical sociologist Philip C. C. Huang (1993). Besides the recruited functionaries, the institution of imperial examination also created a group of "officials in reserve" – or, "semi-officials," in Huang's wording – who played an important intermediate role between state and society. Even though they were not fortunate enough to be recruited into the officialdom, this landed gentry would serve as the upper echelons in the localities and, with their shared Confucian upbringing and the acquired ability in writing Han characters, constituted a circle of literati across ethnic, linguistic, and regional boundaries.

Confucianization as a Dominant Strategy[37]

There were at least three merits that both the rising settler clans and the degrading lowland Austronesian communes could see in this dominant strategy, of which they availed themselves to gain advantages in the fierce competition in the tripartite game framed in the political-cultural context of Chinese despotism.

First, it helped avoid – or, at least, reduce – the arbitrary infringements upon life and property inflicted by either the imperial officials or the informal clerks (胥吏). As scholarly honors implied candidacy for filling an official post, the honor holders as the "officials in reserve," although most of them would not be fortunate enough to take office, were granted certain "privileges" that ordinary subjects did not enjoy, e.g., being exempted from kneeling down before county magistrate, corporal punishment, corvée, and a certain amount of land taxes. With these privileges, an honor holder could evade, and to varying degrees shield his clansmen from, the bureaucratic arbitrariness manifested in the form of personal insult, body persecution, infringement of property, or rapacious extortion, all of which were notoriously ubiquitous in the political-cultural milieu of Chinese despotism.

[37] "Dominant strategy" is a term in game theory that refers to the optimal option for a player among all the competitive strategy set, no matter how that player's opponents may play – or, simply put, the optimal move for an individual regardless of how other players act.

Second, it advantaged the honor holders and the groups from which they came in the fierce competition in the emerging settler society. In the political system of Chinese despotism, county magistrates at the bottom layer of bureaucracy together with other higher-ranked officials were in charge of both administration and judicature. Therefore, this system granted the honor holders an institutional advantage when the disputes with their competitors in the settler society, be they settler clans or lowland Austronesian communes, were referred to the official arbitration, for the honor holders as the "officials in reserve" – for which they were generally taken as the non-incumbent peers of county magistrates – could easily translate the privileges attached to scholarly honor into a judicial advantage that could tip the ruling to their side.

Third and most importantly, it facilitated the stabilizing of the internal organization of the settlers' basic communities. As the mere few having a Confucian upbringing among the local elites in settler society, the holders of scholarly honors were much more proficient than others at applying the Confucian ethical codes to their basic communities, be they the growing settler clans or the fragments degraded from lowland Austronesian communes. The Confucian ethical codes they appropriated were mostly based on some vulgar understandings of Neo-Confucianism (commonly known as "Song-Ming lixue" *宋明理學*, a rational idealism developed in the Song and Ming eras), of which "Master Zhu's Family Rituals" (*朱子家禮*), a collection of ritual prescriptions compiled by the Neo-Confucian master Zhu Xi (*朱熹*, 1130-1200), was one of the most influential sources. Taking advantage of the Confucian ethical codes that covered virtually all aspects of the familial and intra-clan affairs, such as weddings, funerals, family ceremonies, the veneration of ancestors, the organization and succession of family, the honor holders could better consolidate a patrilineal and patriarchal order within their clans, rendering themselves an advantage in the fierce competition of the emerging settler society. More importantly, these principles of organization as a whole were legitimized by the imperial endorsement that was embodied in the "unholy trinity" and reified in the human form as the holders of scholarly honors. That is to say, as an officially endorsed ideology that was skillfully appropriated for organizing and disciplining the constitutive basic communities of the settler society on Taiwan, the Confucian ethical codes were actually elevated to a quasi-jurisdictional standard as the customary laws that prevailed in this newborn settler society.

The Demilitarization of the Lowland Austronesian Communes and the Crescent Militarization of the Locally Formed Settler Clans

Inasmuch as the organizational maturity of a society is revealed in the intensity of its warfare, the well-known "three major rebellions in Qing Taiwan" (*清代三大民變*)[38] can serve as three excellent points of reference through which the process that the settler society was formed and solidified on Taiwan can be observed and evaluated.

Breaking out in the early Long Eighteenth Century, the 1721 Chu It-kùi Incident (*朱一貴事件*) was, in nature, an unorganized uprising that was stirred up among the underclass of the settler society in the making. Made up of the so-called *lô-hàn-kha-á* and led by several headmen, the uprising rapidly spread through southwestern Taiwan. However, divisions in its leadership soon emerged due to disputes over dividing up the booty and distributing powers among the headmen of the rebels, and therefore the rebellious forces were crushed in a short time by reinforcements sent by the Qing court from China proper.

Erupting in the middle of Long Eighteen Century, the Lîm Sóng-bûn Incident (*林爽文事件*, 1786-87) was a relatively more organized revolt that was initiated and led by leaders of the "Heaven and Earth Society" (*天地會*), a non-consanguineous cult-based secret fraternity organized around the political tenet of "overturning Qing and restoring Ming" (*反清復明*). Benefiting from the preexisting organization – albeit merely a secret society, this rebellion, compared to the former Chu It-kùi Incident, suffered much less from divisions in its leadership and persisted for a much longer time. As a result, it was able to organize stronger resistance to the reinforcements sent from China proper who were impelled to mobilize the antagonistic settler clans and join forces with Austronesian warriors from dozens of neighboring communes in order quell the rebellion.

Erupting at the end of Long Eighteen Century, the Tè Tiô-chhun Incident (*戴潮春事件*, 1862-65) was a dogfight between different coalitions of locally-formed strong settler clans, in which the reinforcements sent from China proper played only a minor role in quelling the tangled warfare between the parties. Tè Tiô-chhun, the initiator of the rebellion, was himself one of the local elites in central Taiwan, who was not only a

[38] Hsieh, Kuo-hsing (1993) *官逼民反：清代三大民變* [Uprising against Official Arbitrariness: Three Major Rebellions in Qing Taiwan]. Taipei: Independence Evening Post.

big landlord but also the head of a militia as well as the main sponsor of the local association for deity worship. It was particularly noteworthy that following the outbreak of the rebellion, those who allied themselves with Tè and those allying against the rebellious forces were exact counterparts in terms of wealth, status, and strength. The incessant fighting between different coalitions of the settler clans distributed over all of Western Taiwan persisted until Brothers Lîm of Būhong/Ataabu (*霧峰/阿罩霧*), i.e., Lîm Bûn-chhat and Lîm Bûn-bêng, transferred their militias of several thousand men, which had previously been sent to China proper to suppress the Small Knife Society Uprising and the Taiping Rebellion, back to Taiwan to join forces with Lîm Chiam-mûi of Tekchhàm (*竹塹*) in putting down the rebellious forces.

Chapter Four

The Lasting Nineteenth Century

4.1 A Pastiche of Three Civilizations

The Lasting Nineteenth Century marks the second intersection of the three civilizations on the island following the reentry of European civilization into Taiwan in the mid-nineteenth century. Looking through a civilizational lens, it represents a long and ongoing journey through which Taiwan was gradually incorporated into the modern, Western-shaped international system. More precisely, the second arrival of European civilization in Taiwan actually triggered a twin process that was analytically separable yet empirically intertwined, in which the island was shunted off from the track of the regionally dominant Chinese civilization and, at the same time, switched again to the globally prevailing European civilization. Unlike the transient first introduction of European civilization into Taiwan in the Short Seventeenth Century that left few persistent legacies, the second introduction in the Lasting Nineteenth Century shaped this island, which was both Chinese and Austronesian in civilizational terms and characterized by the settler-tribal dual constitution, into a pastiche of three civilizations that is largely compatible with and deeply integrated into the West-shaped world order.

Geopolitically speaking, since the mid-nineteenth century, Taiwan has increasingly been embedded in the world order that could be called *Pax Anglo-Saxonica*,[39] to borrow this creative term highlighting the homogeneous succession from *Pax Britannica* to *Pax Americana* from John Bew, a British historian of foreign policy and international relations. In this time span of less than two centuries, the political regime on the island has changed three times, and correspondingly the Lasting Nineteenth Century of Taiwanese history can be differentiated into four phases in accordance with the natures of the successive political regimes. The respective natures of these four political regimes to a great extent determined the varied approaches through which European civilization was introduced into the island.

Temporally correspondent with the heyday of *Pax Britannica*, the "Late-Qing Taiwan" in the latter half of the nineteenth century signified the first phase, in which a

[39] Bew, John (2015) "Pax Anglo-Saxonica," *The American Interest*. See: https://reurl.cc/9ZzD5Y.

handful of pro-Westernization Qing officials and a small number of "infiltrating Western agents" played the leading role in reintroducing European civilization into Taiwan.

Largely overlapping the twilight of *Pax Britannica*, the "Japanese Taiwan," spanning around a half-century between 1895 and 1945, was the second phase, in which the Japanese colonizer served as an intermediary for the introduction of European civilization into Taiwan through both imposing and filtrating elements of European civilization that served its interests.

The third phase, starting with the end of the Second World War and ending with the breakdown of the Soviet Union, can be termed the "Chinese Taiwan," in which the introduction of European civilization was once again carried out by another intermediary commonly known as the "Republic of China" or simply "White China," that is, a Chinese émigré semi-Leninist party-state propped up on Taiwan by the United States as an anti-communist sentinel and placed under the *Pax Americana* that prevailed in the Western Hemisphere in the Cold War era.

The last phase, which began at the moment when Cold War came to an end and subsequently *Pax Americana* went worldwide, can be called the "Taiwanese Taiwan," in which the social actors, whose agencies had been long suppressed by the Chinses émigré party-state, were unleashed in the process of democratization and started to spontaneously and autonomously introduce Western ideologies and technologies they saw as beneficial into Taiwan without government restrictions or intervention.

This "four-phase" process, linear and continuous as it may appear, was by no means a one-way channel through which Taiwan would be necessarily "conveyed" to the endpoint of being incorporated into the West-shaped world order. On the contrary, it was a path full of uncertainty and setbacks. The outbreak of the Greater East Asia War (1941-1945) was the most notable incident of "being derailed" from the previously established track, in which Taiwan was diverted, along with its Japanese colonizer, from the national policy known as "departing Asia for Europe" (*脫亞入歐*) that Japan had pursued since the 1868 Meiji Restoration.

Similar to most of its non-Western analogues in the world, the persistent introduction of European civilization into Taiwan was accompanied by – or, more precisely, triggered – a constitutional transformation on the island. The temporal correspondence between the evolving world order and the constitutional changes in

Taiwan actually reveals that from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the former was actually the main determinant of the latter. Constitutionally speaking, the second arrival of European civilization triggered a circuitous course of nation-state formation on the island, bringing forth a Taiwanese nation-state – albeit *de facto* to date – as the Western-style political superstructure forged upon the dual constitution of the island that was previously formed in the Long Eighteenth Century.

This particular form of constitutional configuration was, in fact, an unintended consequence of three waves of nation-state building. Excepting the Late-Qing Taiwan that was marked by the absence of a conscious nationalist project, twentieth-century Taiwan was marked by three waves of highly conscious nation-state building that were put into practice, one after another, within a short span of merely one century. What makes this compressed historical process even more complicated and twisted is that the three waves of nation-state building were actually driven by three mutually conflicting nationalist projects. Put more precisely, the two later nationalist projects consciously viewed their immediate predecessors as an "antagonistic other" that was to be ideologically deconstructed and politically eliminated. In other words, the two later nationalist projects were a reaction to their immediate predecessors, constituting two twists in the circuitous course of nation-state building on Taiwan.

The first nationalist project was a Japanese-oriented nation-state building imposed on Taiwan by the Japanese colonial state in the first half of the twentieth century. This first-ever nationalist project in Taiwan history comprised a state-building scheme that aimed to place both the settler and tribal societies coexisting on Taiwan under the rule of an island-wide modern state and a nation-building blueprint of remaking all the then inhabitants in Taiwan, be they settlers and aborigines, as nationals of Japan. It is clear that this project was not intended to create an independent nation-state in its own right, but to construct a regional entity that was subordinate to metropolitan Japan and expected to be fully incorporated, both politically and culturally, into the expanding national body of Japan. However, this first wave of nation-state building ended abruptly due to the Japanese defeat in the Greater East Asian War.

What followed the prewar Japanese predecessor was a Chinese-oriented nation-state building imposed by a Chinese émigré state, that is, the Republic of China that from 1949 onwards had been exiled to Taiwan and was dominated by the Kuomintang, aka the Chinese Nationalist Party, until the end of Cold War (hereafter, abbreviated as

the KMT-ROC). As it was carried out by an émigré state, this second wave of nation-state building was distinguished by its irredentist tenets. In term of nation-building, the KMT-ROC aimed to remake both the settlers and aborigines on the island, who had to varying degrees been linguistically, culturally, and even politically assimilated to Japan, together with the Chinese refugees of various provincial origins exiled to Taiwan, into a distinct group of what the KMT self-proclaimed as "authentic Chinese," so as to highlight the claimed legitimacy of the KMT-ROC in comparison to the illegitimacy of the CCP-PRC (i.e., the People's Republic of China dominated by the Chinese Communist Party), which was denounced by the KMT-ROC as an "insurrectionist organization" that had usurped the sovereignty of its Chinese motherland and corrupted the Chinese nation. In terms of state-building, the KMT-ROC transplanted the entire assemblage of the Chinese state that was designed for its claimed continent-wide territory to Taiwan, e.g., a massive military conglomerate that could be ambiguously understood as either the "Nationalist Army" (*國民黨軍*) or the "national army" (*國軍*), the ROC Constitution, as well as the institutions of the presidency, the national assembly, and five branches of the central government, all of which were subsequently grafted onto the island-wide state infrastructure that had been forged by the former Japanese colonizer in the previous half-century. Despite its claim of sovereignty over the "whole of China," this émigré KMT-ROC in fact became, against its wishes, the first state exercising effective rule over Taiwan that was also confined to and geographically congruent with the island.

The third wave of nation-state building is an ongoing project of political engineering driven by the rise of Taiwanese nationalism, that was activated in the name of democratization in the late 1980s by those resisting the dominant KMT-ROC who came mainly from the settler population and, to a lesser extent, the aboriginal population. Unlike the former two official nationalisms carried out forcefully by the two "oriental colonizers" from the top down, the third wave of nation-state building was a bottom-up, society-driven movement that arose in a political-cultural context of democratization and therefore was impelled to take a moderate approach based on persuasion rather than coercion. In order to broaden the societal base of the nationalist cause, it put forward purely subjectivist criteria for nation-building that was best exemplified by the arguably most popularized political slogan in the latest three decades, saying that "anyone identifying as Taiwanese is Taiwanese" (*認同台灣的人就是台灣*

人). According to this inclusion-oriented criteria, all the three main historical-political human groups in Taiwanese history, i.e., the long-standing Austronesian aborigines, the settlers who had settled down in the Long Eighteen Century, and the newly arrived post-WWII Chinese émigrés, could be legitimately turned into equal members of the envisioned Taiwanese nation on a voluntary basis. In terms of state-building, it has taken on an even more roundabout path, seeking to incrementally seize the commanding ground in the first-ever island-wide state through repeated elections while simultaneously "naturalizing" the émigré state to the newly formed Taiwanese nation by untying the semi-Leninist entanglements between party (i.e., the KMT) and state (i.e., the ROC).

4.2 Destabilizing the Newly Arrived Equilibrium

Without becoming a colony of any Western power, the second introduction of European civilization into late-Qing Taiwan took place through two channels, which could be classified as "official" and "non-official." The official channel was organized by a handful of Qing provincial officials commonly known as the "Faction of Western Affairs" (*洋務派*, hereafter, abbreviated as the Westernists), who were the mainstay of the Self-Strengthening Movement (*自強運動*, c. 1861–1895). The non-official channel started underground but was officially recognized in the mid-nineteenth century. It was through this channel that a small number of uninvited Western agents "infiltrated" the settler society on the island and brought in certain constitutive elements of European civilization in piecemeal, tentative, or even accidental ways.

The Half-Hearted Westernists

Despite their familiarity with the so-called "Western affairs," the Westernists had only a superficial understanding of the Western advantages over the Qing Empire. Attributing the Qing's vulnerability to the Western powers simply to technological backwardness, they concentrated their self-strengthening efforts on importing the advanced weaponry and industries from certain Western countries – in particular Great Britain, France, and Germany – under the self-important and somewhat ignorant guideline of "suppressing (Western) barbarians by learning their superior skills" (*師夷長技以制夷*). In order not to exasperate the Manchu-Mongol aristocracy who had a

vested interest in keeping the imperial polity intact, these functionaries were by and large uninterested in, or cautiously abstained from, the issue of constitutional reforms. Since it did not involve the reframing of the political superstructure of the Qing Empire or the transformation of the variegated social fabrics under the imperial rule, this technology-oriented top-down movement failed to achieve its intended goal – that is, to resist or even surpass the Western powers. In hindsight, the efforts of the Westernists in the Self-Strengthening Movement were very much like – figuratively speaking – conducting a surgery to "equip" a shaky old man with some of the latest "prosthetics" in the hope of his rejuvenation.

The Westernist officials sent to Taiwan naturally did not go beyond the general layout of the Self-Strengthening Movement.[40] Technologically, they started construction on some important items of state infrastructure, such as railways, telegraph lines, and a postal service, although most of these projects had limited success. Administratively, they strived to extend the geographical scope of bureaucratic rule on the island by setting up new counties and bureaus, and in the mid-1880s promoted Taiwan from a prefecture under Fujian Province to a formally self-sufficient province. With a view to gaining control of the whole island, they actually played the old trick of Chinese despotism – that is, to bring the previously unruly territories and peoples under imperial rule, this time with the help of the Western weaponry and modernized state infrastructure. This old trick rendered late-Qing Taiwan a period marked by the absence of a conscious nation-state building; the appearance of a conscious nationalist project for nation-state building would have to wait until the early twentieth century.

Merchants, Missionaries, and Marines

At the same time, by availing themselves of the highly limited border control capacity of the imperial authorities, a small number of uninvited Western agents steadily "infiltrated" into the island without official authorization, leaving some persistent legacies in Taiwan. Among the "infiltrating Western agents," three types of people were most important: merchants, missionaries, and marines – the "3M's" if you will.

[40] Hsu, Hsueh-chi (1993) *滿大人最後的二十年：洋務運動與建省* [The Last Two Decades of the Mandarins in Taiwan: The Movement of Westernization and the Establishment of Taiwan Province]. Taipei: Independence Evening Post.

The earliest "infiltrating Western agents" were mostly British and, to a lesser extent, German merchants who arrived in the western ports of Taiwan as early as the first half of the nineteenth century to purchase tea and camphor. The 1858 Treaty of Tianjin, in which two ports in Taiwan, i.e., Tainan and Tamsui, were opened to Western trade and residence, was simply a belated official recognition of the commercial activities conducted by the Western merchants that were previously considered as illicit.

Belated as it was, the conclusion of the Treaty of Tianjin induced even more Western agents to come to Taiwan, for their businesses and residences were now legalized and guaranteed according to the Treaty. Considering their profound influence on the social fabric of the island, the Catholic and Presbyterian missionaries as the builders of the early Christian congregations on Taiwan were among the most significant Western agents who brought in one of the constitutive elements of European civilization. By appropriating the noted Aristotelian thesis of "four causes," we may sketch out their missionary undertakings as follows: with a view to glorifying God (the final cause or the end), the missionaries (the efficient cause or the agent) introduced into Taiwan two new organizing principles that could be called "Catholic feudalism" and "Presbyterian republicanism" (the formal cause or the form), which were applied mainly to two kinds of marginalized groups in the settler society (the material cause or the matter).

One of the two marginalized groups came from the underclass situated at the societal bottom of the settler society as "ionized molecules," and the other the degraded lowland Austronesian communes that had been gradually edged out to the geographical margin of the settler society in the Long Eighteenth Century. By remolding their basic communities into Christian congregations in either Catholic or Presbyterian form with the help of the missionaries, the atomized and destitute settlers grew into large and flourishing clans in a mere three decades, while the lowland Austronesian aborigines rebuilt communal solidarity from the fragments of the degraded communes. In introducing into Taiwan the two organizing principles that were absent in the political-cultural context of Chinese despotism, the Catholic and Presbyterian missionaries had organizationally upgraded the existing two kinds of basic community, i.e., the settler clans and the Austronesian communes, in the mold of their European counterparts. Although small in number, these enclave-like Christian congregations scattered throughout the settler society of the island became the most persistent legacy of

European civilization introduced in the first phase of the Lasting Nineteenth Century. These congregations have mostly survived until now and some of them – more specifically, the Presbyterian ones – have played an important role in the third wave of nation-state building on Taiwan.

With the rapidly increasing number of Western agents who came to Taiwan by sea, there were also frequent maritime accidents. The presence of the third player of the "3M's," that is, marines, on the island was therefore from the result of two military-diplomatic incidents, i.e., the American punitive expedition to Taiwan in 1867 and the Japanese one in 1874 (aka the Mudan Incident *牡丹社事件*), both of which were triggered by the fallout of an earlier shipwreck.

These two incidents unfolded in similar ways. Both stories began with a commercial ship that was shipwrecked at the southern tip of Taiwan, and whose survivors were perceived as invaders and subsequently headhunted by the neighboring communes. Subsequently, foreign forces (Americans in the first instance and Japanese in the second) decided to launch a punitive expedition to the communes involved due to their frustration at the Qing officials' unwillingness to take responsibility for the massacres committed by the unruly highland Austronesian communes that were located beyond the scope of the Qing's effective rule on the island. Next, a United States Navy and Marine company in the first instance, and a joint force of the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy (both of which were at the early stages of being Westernized and deployed overseas for the first time) in the second, drove on boldly into the mountains to fight the highland Austronesian warriors who were expert guerrilla fighters, ultimately meeting with little success.[41] [42] The play ended up with a treaty[43] in the American case and a protectorate[44] in the Japanese one, both of which were concluded through a highly feudalistic approach between the American or Japanese representative[45] and Cuqicuq Garuljigulj (recorded as Tokitok in English and

[41] See: https://reurl.cc/odjZyv; https://reurl.cc/MdeXjK; Davidson, James W. (1903). "Chapter IX: Wrecks and Outrages on Navigators. 1848–1867." The Island of Formosa, Past and Present. London and New York: Macmillan.

[42] See: https://reurl.cc/9Xl1r8

[43] With the aid of William A. Pickering and James Horn, Charles Le Gendre, a French-born American officer and diplomat, negotiated an effective treaty, known as the "Covenant of South Cape" (*南岬之盟*), in which Cuqicuq Garuljigulj guaranteed the safety of shipwrecked American and European sailors. See: https://reurl.cc/KjGQ7y and https://reurl.cc/bRvEOv.

[44] See: https://reurl.cc/Xkz5Dg and https://reurl.cc/KjGQ7y.

[45] The American representative was Charles Le Gendre, a French-born American officer and diplomat,

卓杞篤 in Chinese), the then chief of the "Lower Lonckjauw Eighteen Communes" (*瑯嶠下十八社*), a Paiwan chiefdom located at the south part of the southernmost mountainous Hengchun Peninsula.

By the end of the Long Eighteenth Century – that is, the mid-nineteenth century, the constitution of Taiwan was by and large arriving at a new state of equilibrium characterized by the hostile coexistence between an imperial Confucianized settler society expanding to most of the lowlands and a stateless Austronesian tribal society shrinking into Eastern Taiwan and the mountainous hinterland. However, the presence and activities of the "infiltrating Western agents" set off a chain reaction, unsettling the recently established equilibrium of the dual constitution, which was being increasingly reified as a distinct highland-lowland divide. In particular, it brought about three major consequences to the island-wide socio-political configuration of late-Qing Taiwan.

Three Consequences

First, it fueled a new wave of settler expansion triggered by the cultivation of tea trees and the decoction of camphor in the central and northern foothills and mountains of lower altitudes. By the mid-nineteenth century, the previous wave of settler expansion based on paddy fields had almost reached its natural limit, as the arable lowlands on this mountainous island were almost entirely cultivated following two centuries of agricultural development. However, the cultivation of tea trees and the manufacturing of camphor were turned into lucrative enterprises by the Western merchants' eagerness for purchasing tea as a luxury good for their domestic consumers and camphor as the major raw material for smokeless gunpowder. In other words, the presence of Western merchants on Taiwan triggered a resurgence of the settler expansion – this time, into the mountains of the island. Therefore, another round of

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who fought in numerous campaigns for the North in the American Civil War in the early 1860s. Following the end of the war, Le Gendre was appointed to be American consul at Amoy in the Fujian Province of the Qing Empire in 1866. He intervened and mediated the settlement of the 1871 Rover Incident in the capacity of American consul. Between 1872 and 1875, he served as advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Empire of Japan. It was at his suggestion based on his prior experiences in dealing with the aftermath of the 1871 Rover Incident that the government of early Meiji Japan, which was struggling to keep its feet domestically and still a diplomatic tenderfoot in the age of Western imperialism, decided to launch a punitive expedition to Taiwan.

The Japanese representative was Marshal-Admiral Marquis Saigō Jūdō (*西鄉 従道*), a younger brother of Saigō Takamori (*西鄉 隆盛*), one of the three great nobles who led the Meiji Restoration. Saigō Jūdō commanded the Japanese expeditionary forces as a lieutenant-general in the 1874 Taiwan Expedition.

interplay between settlers and aborigines, involving both mutual conflict and joint venture, began – this time, between the highland Austronesian communes, who were later anthropologically classified by some Japanese academics as Saisiyat and Atayal, in the northwestern mountainous regions and the wealthy settler clans, who were typically defended with well-armed militia, of which the Lîms of Būhong/Ataabu (*霧峰林家*) and the Lîms of Pangkiô (*板橋林家*) were among the most notable in central and northern Taiwan respectively.

Second, it cast some doubt about the supremacy of the Qing emperorship in the minds of the ruled on this offshore island, as the Qing-guaranteed political order had been challenged, once and again, by the "infiltrating Western agents." The conventional emperor-gentry patronage, which had been once the dominant strategy in the Long Eighteenth Century, seemed to be "devalued" in the new era, as evidenced by an increasing number of cases related to Western affairs. At the same time, the new alternative patterns of interaction between the islanders, be they settlers or aborigines, and the "infiltrating Western agents" – for example, as mentioned above, the contracts signed between the Western merchants and the local compradors, the local converts acting under the *de facto* protection of the Western missionaries, and the treaties concluded between foreign forces (including the US Marine Corps as well as the Westernized Japanese military) and the southernmost highland Austronesian communes – seemingly became a more reliable cornerstone of security and prosperity in late-Qing Taiwan. Although it is unclear to us whether, or to what extent, the emerging forms of the islander-Western connectivity outweighed the conventional emperor-gentry patronage in the minds of the islanders following the presence of the "infiltrating Western agents," this uncertainty was by no means an encouraging and reassuring prospect for the Qing, a pre-modern empire that maintained political order more by prestige than through sheer violence.

Third, it induced the Qing court to tighten its grip on this offshore island by expanding the geographical scope of its effective rule as a countermeasure to dispel the rumored foreign attempts to take over Taiwan. Following the successive shipwrecks at the southernmost tip of Taiwan, the Qing's jurisdiction over the extensive mountainous hinterland as well as what were commonly called the "behind-mountains" (*後山*) areas (referring to Eastern Taiwan) was called into question, on account of the passivity of the Qing officials in arranging settlements following the accidents as well as their

inability to penalize or hold in check the Austronesian communes which killed the survivors of the shipwrecks. With a view to substantiating the empire's claim over the whole island of Taiwan, some ambitious Qing officials devised a policy called "opening the mountains and pacifying the savages" (*開山撫番*), seeking to extend the very thin imperial form of political superstructure that was originally confined to the settler society on the island to the tribal society that had already shrunk into the extensive mountainous hinterland and the "behind-mountains" areas in the Long Eighteenth Century. In order to carry out the policy, the officials first deployed Qing troops sent from China proper to open up three eastbound passageways running through the Central Maintain Range that departed respectively from the northern, central, southern regions of Western Taiwan. As these infrastructure projects entailed official incursions into the territories of the Austronesian communes in proximity to the construction, the policy unavoidably resulted in a series of wars[46] against the communes over a wide geographic range, including the southernmost peninsula, the northeastern part of the mountainous hinterland, and the rift valley and littoral of Eastern Taiwan, areas where effective state rule had never been secured previously.

Two things were particularly noteworthy about this warfare. First, the campaigns marked the first official attempt since the Qing's takeover of Taiwan to "proactively" direct its military efforts against the Austronesian communes – for most of the time prior to the articulation of this aggressive policy, the Qing had only launched punitive expeditions in retaliation against lowland or highland Austronesian warriors who had repeatedly waged guerrilla warfare against agrarian settlements or government facilities. Second, the expenses required for the repeated campaigns against the unruly and militant Austronesian communes were covered, for the most part, by imposing heavier levies on the settler society, especially on the large and wealthy settler clans. Ultimately, this proactive policy seeking to gain control of the whole of Taiwan met with little success, partly due to the fierce resistance of the invaded tribal society and partly because of the deliberate procrastination of the extorted settler society.[47] Although

[46] 1875 獅頭社事件 (排灣族：瑯嶠上十八社)、1876 太魯閣事件 (太魯閣族)、1877 大港口事件 (阿美族)、1878 加禮宛事件 (撒奇萊雅族與噶瑪蘭族)、1888 呂家望事件 (花東縱谷各庄社的大武壠族、阿美族、卑南族、客家墾民聯合抗清)

[47] Lin Wen-kai (2014) 晚清臺灣開山撫番事業新探：兼論十九世紀臺灣史的延續與轉型 [Opening Up the Mountains and Pacifying Aboriginal Peoples in Late Qing Taiwan: A New Study – Plus an Analysis of Continuity and Change in Nineteenth Century Taiwanese History], *Chinese Studies*, 32(2): 139-174.

geographically shrinking and with a much smaller population, the tribal society had not been conquered by either the settler society or the Qing Empire. It was not until the early twentieth century that the two coexisting yet conflicting societies on Taiwan were conquered in succession by the fully Westernized Japanese forces coming from without the island.

4.3 The Formalization of the Settler-Tribal Constitutional Duality

The constitutional significance of the Japanese rule over Taiwan in the Taiwanese national history is twofold. One was the creation of a Western-style political superstructure territorially congruent with Taiwan, and the other was the unintended, or even counter-intentional, formalization of the existing settler-tribal constitutional duality of the island for the practical necessity of stabilizing the Japanese rule over the two coexisting societies of drastically different natures.

The former actually involved a thorough reconstruction of the Qing-established imperial form of political superstructure covering only the settler society on the island into the first-ever island-wide modern colonial state in Taiwan's history. In the following paragraphs, I will examine the three conspicuous particularities of this completely new political superstructure, all of which are significant for the formation of the Taiwanese nation-state.

The First-Ever Island-Wide Modern Colonial State

To begin with, it was the first-ever island-wide state. For the first time, the entire island, including the coexisting settler and tribal societies, was put under the rule of the same state. Unlike the settler society that had been accustomed to state rule since its inception, the tribal society, although shrinking geographically, had never been dragged out of its long-standing state of statelessness prior to its eventual conquest by the Westernized Japanese troops in 1915, the year when the twice carried-out "Five-Year Program to Govern the Savages" (*五年理蕃計畫*) was finally declared complete. In other words, it was as late as the first half of the twentieth century that the two coexisting societies on Taiwan were incorporated into the same political-cultural framework, that is, Japanese colonialism. If we really want to point out a starting point from which Taiwan island as a whole could be taken as "an 'independent' (if understood

as ‘unitary’) stage of history,” as asserted by Tsao in his thesis of HTI, the year of 1915 would be a reasonable choice, since the coexisting settler and tribal societies on the island were for the first time brought under the rule of the same state from that time onwards.

Moreover, it was a modern state. Admittedly, the settler society on Taiwan was quite used to state rule before the Japanese takeover of the island, but it was a pre-modern form of bureaucratic rule imposed by the Qing, a continent-wide agrarian world empire. Following the Japanese acquisition of Taiwan, a modern form of bureaucratic rule framed in the structure of nation-state and fueled by the industrialized might of the Japanese empire was imposed on the island. This type of state formation was unknown to the settler society – let alone the highland Austronesian tribal society, whose first encounter with the state was actually to confront a modern one. The Japanese-made modern state was unprecedentedly strong in both aspects of state capacity, which are nicely differentiated by the prominent sociologist Michael Mann (1984) as “despotic and infrastructural powers.” In terms of despotic power, the modern Japanese state had a fiscal-military machine at its disposal, and more strikingly, an equilibrium between its revenue and expenditure was achieved within the first decade of its rule over the island through implementing state monopolies for the sale of salt, tobacco, camphor, and opium. That is to say, this fiscal-military machine – or, in a broader sense, the entire state apparatus – could be fully funded by indiscriminately imposing indirect taxes upon the entirety of the colonized, both wealthy and poor. In terms of infrastructural power, the state carried out a wide range of infrastructure projects, including the surveys of lands, customs, households, forests, and the “savages” as well as the constructions of railways, roads, ports, a postal system, grand official buildings, power and tap-water supply systems, telecommunication facilities, reservoirs, irrigation channels, as well a meticulous network of police stations and substations covering the whole island. The successive completion of various infrastructure projects in the first half of the Japanese rule over Taiwan facilitated the penetration of state power into the grassroots level of the colonial society and the subsequent industrialization and capitalist transformation of Taiwan as a whole.

Lastly, it was a highly autonomous colonial state, not only from the colonized in Taiwan but also from the metropolitan government in Japan, leading the notable leftist Japanese historical sociologist Oguma Eiji (2010: 141-191) to dub it the “Kingdom of

Government-General (of Taiwan)" (*總督府王國*). In the first half of its rule over Taiwan, this island-wide modern colonial state was characterized by the Japanese monopoly of both the "repressive and ideological state apparatuses," to borrow this useful conceptual dichotomization of state machinery from the French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser (1971: 121-176). In other words, the colonized on the island, be they settlers or aborigines, and no matter what social stratum they came from, were completely excluded from the highly centralized political superstructure. It was not until the second half of its rule, an age in which the Japanese colonizer boasted of its assimilation policies, that a limited number of the local inhabitants were recruited to fill the low-level positions of the repressive and ideological state apparatuses. Nonetheless, the Japanese predomination of the state machinery in both number and power was still obvious and unshakable.

In addition to the high degree of autonomy from the colonized, this colonial state was also highly autonomous from the metropole. Politically subject only to the Home Minister of Japan, the Governor-General of Taiwan was delegated, as a result of the struggles between the military-oriented Meiji oligarchy and the political party-based civilian politicians, with nearly unconstrained power in Taiwan. This unconstrained power was criticized by Oguma Eiji (2010: 184) – in my view, correctly – as the "(constitutionally) groundless dictatorship of the governor-general." While its constitutionality was contested in the political circles of metropolitan Japan, the "dictatorship of the governor-general" is undoubtedly an accurate portrait of the basic political arrangements in Japanese Taiwan, whereby the governor-general not only had executive power, but also the power to issue decrees in the permanent absence of a genuine colonial legislature (that is, the delegated legislation authorized by the Imperial Diet of Japan through the notable Law No. 63), while at the same time being in charge of the administration of the judiciary and serving as the commander of the Taiwan Army of Japan (*台湾軍 Taiwangun*), a garrison of the Imperial Japanese Army stationed on Taiwan.

It was under the rule of this first-ever island-wide modern colonial state that the existing settler-tribal constitutional duality of Taiwan was unintendedly – more precisely, counter-intentionally – formalized through a series of pragmatic measures and practices that were based on a sober awareness of the drastically different natures of the two coexisting societies on the island, rather than by any single specific policy

or decree serving a clear official purpose.

Double Particularism

The five-decade Japanese rule over Taiwan is conventionally differentiated into two phases in accordance with changes in official policy. Taking the inauguration of the first civilian Japanese Governor-General of Taiwan, Den Kenjirō (*田 健治郎*), in late 1919 as the watershed, the former phase (1895–1919) was marked the "doctrine of special rule" (*特別統治主義*) and the latter phase (1920–1945) the "doctrine of the elongation of the metropole" (*內地延長主義*).[48]

While it may be valid and useful in considering the Japanese rule over the settler society, we would be better advised to note that this two-phase periodization is based on a lopsided conception that subconsciously takes the settler part for the whole of Taiwan while completely erasing the actual existence of the tribal society from our horizons. Therefore, as a temporal classification of Japanese Taiwan, it is much less illuminating when we incorporate the two coexisting societies on the island into our analysis. This conventional two-phase periodization based on this frequently seen lopsided conception is, to a great extent, from the result of the excessively meticulous division of labor in academic circles: those studying the settler society in Japanese Taiwan tend to overlook the contemporaneous tribal society, while those focusing on the tribal society under the Japanese rule tend to disregard issues related to the contemporaneous settler society.

By taking an overall perspective, instead of taking a part for the whole, we will soon become aware of a consistent pattern inherent in the five-decade Japanese rule over Taiwan, which can be characterized as "double particularism." The pattern of "double particularism" can be encapsulated as follows: Taiwan as a whole was placed under a special rule that was legally and politically separated from the administration of metropolitan Japan, while the "Savage Territory" (*蕃地*) within Taiwan, together with the tribal society attached to it, was subject to a secondary special rule, called the "savage-governing administration" (*理蕃行政*), that was distinct from what was called the "general administration" (*普通行政*) applied to the settler society. Structurally

[48] The incorporation of Taiwan into the metropolis was not carried out in full until 1919, the year when *tokubetsu tōchi shugi* (特別統治主義, the doctrine of special rule) gave way to *naichi enchō shugi* (*內地延長主義*, the doctrine of the elongation of the metropole).

speaking, this consistent pattern of "double particularism" in Japanese Taiwan was a recurrence of the political regime of "one (proto-)state, two systems" in the Dutch Formosa, albeit occurring two centuries later in a modern form, on a larger, island-wide scale, and with an oriental colonizer. Spreading throughout the half-century of Japanese rule over Taiwan, the pattern of "double particularism" had three main characteristics.

First, the separate conquests of the settler and tribal societies entailed their different dynamics of being subjugated to Japanese rule. Even though Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895, the Japanese colonial state did not extend its effective authority over the whole island until 1915. That is to say, the island-wide Japanese rule over Taiwan in the early stages was merely a legal fiction rather than a military or political reality due to the separate conquests of the two societies on the island, first the settler one and then the tribal one, with a time lag of nearly two decades between them. The conquest of the settler society, termed the "Pacification of Taiwan" (*台湾平定作戦 Taiwan heitei sakusen*) in Japanese, was completed within six months in 1895, while the expeditions to the tribal society, known as the "Five-Year Program to Govern the Savages" only began in 1906 and were finally completed in 1915.

It was noteworthy the Japanese conquests of the two coexisting societies took advantage of the enmity between them. More precisely, the Japanese colonizer collaborated with the tribal society to conquer the settler society, then collaborated with the settler society to conquer the tribal society. By 1895 some highland and lowland Austronesian communes in the northwestern, central, and southernmost Taiwan had responded to the call of the Japanese army to eliminate the remnants of the settler militiamen resisting the Japanese takeover, while ten years later, wealthy settler clans, in some cases voluntarily, in other cases reluctantly, provided fiscal and logistical support for the pacification of the tribal society.

This two-decade time lag had two implications. First, it implied a shorter time-span – that is, three decades at most – of subjugation of the tribal society to the Japanese rule. Second, and more importantly, it implied an asymmetry between the two societies in terms of their treatment by the colonial authorities: while the settler society was placed under a highly repressive rule headed by a "military governor-general" (*武官總督*) and carried out through a deeply penetrative police system, the tribal society was still largely left beyond state control and subject to either a "charm offensive" or a more aggressive strategy combining appeasement and pacification – the former "charm

offensive" tactics proved counterproductive, while the latter two-faced strategy more often than not incurred armed resistance from the highland Austronesian communes. Furthermore, when the settler society was experiencing a shift in colonial policy to a relatively looser rule headed by a "civilian governor-general" (*文官總督*) and implemented through a bureaucrat-led local administration in 1920, the tribal society was actually at the early stages of being placed under police rule that had lasted for three decades until the eventual withdrawal of the Japanese colonizer in 1945.

Second, following the successive and separate conquests of the settler and tribal societies, the Japanese colonizer enforced strict segregation between the two societies for two reasons, one political and the other economic. On the one hand, it was a preemptive political measure to prevent any anti-Japanese alliance from being formed between the two societies, which were previously hostile to each other but now subjected to the rule of a common foreign conqueror. On the other hand, with a view to exploiting the abundant mountain resources of this mountainous island, the Japanese colonizer had carefully investigated, demarcated, classified, and forcefully nationalized what was designated as the "Savage Territory" (*蕃地*). Despite its original intention to secure political stability and monopolize mountain resources, the strict segregation between the two societies by means of nationalizing the "Savage Territory" had an incidental effect on the existing settler-tribal constitutional duality of Taiwan: it blocked up the second wave of settler expansion into the mountains triggered by the demands of Western markets in the mid-nineteenth century.

A sharp contrast in terms of effectiveness between this segregation enforced by the Japanese colonizer and the so-called "quarantine policy" (*封禁政策*) implemented by its Qing predecessor can be easily perceived. As a pre-modern agrarian empire, the Qing was even incapable of containing the first-wave settler expansion driven by the development of paddy fields in nearly all the lowlands of the mountainous island. In contrast, with the help of its Westernized repressive state apparatuses (i.e., the joint force of the army and the police, both of which were modeled on its Western predecessors and equipped with advanced weaponry and technology), and by dint of its masterful legal-political maneuvering (i.e., to nationalize the "Savage Territory"), the Japanese colonizer had effectively held back the second-wave settler expansion triggered by tea and camphor into the mountains. Under this strict segregation, the settler and tribal societies were largely secluded from each other, as the "Savage

Territory" became a virtually forbidden area, into which only the state-approved agents, who were mostly Japanese, e.g., policemen, officials, businessmen, Buddhist monks or Shinto priests, and academics, were granted entry.

Third, throughout the Japanese rule over Taiwan, the Japanese colonizer applied two distinct modes of governance to the two coexisting societies on the island. The successive and separate conquests of the settler and tribal societies, as well as the subsequent strict segregation between them, implied that from the very beginning of its takeover of Taiwan, the Japanese colonizer was well aware of the drastically different natures of the two coexisting societies on the island, and thereby consciously dealt with them in different ways or even manipulated the contradictions between them. It was out of the practical necessity to stabilize its rule that the Japanese colonizer had to apply, as noted previously, two distinct modes of governance to the two coexisting societies on the island – that is, the "general administration" to the settler society, and the "savage-governing administration" – or, in most cases, simplified as "governing savages" (*理蕃*) – to the tribal society.

The former, in essence, signified a modern form of bureaucratic rule that was characterized by its deep penetration into local society and the active deployment of the police – especially in the first half of the Japanese rule over Taiwan – in the implementation of official policies. The latter was, by nature, a semi-feudalistic police rule, in which the "savage-governing policemen" were tasked with a wide range of functions and armed with nearly plenipotentiary powers to take measures they felt necessary or helpful in the day-to-day governance of the tribal society.

The persistence of this binary mode of governance throughout the Japanese rule over Taiwan could be explained, to a great extent, by the very fact that the two societies on the island respectively underwent demilitarization at different paces following their confrontations with the Japanese colonizer.

From my point of view, the term "demilitarization" has a double connotation of physical and psychological disarmament. The former refers to the forceful handover of weapons and the dissolution of military force, while the latter means a sort of self-imposed restraint, with which the defeated rules out in his mind any possibility of resorting to force as a means of resistance. If demilitarization is understood as a process, instead of a one-shot deal, of reducing military might, its starting line is marked by physical disarmament and the finish line by psychological disarmament. In a strict sense,

only psychological disarmament means a true surrender – a conqueror could hardly feel at ease until the conquered was pressured into disarming psychologically.

From the very beginning, the Japanese acquisition of Taiwan was not realized by a peaceful transfer of territory as dictated in the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 between the Empire of Japan and the Qing Empire, but through a series of campaigns against the variegated yet poorly coordinated resisting forces on the island. Aside from the ephemeral and phantasmagoric Republic of Formosa led by the province-level Qing officials stationed in Taiwan as well as the big landlords and wealthy merchants which collapsed on its first encounter with the Japanese military, it took the Japanese conqueror half a year to destroy high-spirited yet poorly-armed guerrilla resistance led by small landlords in central and northwestern Taiwan, and another seven years to eliminate the remnant militias who absconded into mountains – among the leaders of these militias, Kán the Giant Lion (*簡大獅*) in the north, Kua the Iron Tiger (*柯鐵虎*) in the central, and Lîm the Young Leopard *(林少貓*) in the south, collectively called the "three anti-Japanese braves" (*抗日三猛*), were the most notable. The early pacification of the settler society was soon followed by intermittent riots among unorganized or loosely organized peasants that were triggered by massive land grabs for the constructions of state infrastructure. These disturbances started in 1907 and did not come to an end until the 1915 Tapani Uprising (*噍吧哖事件*), in which the participants were brutally purged by the Japanese authorities.[49]

From the aforementioned process-oriented perspective, it is fair to say that the settler society was thoroughly demilitarized after the bloody failure in 1915, which marked the last armed resistance against the Japanese rule emerging from the settler society. This argument resonates with the generally accepted view that, awed by the heavy casualties caused by this aborted rebellion, the anti-Japanese resistance from within the settler society started to shift its approach from outright armed revolt to a nonviolent nationalist movement. In this regard, the incident signified the final straw that impelled the settler society into psychological disarmament, since force in resistance to colonial rule was from now on ruled out of their political repertoire. That is to say, it took the Japanese colonizer two decades (1895–1915) to enforce a thorough demilitarization of the settler society.

[49] Katz, Paul R. (2006) *染血的山谷：日治時期的噍吧哖事件* [The Bloodstained Valley: The Tapani Incident in Japanese Taiwan]. Taipei: San Min Book Co., Ltd.

In contrast to the settler society that arrived at the finish line of demilitarization in 1915, the tribal society was just forced across the starting line by the very same year when it was required to hand over its weapons to the Japanese authorities as a taken of submission following the completion of the "Five-Year Program to Govern the Savages." However, despite its physical disarmament in 1915, it is difficult to tell when exactly the tribal society actually arrived at the finish line of demilitarization for two reasons.

First, the tribal society had never been thoroughly disarmed physically. It should be noted that, over the three-decade Japanese rule on the tribal society (1915–1945), the physical disarmament was implemented not through a complete prohibition of using firearms but via a regulation that limited the use of guns to hunting animals for supplementary livelihood or important ceremonies.

Second, it was also uncertain when, or whether, force as the last resort to resist was actually ruled out in the minds of the subjugated highland Austronesian warriors. The 1930 Musha Incident (*霧社事件*) was an unambiguous indication that, despite their apparent submission and obedience and the strict regulations on the use of firearms, the tribal society was not yet to be disarmed psychologically. Moreover, it was as late as 1933 that the eighteen-year guerrilla warfare between a group of Bunun warriors and the Japanese troops, known as the Dafen Incident (*大分事件*), eventually came to an end with a peaceful settlement between the two warring parties. Even in the last years of the Japanese rule over Taiwan, as the case of the Takasago Giyutai (*高砂義勇隊*, literally, aboriginal volunteer corps) showed, more than four thousand aboriginal warriors had displayed a high degree of militarism and a superb combat capability that impressed the Japanese officers in the Southeast Asian theater of the Greater Pacific War, despite the fact that this time they were no longer fighting against the Japanese soldiers but confronted American and Australian troops. Considering the abovementioned military-oriented occurrences, it is only reasonable to conclude that the tribal society, although subjugated by the Japanese state in 1915, had never been thoroughly demilitarized under the three-decade Japanese rule that ended in 1945.

This consistent pattern of "double particularism" had an unintended consequence: the settler-tribal constitutional duality of Taiwan that had formed from the bottom up in the Long Eighteenth Century was unintendedly – more precisely, counter-intentionally – "formalized" from the top down through the pragmatic measures and actual practices of the Japanese colonizer in the second phase of the Lasting Nineteenth Century, i.e.,

the first half of the twentieth century. It was through this dynamic and binary process that the settler-tribal constitutional duality of Taiwan was officially perceived, recognized, and unintendedly – or, to be more precise, counter-intentionally – formalized.

4.4 The Semi-Leninist Unitary Rule

If the Japanese rule over Taiwan characterized by a consistent pattern of "double particularism" was, as noted previously, a recurrence of the Dutch regime of "one (proto-)state, two systems," the KMT-ROC was virtually a repetition of the Kingdom of Tungning in terms of both states' shared attribute of émigré-ness, and in the sense that they both replaced their immediate predecessor's binary mode of governance with a unitary rule.

The émigré-ness of the KMT-ROC was first manifested in its forced retreat, together with a huge number of émigrés, to Taiwan following its defeat to the CCP-PRC in the Chinese Civil War. In a very short time span of the early 1950s, this massive émigré population, estimated at more than one million people, flooded into Taiwan, an island whose population at the time was around six million.

Of this one-million-strong émigré population, 600,000 were reportedly soldiers – that is to say, the military accounted for more than half of the émigré population. Poorly-equipped and badly-trained as it was, this large army represented the only regular military force in postwar Taiwan, rendering the exiled KMT-ROC an overwhelming advantage in terms of sheer violence over the native population on the island, be they settlers or aborigines.

The sudden influx of the massive émigré population would naturally aggravate the shortages of food and housing, which had already become serious issues in the aftermath of the Second World War prior to the arrival of the émigrés. Similar to the Zheng regime, this problem was worsened by the fact that nearly all the émigrés were nonproductive in nature. Aside from the large number of military personnel who depended entirely on state supplies, the remainder of the émigré population were mostly dependent on government posts to make a living, primarily in the administrative and educational systems.

In other words, this one-million-strong émigré population that arrived in postwar

Taiwan was, in nature, no different from what was previously called the "Zheng papulation" that fled seventeenth-century Taiwan in terms of its dependency on the émigré state for subsistence. Needless to say, the expenses required to satisfy the needs of the dependent émigré population were inevitably covered by imposing extremely heavy levies and extortions on the native population. This was the historical-structural origin of the formation of a special, state-patronized stratum known as the "military-bureaucracy-education" (*軍公教*) in postwar Taiwan,[50] a privileged class constituted disproportionally by the émigrés and, to a lesser extent, by some native collaborators who were designated to fill the low-level positions, which as a whole was considered as nonproductive and parasitical.

The Third Type of Basic Community

Following the sudden influx of the massive émigré population, Taiwan witnessed the third type of basic community known as *juàncūn* (*眷村*, referring to the "military dependents' villages") that was added into the social fabric of the island where its two predecessors, the locally formed settler clans and the long-standing Austronesian communes, preexisted. As implied in its name, the formation of this new, third type of basic community was the result of a government project that was intended to provide accommodation to the servicemen on active duty or veterans – including their families if these single soldiers were able to marry a native woman in Taiwan. It was reported that around one-third of the émigré population had lived in *juàncūn*, while the other two-thirds were mainly urban dwellers, whose accommodations were acquired through confiscating the properties left by the Japanese or owned by wealthy natives. With a view to both safeguarding the émigré leadership against the native population and keeping a close eye on the military personnel, these numerous *juàncūn* were deliberately established nearby cantonments and important government agencies. Obviously, this strategic arrangement reflected the émigré elites' sense of insecurity

[50] Postwar Taiwan was banteringly called "a welfare state for the 'military-bureaucracy-education'" (*軍公教福利國家*). By 1950, the expenditures of general administration and national defense (mostly used for paying the personnel expense of the military) constituted 74.2 percent of the total budge of government; the percentage did not decrease to less than 50 percent until 1968. In 1950, the expenditures of social welfare constituted 2.8 percent of the total budge of government and grew to surpass 10 percent only after 1970. However, even this small sum of welfare was mostly distributed to the émigré population. See: Wakabayashi, Masahiro (2014: 128) *戰後臺灣政治史：中華民國臺灣化的歷程* [The Postwar Political History of Taiwan: The Process of the Taiwanization of the Republic of China]. Taipei: National Taiwan University Press.

toward not only the native population but also the émigré population. Geographically speaking, most *juàncūn* resembled enclaves that were surrounded by native communities, with the highest density in the capital Taipei, followed by two other important cities, Kaohsiung and Taichung.

It should be noted that, in a strict sense, *juàncūn* was a kind of basic community more in form than in substance – or, a pseudo-basic community, if you will. Bluntly put, *juàncūn* looked like a basic community while actually lacking the constitutive elements of it. The most apparent proof that *juàncūn* was a pseudo-basic community was the nonexistence of a common language and a common religion among the *juàncūn* residents. It is difficult to imagine that the members within a genuine basic community would have neither a common language as a means of communication nor a common religion that functioned to forge bonds among them. Time does matter in the making of a genuine basic community, especially when it comes to the emergence of a commonly spoken language or a collectively practiced religion. Obviously, the nonexistence of a common language and a common religion was a necessary result of the fact that *juàncūn* in nature was an outcome of hasty enclosures sponsored by the émigré state or patched up by some émigrés under official connivance, instead of a natural product out of a long enough process through which the émigrés could gradually settle down in the host society.

These two pieces of evidence, i.e., the lack of a common language and the absence of a common religion, could also explain – at least, partially – the occurrence of two conspicuous phenomena related to the émigré population in postwar Taiwan. First, compared to their contemporaries who came from the other two types of basic community preexisting in Taiwan, the descendants of the *juàncūn* residents, i.e., the so-called "second-generation mainlanders" (*外省第二代*), generally showed a much stronger enthusiasm for learning the official language as a lingua franca, and thereby, in general, they actually acquired a better command of Mandarin than their settler or aboriginal contemporaries did. Second, unlike the settler population among whom variegated folk religions were deeply rooted in their respective communities, it seemed to be much easier for Christian evangelists to win over new converts from within the émigré population, including the *juàncūn* residents, since no community-based religion had already taken root among them.

Moreover, aside from the lack of a common language and the absence of a

common religion, the *juàncūn* in itself did not constitute a self-sufficient economic unit, as opposed to the other two types of basic community that were socio-economically self-contained. Either maintaining a hunting-gathering subsistence together with slash-and-burn agriculture, or living on intensive farming or agriculture-based trades, the survivability of the two preexisting types of basic community in Taiwan, i.e., the Austronesian communes and the settler clans, hinged on their community-based collective efforts and common properties. But this was not the case for *juàncūn* – the subsistence of its residents was supplied by the state, that is, wages, subsidies, and welfare benefits. In other words, the livelihood of each *juàncūn* resident, as well as their families if married, was vertically linked to the state on an individual basis rather than horizontally connected to other residents on a collective basis. In other words, a genuine basic community is supposed to function as a socio-economic unit of shared interest and collective livelihood; the *juàncūn* simply did not operate in this way.

Lastly, *juàncūn* failed to cross the minimum threshold for a genuine basic community, that is, intergenerational continuity. Admittedly, we have to concede that their failure could be attributed, to some extents, to the fact that most *juàncūn* were established at an inopportune time: they mostly materialized in the 1950s and 1960s, a period that was closely followed by rapid industrialization and urbanization. That is to say, the residents of *juàncūn*, together with their immediate descendants who were just reaching adulthood, had to face the outflow of young people seeking a job in the cities a mere one or two decades after they settled down in *juàncūn*. There is no doubt that the deconstructive forces unleashed by industrialization and urbanization were an onslaught not only on *juàncūn* but also on the other two types of basic community. While it is hard to tell whether or not it was the most vulnerable to the deconstructive assaults, *juàncūn*, as a kind of basic community more in form than in substance that lacked a common language, religion, and material foundation, was obviously the one which was least capable of recovering from its disintegrated and devastated state caused by the industrialization and urbanization.

I believe nothing could support the statement above better than the phenomena that since the 1990s, there has had a movement of "communal revival" (*部落復振*) and a variety of "community development projects" (*社區總體營造*) that were launched with a view to reinvigorating the Austronesian communes and the settler clans respectively, as opposed to only a few programs that were devised for the preservation

of *juàncūn*. It is noteworthy, and ironic indeed, that by closely examining these few programs, we will find their common tenet was to keep and refurbish the old, dilapidated, and mostly empty houses in *juàncūn* as a site of reminiscence rather than to retrieve the original *juàncūn* residents and their descendants who had moved out and dispersed.[51] This least intense aspiration to restore *juàncūn* as a living community of people, rather than a site of émigré cultural remains preserved for sightseeing or educational ends, was another lateral proof that *juàncūn* was at best a kind of pseudo-basic community.

The KMT-ROC as a Dependency of the West

Given their sameness of serving as an émigré regime that imposed a highly-centralized unitary rule over Taiwan, the KMT-ROC still had two distinctive features that differentiated it from its Zheng predecessor.

First, the Kingdom of Tungning, aside from its émigré-ness, was also characterized by its "maritime-ness" that sprang from its pirate-merchant origin, while the KMT-ROC was a land-based state that claimed a continent-wide territory. Even following its exile in Taiwan, this émigré state strived to keep its continent-oriented attribute intact, as evidenced by its claim of sovereignty over the "whole of China," which to date it is yet to formally renounce, as well as the "doctrine of a large army" (*大陸軍主義*), a military configuration of troops and resources that gave priority to maintaining a large-size ground force that the émigré leadership considered necessary for recovering and occupying its claimed continent-wide motherland, but which was greatly oversized when applied to the island-wide defense of Taiwan.

Second, and more importantly, the House of Koxinga was a major contender to the European agents, be they Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, or British, who were competing for the maritime interests and hegemony in Asian waters in the seventeenth century. In contrast, the KMT had been dependent on the West since the mid-1920s. More specifically, the KMT's dependence on the West can be divided into four phases.

First, only several years after its establishment in 1919, the newly founded KMT soon carried out an opportunistic transfer of its patron in the mid-1920s. Dissatisfied with the limited support provided by certain Japanese paramilitary groups, e.g.,

[51] Li, Kuang-chun (2019) *眷村保存與多元文化的社會學分析* [The Sociological Analysis of the Preservation of *Juàncūn* and Multiple Cultures] Taipei: Yuan-Liou Publishing Co., Ltd.

Kokuryūkai (*黒竜会*, literally, the Black Dragon Society), which had been long suppressed by the pro-Westernization Japanese establishment for their Pan-Asianism, the KMT turned to the Bolsheviks who had just usurped power in the Russian revolution, successfully established the Soviet Union in 1922, and were naturally more powerful and had more access to resources than the KMT's former Japanese patron. With fiscal, technological, and political support from the Soviet Union,[52] the KMT started to establish Soviet-style military and civilian institutions in accordance with the instructions of a handful of Soviet advisors. Among these, the Whampoa Military Academy (*黃埔軍校*) and the Central School of Party Affairs (*中央黨校*) were the most notable and influential, both of which were later relocated to Taiwan and renamed as the Republic of China Military Academy (*中華民國陸軍官校*) and the National Chengchi University (*國立政治大學*) respectively. It is noteworthy that Chiang Kai-shek was the main supporter and beneficiary in the KMT's dramatic "Soviet turn," as he usurped more senior members, who were generally considered as much more qualified than Chiang, and successfully assumed leadership of the party by virtue of serving as the superintendent the Whampoa Military Academy and the commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army, both of which were sponsored by the Soviet Union.

The second phase started in the mid-1930s, the eve of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). Alarmed by the expansion of the communist influence, Chiang began to purge the CCP members within the KMT in 1934 with the help of the military advisors sent by Nazi Germany. Despite Chiang's suppression of Chinese communists, the Soviet leadership was still willing to bet on the seemingly more robust KMT than the faltering CCP when it came to the goal of propping up a competent proxy in China for pursuing world revolution. Following the Second Sino-Japanese War, China became a combatant in the Second World War (WWII) in 1941 on the allied side as a result of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, receiving even more aid from the United States than that the Soviet Union had previously provided.

The third phase began with the end of WWII and ended with the KMT's retreat to Taiwan. In this short time span of only a few years, the KMT were ditched by both the

[52] Germinating in yet eventually alienating itself from the Western civilization, the Soviet Union – or, in a broader sense, all communists in the world – was a challenger to the West that actually came from within the West.

Soviet Union and the United States. After the Bolsheviks shifted their military and fiscal support completely from the less reliable KMT to the CCP, the KMT also suffered from the withdrawal of the American aid because of the prevailing corruption in the KMT leadership. As a result, soon after victory in WWII, the KMT suffered a bitter defeat in the Chinese Civil War and was exiled to Taiwan.

The fourth phase began with the outbreak of the Korean War, after which the moribund KMT exiled in Taiwan began, once again, to receive massive American aid and was placed under an American protectorate. Exiled in Taiwan and benefitting from American aid and protection, the KMT's dependence on the West in this phase was Janus-faced. On the one hand, taking advantage of the feebleness of rival factions in the party due to the loss of their political bases in China, Chiang was eventually able to thoroughly reconstruct the KMT-ROC into a highly centralized Leninist party-state under his personal dictatorship in accordance with the Soviet model. On the other hand, in continuously receiving the political, diplomatic, military, and economic support from the United States, the émigré state itself as well as the Taiwan society under its rule were both increasingly infused with what could be called "American factors," which eventually overcame the rival "Soviet factors" from within and without the state – this process was virtually a textbook example of so-called "peaceful evolution."

The Party-Military-Intelligence Complex

The core of the reconstructed KMT-ROC in Taiwan state was a Leninist machine – so to speak, the party-military-intelligence complex. This party-military-intelligence complex adopted a variety of coercive measures to enable the tottering émigré state to consolidate a highly centralized unitary rule on the island. This highly centralized unitary rule included three main modes of control, which were applied indiscriminately to all the inhabitants of Taiwan, be they aborigines, settlers, or émigrés.

The first was the clientelism mode. With a view to containing the political energy and momentum of the settler and tribal societies at the local level, the émigré party-state established a meticulous web of district-oriented "local party bureaus" (*地方黨部*) together with their substations and what were called the "service centers" (*民眾服務社*), through which the party was able to reach, appease, and coopt the settler and aboriginal local elites by promising them local offices and economic privileges. In other words, this established a patronage relationship between the émigré party-state and the

local elites, in which economic rewards and political loyalty were exchanged in systematic ways. By setting up a clientelist form of linkages with the local societies, the émigré party-state was able to create and maintain what Wu Nai-teh (1987) called the "dualistic structure of national and local elites" in Taiwan. In this dualistic structure, the émigré elites monopolized power at the national level according to their personal relationship with the paramount leader Chiang Kai-shek and later his heir Chiang Ching-kuo, while the local offices and associated economic privileges were reserved for the settler or aboriginal elites through limited competitive elections. It is noteworthy that there were a variety of so-called "special party bureaus" (*特種黨部*) that were designed to monitor and control the émigré population, including the *juàncūn* residents as well as those taking government posts in the military, administrative, and educational systems.[53]

Second, the émigré party-state applied a hybrid of the Soviet-style nationalization of all key, mostly heavy, industries and the Nazi mode of state corporatism to the regulation of important economic entities and social groups. Immediately after its military occupation of Taiwan enforced in accordance with the General Order No. 1 issued by the U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, Chen Yi, the then proxy of Chiang, confiscated nearly all the industries that the Japanese had established for wartime needs, including, energy, chemicals, transportation, shipbuilding, steelmaking, and finance, subsequently "nationalizing" them as state-owned enterprises – more specifically, enterprises owned by the central or provincial governments of China. Therefore, before its exile in Taiwan, the KMT-ROC had already taken over most important industries on the island through Soviet-style nationalization.

Aside from the creation of state-owned enterprises by nationalizing the wartime heavy industries founded and left behind by the former Japanese colonizer, the émigré party-state also applied the Nazi mode of state corporatism to certain state-patronized large-size private enterprises as well as the peak organizations such as the general chamber of commerce and the national federation of industries. The former were the by-products of the sweeping land reforms enforced by the émigré state in the 1950s; after the material and social foundations of the upper echelons of the settler society

[53] Kung, I-chun (1998)*「外來政權」與本土社會：改造後國民黨政權社會基礎的形成 1950-1969* ["Foreign Regime" and Local Society: The Formation of the Reformed KMT's Social Bases, 1950-1969]. Taipei: Dawshiang.

were destroyed through the land reform, the émigré state paid the wealthy settler landlords with stocks in the so-called "four big companies," that is, companies of cement, papermaking, agriculture and forestry, and mining, as compensation for their losses. The latter was the result of clumsily imitating the Nazi mode of state corporatism in a socio-economic milieu that actually lacked a tradition of corporatism, through which the émigré state attempted to seize the commanding grounds of economic production. Seeing the merits in the Nazi mode of state corporatism for securing a stable rule over an unfamiliar territory, the émigré state also applied the principles of state corporatism to certain influential religious and professional groups. By organizing and subsuming these originally scattered and unrelated groups under the same peak organizations monitored and controlled by government agencies, it would become much easier for the émigré state to mobilize their active support for the government and to take preemptive measures to demobilize the latent non-conformist forces.

The third mode was pretty much a shoddy duplication of the KGB (*Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti*, the Committee for State Security in English), which rendered the émigré KMT-ROC the infamy of "rule by secret service" (*特務治國*). With a variety of bureaus in the party, military, police, and administration that were tasked with intelligence and secret service work, this shoddy duplicate was characterized by its plural and chaotic chains of command, overlapping scope of jurisdiction, and ruthless infighting. Terror tactics were used to enforce control over schools, mass media, clubs, and administrative offices, while the secret police were used not only against suspected communists but also suspected political dissidents of all kinds. In short, the entire society was put under surveillance by the émigré state.

Émigré Colonialism

Under the semi-Leninist unitary rule, the relationship between the émigré state and the host society as a whole embodied a typical colonial structure. One of its colonial characteristics was to prevent the native elites – that is, the settler and aboriginal elites, in the case of Taiwan – from meaningfully participating in the political superstructure, in particular the upper parts of it. The exclusion of native elites from the political superstructure began even before the KMT-ROC was exiled in Taiwan in 1949. The bloody military crackdown of the February 28 Incident of 1947 and the subsequent purge carried out in the name of rooting out communists had already killed many of the

native elites and forced others to flee abroad, while those who remained withdrew from politics.

After decimating the native elites, the émigré state was able to steadily replace its Japanese predecessor's binary mode of governance with a highly centralized unitary rule based in Taipei with the help of native collaborators. By abolishing the strict segregation between the two coexisting societies on the island enforced by the former Japanese colonizer and subsequently subsuming the tribal society under the general administration, the émigré KMT-ROC was actually turning the prewar Japanese regime of "one (colonial) state, two systems" into a unitary and hyper-centralized mode of governance that could be characterized as "one island, one system."

This was the first time, occurring as late as the second half of the twentieth century, that the settler and tribal societies on Taiwan were placed together under one single homogenous jurisdiction. This policy had two major consequences, both of which later unintentionally stimulated and facilitated the making of the alliance between the proponents of Taiwanese and aboriginal nationalisms.

First, the tribal society was gradually turned into a periphery of the settler society in both politico-administrative and socio-economical terms, despite the fact that they had previously existed in parallel with each other. Following the new version of administrative division and the repeated local elections implemented by the émigré state, the governance of the tribal society was reduced to the township- and village-level administrations that were subordinate to their respective superordinate local governments, that is, the counties and the Taiwan Provincial Government. Socio-economically speaking, the abolishment of strict segregation resulted in a double yet counter-directional movement of capital and people – large-scale capital moving up to the mountain areas and a young labor force moving down to the cities. Formerly a forbidden area under the Japanese rule, the tribal society was forcibly opened not only for state-run enterprises, such as ranches operated by the Veterans' Affairs Council and lumbering and afforestation operations directed by the Forestry Bureau, but also for private settler-owned agricultural enterprises that cultivated cash crops on a large scale under the connivance of the state (Good and Chang 1999). These large-scale enterprises not only further encroached on the lands that sustained the aboriginal subsistence economy, but also created a pecuniary economy where aborigines were increasingly reliant on money to satisfy their daily needs. The disintegration of the aboriginal

subsistence economy and the rise of the pecuniary economy in the tribal society acted as push forces driving aboriginal migration to the cities in western Taiwan to make a living by serving as low-level workers. Today, at least half the aboriginal population lives in urban areas. These resulting politico-administrative and socio-economical disadvantages suffered by the tribal society under the unitary rule of the KMT-ROC not only triggered the emergence of aboriginal nationalism but also became a concern of Taiwanese nationalists, facilitating the incorporation of a multiculturalist tenet into the civic Taiwanese nationalism that prevailed in the democratization of Taiwan.

Second, following the strict segregation between the two societies was abolished, the interactions and exchanges between the settler and aboriginal populations were greatly increased, especially at the elite level. The aboriginal youth who came down to the cities to receive higher education and acquired a good command of Mandarin became the representative aboriginal elites, and eventually came forward to serve as the earliest advocates of aboriginal rights and autonomy. The settler evangelists, together with western missionaries, went into the mountains, converted the aborigines with the help of American aid (mostly wheat flour, milk, and cloth), and eventually Christianized nearly the entire tribal society. The highly educated aboriginal elites and the Presbyterian aboriginal ministers together served as the mainstay of aboriginal movements for aboriginal rights and autonomy since the late 1980s.

The American Factors

Following its exile in Taiwan and the outbreak of the Korean War, the KMT-ROC could no longer sit on the fence between the Soviet Union and the United States, and instead had to portray itself as an East Asian anti-communist sentinel in order to win wholesale American support. However, its one-sided dependence on the United States inevitably spawned numerous what I term the "American factors," with which, all things being equal, the Soviet-style constitution of the émigré state would be gradually changed. The most influential "American factors" embedded in the émigré state was a group of young technocrats, exemplified by Lee Teng-hui who was one of the most notable technocrats working for and trained by the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, one of the most important channels through which the American aid was delivered. The most important "American factors" situated outside of the state were the small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which constituted

the mainstay of the US-bound export sector and had outperformed the state-owned enterprises since the 1960s. In this sense, the democratization of Taiwan could be understood as the bloodless reconstruction of the Soviet-style constitution of the émigré KMT-ROC, in which the decrepit "Soviet factors" (e.g., the party-military-intelligence complex and the SOEs) were dismantled and reframed by the joint force of the "American factors" from within and without the state – mainly the numerous SMEs and the liberal-minded technocrats coming from the settler society and, to a lesser extent, the Presbyterian forces from both the settler and tribal societies, which could be considered as a type of "American factors" that took on a religious form.

4.5 Nation-State Building in the Name of Democratization

Benefiting from, and therefore constrained by, the actual protection of the United States, which led the defense of the Western civilization against communist challengers during the Cold War era, the émigré KMT-ROC as an American dependency was unable to prohibit the settler and tribal societies on the island from absorbing two constitutive elements of Western civilization. First, the settler society underwent rapid industrialization and capitalist transformation after the late 1960s. Second, the tribal society collectively converted to Christianity in the 1950s and 1960s. Through capitalism and Christianity, the two societies coexisting in Taiwan had, on the one hand, reframed their respective social fabrics and, on the other, weaved themselves into the worldwide texture of the Western world order.

In taking the civilizational-constitutional perspective above, the democratization of Taiwan that began in the 1990s can be therefore understood as a process whereby the industrialized settler society and the Christianized tribal society joined forces to overthrow the repressive rule of the émigré state, with an aspiration to introduce and internalize another constitutive element of Western civilization, that is, the self-rule of the people, or democracy for short, that is supposed to be materialized within the contemporary political-cultural framework of the nation-state. Emerging from the peculiar context of émigré colonialism imposed by the KMT-ROC, the third wave of nation-state building and democratization were two sides of the same process.

A Civic and Multicultural Taiwanese Nation

As a reaction to the second-wave nation-building that was carried out by forcing the aboriginal, settler, and émigré populations into becoming so-called "authentic Chinese," the third-wave nation-building sought to reshape this existing ROC citizenry constituted by the involuntary combination of various human groups in postwar Taiwan into a civic and multicultural Taiwanese nation.

Obviously, it implied a political engineering guided by a nationalist ideology that was diametrically opposed to the official ideology indoctrinated by the émigré KMT-ROC, i.e., the ethnic and assimilationist Chinese nationalism. To being with, this nationalist ideology deemed the people of Taiwan as "Taiwanese" belonging to a legitimate nation, as opposed to a distinct group of "authentic Chinese" inhabiting Taiwan. Moreover, it argued Taiwanese would be a civically-defined national category in opposition to the ethnically-defined Chinese nation. Finally, it emphasized that this civic Taiwanese nation would be organized in accordance with multiculturalist principles, which were deliberately upheld in defiance of the assimilationist tenets inherent in the official Chinese nationalism (Sia 2016).

Inspired and encouraged by the multiculturalist principles inherent in Taiwanese nationalism, an "autonomist line of aboriginal nationalism" germinated in the mid-1980s and started to differentiate itself from its ideological matrix, i.e., the civic and multiculturalist Taiwanese nationalism, in the 1990s. As a secondary nationalist ideology that was logically derived from, and thereby naturally compatible with, the civic and multiculturalist Taiwanese nationalism, it conceived Taiwan as a "civic nation" – so to speak, a "civically-defined political community," instead of one defined by culture, language, blood, or any other ethnic traits. Along multiculturalist lines, it went one step further to argue that this civically-defined political community of Taiwanese was actually composed of two broadly-defined "races": one was the Pan-Austronesian aborigines, and the other was the Pan-Han people, referring to the settler and émigré populations, despite the different timings of their arrivals in Taiwan and their differences in cultural traits and political status.

Lastly, it put forward a conditional thesis concerning the aboriginal participation in the formation of the Taiwanese nation: since aboriginal interests and rights had been encroached and undermined by the successive foreign regimes that both the Pan-Han settlers and émigrés had participated in, now that these two latecomers sought to forge

a political community together with the Pan-Austronesian aborigines, the aborigines demanded their status to be guaranteed and promoted in accordance with multiculturalist principles as an equal member in the envisioned Taiwanese nation. It should be noted that "being an equal member" here had a double connotation: at the individual level, the aboriginal interests and rights that were infringed upon by either the foreign rulers or the two latecomers should be restored and compensated, while at the collective level, aboriginal self-rule should be realized within the political-cultural framework of the envisioned Taiwanese nation (Sia 2018).

Over the last three decades, the major political fault line in Taiwan has been the struggle between rival national identities advocated by the Chinese and Taiwanese nationalist camps. In this three-decade bloodless nationalist competition, aboriginal nationalism has played a role as a "wing" of the Taiwanese nationalist camp to outflank the Chinese nationalist camp. Since the 1990s, a strategic alliance has been formed between the settler-based Taiwanese nationalism and the autonomist line of aboriginal nationalism. Considering the four-centuries-long history of historical hostility, mutual mistrust, and hostile competition between settlers and aborigines, this settler-aboriginal nationalist alliance was indeed an unprecedented endeavor. Under this alliance, aboriginal nationalists symbolically granted Taiwanese nationalism certain "pure" and "authentic" Austronesian elements of "Taiwan-ness" that were generally perceived as having nothing to do with "Chinese-ness" so as to counteract the émigré-centric ethnic and assimilationist Chinese nationalism. In exchange, Taiwanese nationalists promised aboriginal self-government once they obtained power.

Under the triangular political structure in which the latest foreign ruler (i.e., the KMT) held a dominant position at the top, multiculturalism served as the bond of solidarity for this unlikely alliance and the bridge linking the aspirations of Taiwanese and aboriginal nationalisms, forming the common ground that bound their efforts to overthrow the ethnically-defined "authentic" Chinese nation officially imposed by the émigré state and replace it with a civically defined multicultural Taiwanese nation-state. In this envisioned multicultural Taiwanese nation-state, the settler-tribal constitutional duality of Taiwan that had been nullified by the émigré state for around four decades was expected to materialize in the name of aboriginal self-rule and in the form of "(aboriginal) nations within a (multicultural Taiwanese) nation" (*國中有國*). In other words, the once-nullified dual constitution of Taiwan was to be resurrected at the

national level.

Driven by the joint forces of Taiwanese and aboriginal nationalisms, there has indeed been a big leap forward in realizing aboriginal rights and self-rule over the last three decades. In 1994, activists achieved the incorporation of the term *yuanzhumin* (*原住民*, referring to "aborigines"), the first self-designation for aborigines as a collective, into one of the ten additional articles to the ROC Constitution. This term was then altered to *yuanzhuminzu* (*原住民族*, referring to "aboriginal nations") in the constitutional revision of 1997. That is to say, from the late-1990s onwards, "aboriginal nations" have been recognized as "constitutional subjects" that are entitled to self-government. Following a campaign by activists, a cabinet-level Council of Indigenous Peoples was established in 1996, signifying the elevation of aboriginal affairs in the bureaucracy from the local to the national level. Moreover, aborigines that constituted only around two percent of the contemporary population of Taiwan were granted overrepresentation in the parliament, providing them with leverage that could be manipulated in the party competition as well as used to protect themselves as the minority from the decisions of the majority that adversely affected their interests.

Following the first-ever rotation of power in 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the main political vehicle of Taiwanese nationalism, actively promoted aboriginal autonomy during its first period in office (2000–2008), despite the fact that the party's power was highly restricted due to its lack of a parliamentary majority and the proactive or passive resistance from KMT strongholds in the judiciary, military, and bureaucracy. In 1999, a highly symbolic treaty-like document known as "The New Partnership between Aboriginal Nations and the Government of Taiwan" was signed between representatives from each of the aboriginal tribes and Chen Shui-bian, the then presidential candidate nominated by the DPP. In 2002, the aforementioned agreement was reaffirmed by Chen, this time as head of state, in a ceremony involving aboriginal representatives, where he pledged that the partnership between Aboriginal Nations and the Taiwan Government would be realized as a "quasi-nations-to-nation relationship" (*準國與國關係*) in the form of "nations within a nation." This development culminated in the passage of the "Indigenous Peoples' Basic Law" in 2005, which legally reaffirmed the spirit of the agreement. The passage of the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law in 2005 marked a major milestone of aboriginal self-rule, laying down a favorable legal foundation for the future aboriginal movements to politically, judicially,

economically, socially, and culturally realize the goal of resurrecting the dual constitution of Taiwan onto the higher, national level.

During the second DPP period beginning in 2016, we have witnessed swift progress on symbolic and cultural issues, as exemplified by the presidential apology to indigenous peoples made officially by the second DPP president Tsai Ing-wen on behalf of the ROC, which received wide international and domestic coverage, as well as by the passage of the "Indigenous Languages Development Act," by which aboriginal languages were recognized as official languages. Immediately after Tsai's election, the Indigenous Historical Justice and Transitional Justice Committee was set up at the level of Presidential Office to lay the historical and legal groundwork for restoring and promoting aboriginal rights and autonomy. President Tsai herself served as the convener of the committee, while representatives of the sixteen officially recognized aboriginal nations and those striving for official recognition were invited to participate as *ex officio* members.[54]

Inheriting yet Reframing the Émigré State

As a reaction to the second-wave state-building that materialized in the form of the KMT-ROC, the third-wave state-building sought to inherit the first-ever Taiwan-wide façade of the émigré state while simultaneously reframing its interior structure, in the hope of eventually "naturalizing" this reconstructed émigré state to the newly formed Taiwanese nation. Over the last three decades, this third-wave state-building, although it remains an ongoing project of political engineering, has achieved five major accomplishments.

First, through the regularly repeated presidential and parliamentary elections, the closed upper parts of the island-wide political superstructure that were deliberately reserved for and dominated, if not monopolized, by the émigré elites were unlocked. The opening of the central-level political superstructure has two significant political implications: one is that the settler and aboriginal elites who had been previously

[54] These paragraphs above are rewritten from my own previous analyses. See: Sia, Ek-hong Ljavakaw (2018) Crafting Aboriginal Nations in Taiwan: The Presbyterian Church and the Imagination of the Aboriginal National Subject. *Asian Studies Review*, 42 (2): 1-20; Sia, Ek-hong Ljavakaw (2017) On the Paradoxical Effect of Democratization in the Making of the Taiwanese Nation-State. Paper presented at International Roundtable Workshop on The Pattern of Taiwan's Democratization, at the University of Nottingham, United Kingdom, 22-23 June. Published on *Taiwan Sentinel*: https://reurl.cc/AE01K.

excluded from the commanding grounds of the émigré state started to gain entry into them, and the other is that a factual Taiwan-wide political community has been reified and represented, once and again, through the nation-wide practices in the regularly repeated presidential and parliamentary elections that are politically confined to the *de facto* citizenry of Taiwan.

Second, by politically nullifying and organizationally congealing the ROC National Assembly, a Leninist organ designed to represent the "whole of China," as well as the Taiwan Provincial Government and Legislature, Taiwan has been effectively upgraded from a provincial unit within the imagined, extremely extensive entirety of the ROC to a legitimate nation-state in its own right. After cutting off the intermediary provincial-level administration and the self-proclaimed "Whole-China" representative body, the *de-facto* Taiwan-wide central government was therefore linked directly to and superimposed congruently with Taiwan.

Third, after three rotations of the ruling party (the first in 2000, the second in 2008, and the third in 2016), the separation of party and state – that is, to separate the KMT from the ROC – has been gradually realized. This political engineering consists of judicial and non-judicial measures, for example, to remove the KMT agents and party cells that had penetrated state institutions, e.g., the military, judiciary, intelligence, police, and administrative offices at both central and local levels as well as the state-funded institutions, e.g., public schools at all levels and the state- or party-funded mass media of all kinds, to settle ill-gotten party assets and return them to the state, as well as to carry out transitional justice so as to hold the KMT accountable, both legally and politically, for its human rights abuses on both an individual and collective basis.

Fourth, taking advantage of the growing influence of the localities in the regularly repeated elections at both the central and local levels, the hyper-centralized rule imposed by the émigré state has been moderately decentralized in the process of democratization, culminating in the emergence of what are known as the "Six Special Municipalities (*六都*)" in western Taiwan in the early 2010s. As the hyper-centralized rule and the accompanying highly uneven distribution of power and resource biased toward Taipei had been politically delegitimized in the process of democratization, the power of the local governments, in particular the so-called "Six Special Municipalities," has been heightened in relation to that of the central government. The emergence of the "Six Special Municipalities" not only conforms to the socio-economic tendency of

urbanization that had been intensified rather than slowed down in the process of democratization, but also implies a constitutional devolution of power and resources based on mutual consent between the elected central leadership and the elected local administrations that had been brought into effect in a peaceful and smooth manner, without even adding any amendments to the ROC Constitution.

Fifth, after repeated elections and the accompanying rotations of power between different political parties became the defining and constitutive components of the democratic regime of Taiwan, the ambiguous status of the military has been gradually resolved, turning the military into an unequivocal national military by strengthening civilian control of the military. The subordination of this massive émigré military conglomerate that used to ride roughshod over the people of Taiwan to the democratically elected civilian leadership was by no means an easy task. The overall composition of the military constituted the political-organizational background against which this émigré armed force could be eventually tamed: thanks to the several-decades-long maintenance of a policy of conscription for all qualified males that began in 1951, the rank and file of the military has long been constituted by Taiwan-born youth, be they coming from settler, aboriginal, or émigré families, despite the remaining predomination of the second-generation émigré officers in the senior ranks. In addition to the native composition of the military based on the Taiwan-wide conscription, a series of political measures taken by the democratically elected civilian leadership proved significant in enforcing civilian control of the military, for example, an end to the Soviet-style political-ideological work of KMT members in the military, the promotion of as many native – so to speak, settler or aboriginal – officers as possible to senior ranks, and tightening the civilian leaders' grip on the military by means of the presidential appointments of the Minister of National Defense and Chief of the General Staff as well as parliamentary review over military appropriation.

Conclusion

At the beginning of the conclusion section, I would like to make this study enter a three-level dialogue with the literature.

Dialogue with the Literature

Taiwan's Democratization, National Identity, and Nationalist Politics

To begin with, I would like to discuss this study's contributions to the body of works on Taiwan's democratization, national identity, and nationalist politics. I consider this study has contributed from three aspects.

First, by formulating a four-century-long thesis of nation-state formation on the island through a non-essentialist approach, it adds a historical depth to the empirical studies on the political issues of contemporary Taiwan, such as democratization, democratic consolidation, the rise of national identity as well as ethnic or nationalist politics.

Second, by putting forward a civilizational-constitutional thesis of Taiwanese national history, it rectifies a settler bias widely implied in the current publications of Taiwan history; and, with this macro and holistic perspective, it offers an intellectual-methodological alternative of doing history, as opposed to the increasingly trivialization of historical studies in the established academic circles.

Third, by proposing a civilizational-constitutional view, it properly appreciates the roles and influences of Austronesian, European, Chinese civilizations in the nation-state formation on Taiwan and theoretically puts them in their rightful places in Taiwanese history.

Theories of Democratization

Furthermore, I would like to discuss the implications of this study for theories of democratization as well as the more recent phenomena of what is known as "democratic backsliding" or "authoritarianization."

Most theories regarding democratization responded to developments in the real world as the third wave evolved. Two main approaches to explaining democratization

can be identified: one emphasizing favourable structural conditions and the other stressing elite choice. Despite the merits of these accounts, as well as the differences between them, I find two problems that are inherent in them.

The first problem with theories of democratization is that each of them, be it taking the favourable-conditions approach or the elite-choice approach, operates with an unstated assumption that takes for granted the pre-existence of a political community, on which a democratic system could be instituted.

As political theorist Margaret Canovan (1996) reminds us, democracy operates on the assumption that there is a "people" who governs. In other words, democracy logically presupposes a nationhood – or, simply put, a well-functioning democratic system is premised on the existence of a stable political community.

Unfortunately, this implicit assumption did not always hold true in the real world, especially among the cases of what Samuel Huntington calls the third-wave democratization. It is fair to say that the making of nationhood is the "meta-question" that precedes the questions concerning democratization. In this sense, most studies on democratization were arguably conducted in an excessive haste, as they tended to skip over the question of nationhood and immediately jump into the question of democracy.

No wonder many observers and scholars would be later perplexed by the recent phenomena of what are called "democratic backsliding" or "authoritarianization" that took place in some countries where the democratic prospect seemed once to be promising. Nevertheless, they would not be surprised by the authoritarian regressions or the appearance of hybrid regimes if they had avoided the second problem with theories of democratization.

The second problem is that perhaps out of good intentions or political correctness, few if any scholars studying democratization are willing to admit or point out an inconvenient fact: democracy, that is, a nation-state organized in democratic forms, is a delicate, demanding, and expensive form of political superstructure that may not be suitable, affordable, and sustainable for all sorts of social fabric.

To construct a democratic nation-state, or to make a nation-state democratize, is not like setting up a tent but building a tower or a skyscraper. As we all know, a tower built on the sand is untenable, so is a skyscraper erected on the excessively heterogeneous base consisting of rocks, woods, bricks, the mud, and the sand. That is to say, a viable social fabric is of fundamental importance when it comes to

democratization or instituting a democratic system.

It will be only shaky and easy to be reversed when a democratic system is to be instituted on a highly fragmented social fabric – for example, the Middle East that has been rent to pieces along various political, economic, social, sectarian, and cultural cleavages for centuries – or a highly atomized social fabric, such as the Chinese and Russian societies that had experienced Leninization for decades.

As Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem implies, democracy as a political framework of decision making will inevitably fail to accommodate and satisfy the overly variegated social groups or the excessively atomized individuals, as long as their interests and aspirations are too conflicting and too diversified to be reconciled or integrated. No doubt the "democracy failure" will naturally pave the way for a tyrant who is able to bear down all opposition or call for the dictatorship of a populist leader.

However, a viable social fabric is a historical formation grounded upon the previous socio-political realities, instead of a condition that should be created from scratch. That means it must be a ready-made historically-formed condition already there when democratization is taking place, or it will be something you must wait for its development for decades or even centuries.

Take the case of Taiwan for example. The dual constitution of Taiwan – that is, the hostile coexistence of an imperial confucianized settler society and a stateless Austronesian tribal society on the island – had formed in the period that I call the "Long Eighteenth Century." It was a time span of nearly two hundred years between the mid-seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries. The three waves of nation-state building in the twentieth century were actually carried out upon this social fabric that I characterize it as "dual constitution." In hindsight, it is a social fabric that is barely serviceable but still not stable enough. It is facing at least two main challenges at present.

First, there exists a latent but actual tension between the settler and tribal societies. After collectively adopting Christianity in the second half of the twentieth century, the Austronesian aboriginal communes in Taiwan shared some similarities, in the sense of the Spenglerian thesis of "civilizational seasons," with the Christianized Germanic tribes in the early medieval Europe. As far as these Christianized aboriginal communes are concerned, that kind of unitary, compulsory, top-down, and interventionist policies and measures that have identically applied to the settler society often violate their social usages and, therefore, repelled them. This mentality of rejection and resistance has been

translated into the aboriginal movement seeking to promote aboriginal self-rule within the political framework of the newly formed Taiwanese nation-state. This is no doubt a centrifugal force moving away from the nascent political establishment. At best, it can serve as a drive to transform the highly centralized political framework inherited from the KMT-ROC into a looser form of "asymmetric federation" – that is, a conjunction of a unitary government applied to the settler society and a federal regime constituted by the reviving aboriginal self-governing bodies. At worst, it can be turned into a dividing force that functions to destabilize, both politically and theoretically, the nascent Taiwanese nation-state.

Second, the settler society that constituted the main body of the Taiwanese nation has run into trouble of its own. After experiencing rapid industrialization and urbanization in the second half of the twentieth century, the settler society on Taiwan has showed a typical social symptom of late capitalism, that is, the atomization of society. The atomization has manifested itself as a process in which the settler clans as the main form of basic community constituting the settler society had first degraded into nuclear families and later the nuclear families have further degraded into atomized individuals, eventually resulting in the extremely low birth rate in recent years. As a result, the settler society on Taiwan characterized by societal atomization and negative population growth has become similar, in the sense of the Spenglerian thesis of "civilizational seasons," to the late-stage continental European civilization – referring to contemporary France and Germany, to be more specific.

As noted above, a highly atomized social fabric could constitute at best an unsolid foundation for a democratic nation-state. What is worse, the negative population growth is leading to population replacement in Taiwan, just like what is also happening in France and Germany. Guest workers and female marriage immigrants coming from Southeast Asian countries are replenishing the settler society on Taiwan with labor force and families with more children. It is still in the air whether the Southeast Asian immigrants and families would be eventually integrated into the conventional form of settler clan or going to create different forms of basic community in the image of the counterparts in their home countries. This indeed adds an uncertain factor to the future social fabric of Taiwan.

As Taiwan represents a case of the third-wave democratization where a democratic system has been barely consolidated on a social fabric that is serviceable yet unstable,

I believe we can draw some implications from it for the post-Cold War "grand strategy" that has been taken mainly by the established Western democracies.

This grand strategy, be it packaged in the discourses of "democracy promotion," "engagement strategy," or the "Partnership for Modernization," aims to bring the former communist states as well as the other non-democratic states in varying forms into the West-shaped world order – so to speak, to make a world consisting of nation-states that had better be organized into democracies. Whither it was carried out through military-political intervention or economic liberalization or a combination of both, this grand strategy has a natural limit that has nothing to do with the approaches it takes.

The truly unsolvable difficulty faced by the grand strategy was that a viable social fabric on which a democratic system could be instituted and consolidated might not exist at all. Under this unfavorable condition, the grand strategy was actually giving a false hope, a rosy prospect that is untenable or even unreachable, to those who truly believed in the hope and those who were still dubious about accepting it.

Sooner or later, as the hope kept being far from coming true, a strong resentment against the promiser, that is, the West, would be naturally aroused among the frustrated peoples. Of course, tyrants or populist leaders would never absent themselves from this timing to exploit this prevailing resentment. Ideologues would seize the opportunity to invent some versions of "great ideal" and dispread them to both the elites and the grassroots – for example, Eurasianism, Neo-Ottomanism, Islamism, and the restoration of the "Order under the Heaven." With these great ideals, their nostalgia for the good days of having a strong empire could be satisfied and their intended revenge on the "deceitful" Western powers justified.

The problem is not about the intention or character of any individual political leader rising in the turbulence of democracy failure. It is about the real resentment among the frustrated peoples, which was caused, in the final analysis, by the absence of a viable social fabric that could sustain a democratic system when democratization was taking place or imposed. However, the natural limit of the grand strategy lies in the difficulty that a viable social fabric constituted by the robust basic communities that are largely homogenous, resembling in form, organized in accordance with similar principles, and having no irreconcilable conflicts in their aspirations and interests is a historical formation, which the Western interventionists could not create from scratch.

The Making of Order

Lastly, through studying the nation-state formation on Taiwan, I would like to reflect upon one of the basic issues in political science: the making of order.

Order arises from the balance achieved between two conflicting forces: freedom and organization, the two determining forces in history on which the prominent philosopher Bertrand Russell (1934) had elaborated. There is a trade-off between the two forces: maintaining or defending freedom requires organization, while organization will unavoidably restrict freedom to some degrees. In finding and keeping a delicate balance between freedom and organization, an order is formed.

To make organization, people have to pay a cost of freedom that is considered as worthy and acceptable. The more unpleasant reality is that, historically speaking, people make their own organization, but, to borrow Karl Marx's well-known words, "they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past." That is to say, there is no guarantee that people will necessary achieve an organization as they intend or please.

Nation-state is a kind of organization that is expected to serve as an instrument for maintaining or defending the freedoms of a human group – to be precise, a political community in national form, a nation for short. As Benedict Anderson (2006: 7) vividly puts it, "…nations dream of being free. The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state." In this sense, a nation-state is like a suit of armor. It functions to provide protection for a people/nation, but it would unavoidably impose restrictions on the freedoms they enjoy at the same time. In the same vein, a democratic nation-state resembles a well-fitting suit of armor, as it could provide protection for the wearer while imposing less – and, in a sense, voluntary – restrictions on the freedoms they enjoy. However, no matter the suit of armor is well-fitting or ill-fitting, only strong and vigorous knights can wear it. It is either too heavy for the feeble to bear or too expensive for the poor to obtain. That is to say, nation-state as a kind of organization that is, in nature, not affordable or bearable for all. To put it fairly, nation-state as a kind of organization is not necessarily desirable, provided that a particular human group have no intention to claim and make themselves a nation. In a word, nation-state as a kind of organization is not available, bearable, or necessarily desirable for all.

If it is the case, the contemporary West-shaped world order whose core is

constituted by the Western democratic nation-states should be understood as a historical contingency that could be realized only on the geographically limited scope when conditions meet, instead of a historical inevitability that will prevail all over the world. If this view is tenable in the real world, we may forsake both the noted thesis of Francis Fukuyama, i.e., the end of history, and the prominent Kantian conception of perpetual peace. The former is an empirical inference that Western liberal democracy will be universalized as the final form of human government, while the latter is a normative anticipation that perpetual peace is to be premised on a world composed of states that should be "republican" – meaning "democratic" in the contemporary political-linguistic context. Ideally wonderful as they may sound, both views become untenable and even unrealistic, when considering the very reality that nation-state, be it in the democratic or non-democratic form, is not available, bearable, or necessarily desirable for all.

In my view, we may better cast away illusions and get used to the unpleasant yet more down-to-earth human condition that the realm of chaos, the realm of despotism, and the realm of liberty had coexisted on earth and will continue to coexist with a series of conflicts, large or small, for a long time, if not forever. After all, it is the "perpetual conflicts," instead of the "perpetual peace," among different orders that constitute the source of internal momentums and dynamics of the world, with which the history of human being never ends.

A Biography Written for a Nation in Confinement

The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about changes of great significance to the world. The Cold War came to an end, the Iron Curtain in western Eurasia was torn down, and the pace of globalization was greatly accelerated. However, the architecture of the San Francisco Treaty that had dictated the basic order in eastern Eurasia since the early 1950s remained unshaken. The third wave of nation-state building in Taiwan was therefore carried out under highly-constrained post-Cold War historical conditions.

Figuratively speaking, the San Francisco Regime resembles a "womb," in which the "fetus" of the Taiwanese nation-state is growing day by day. Being situated in the womb, the fetus was protected from attacks coming from without (e.g., the three Taiwan Strait Crises, occurring in 1954–1955, 1958, and 1995–1996) and, at the same time, prevented from being delivered prematurely (e.g., the first-ever 2004 national

referendum in Taiwan that was tactically defined by the ruling DPP as the platform for expressing the Taiwanese voters' support for Taiwan independence).

However, protection and restriction are simply two sides of the same coin. The San Francisco Regime as a womb incubated the embryo of the Taiwanese nation-state while simultaneously containing and impeding this fetus that was ready for delivery from being born as a full-fledged member of the international society. As Taiwan achieves maturity to serve as a competent actor in the world, its status of being placed under the protection of the San Francisco Regime becomes a torture to itself. The release from its confinement is not only determined by Taiwan itself but also hinges on a fundamental reformatting of the world order.

As an island whose location is of strategic value for competing powers, the formation of the Taiwanese nation-state can hardly be immune to the geopolitics surrounding it. Over the last three decades, Taiwanese and aboriginal nationalisms have acted as a "two-stranded rope," by which Taiwan's identity has been gradually pulled out of the continental vision that defines the island as an inshore piece of a greater Confucian nation based on the East Asian mainland and redirected to the oceanic vision that positions Taiwan as a member of an extended Austronesian family spreading out over the vast Pacific.

However, the advancement of this oceanic vision has continued on a thorny path in the post-Cold War milieu. Politically speaking, the U.S. strategic shift was indeed a blow to the KMT, as the engagement strategy nullified the residual value and necessity of sustaining an anti-communist authoritarian regime on Taiwan. As the authoritarian rule imposed by the KMT-ROC was dismantled step by step, the accompanying continental vision was also gradually undermined in the process of democratization. However, economically speaking, the post-Cold War engagement strategy in the hope of taming and transforming communist China by incorporating it into global capitalism proved counterproductive and instead paved the way for the rise of the increasingly assertive "Chinese Dream," which could be manifested, as Chinese President Xi Jinping portrays it, as "the great rise of the Chinese nation." This Chinese Dream is rekindling a communist version of the continental vision of Taiwan, which takes the annexation of the island, by absorbing it through economic incentives if possible and by force if necessary, as the prerequisite for "the great rise of the Chinese nation."

With its massive investments in China – the result of living up to the neoliberal

zeitgeist of the post-Cold War China-bound globalization, Taiwan resembled a ship with a political aspiration to sail away to the ocean while being fastened to the East Asian mainland by an economic chain. However, the restructuring world order is turning out to be in the interests of the oceanic vision. As the Trump administration unveiled a new era that has been referred to as the "New Cold War" or the "Cool War" in 2016, America's Indo-Pacific Strategy and Taiwan's New Southbound Policy have been functioning as the two blades of a giant pair of scissors to cut off the chain that ties Taiwan to the East Asian mainland. The restructuring of the world order is facilitating the realization of the oceanic vision advocated by Taiwanese and aboriginal nationalisms, revealing again the inherent oceanic qualities of Taiwan that had been obscured by the continental vision imposed by the postwar émigré state for decades.

If the 2016 election of Donald Trump arguably presaged the end of the post-Cold War globalization, the global pandemic of 2020 was undoubtedly the starter of its systematic breakdown. While optimists may still consider the pandemic as an accidental trigger for a temporal stagnation of the globalized world economy, the depletion of the massive Chinese sweat labor supply, which had constituted the cornerstone of the greatly accelerated globalization over the last three decades, foretells a structural factor terminating the post-Cold War globalization. In other words, the post-Cold War globalization has already exhausted its internal possibilities, unless a substitution for the massive Chinese sweat labor supply could be found somewhere else in the world – which is yet to be seen until now and in all probability will never be achievable.

As far as Taiwan is concerned, the end of globalization may lead to a scenario that can be described as double-edged. As suggested by the similar origins of the previous two world wars, it is only reasonable to envisage a chain reaction: the end of the post-Cold War globalization may, sooner or later, result in a war on a large scale, which would subsequently sway the architecture of the San Francisco Treaty. If that is the case, three questions that are crucial to the future prospects of Taiwan immediately come to my mind.

First, when will the San Francisco Regime start to undergo a rupture, which would be, in all probability, triggered by a war resulting from the breakdown of globalization?

Second, will Taiwan survive the coming war and successfully transform itself into a *de jure* nation-state from its prewar *de facto* status? If it does, how heavy will its

casualties be?

Third, when the Taiwanese nation-state is born, will the world that it is born into be the same one in which nation-states still play the leading role like before?

Childbirth is a matter of life and death, and so is the birth of a nation. No one can tell prior to the onset of labor whether or not an infant will come into the world safely. I believe we will know, in the near future, about the actual value of this present four-centuries-long biography written for the *de facto* Taiwanese nation-state: it may become either a tedious epitaph for a stillborn nation, or an elaborate birth certificate of a newborn nation. Or, perhaps both possibilities will become irrelevant, as the new world forged by the flames of the coming war will no longer be a world of nation-states.

Political Concern and Academic Soundness

In Prof. Schlumberger's review, he poses a hidden challenge to the relationship between the author's political concern and the academic soundness of this study, as he writes, and I quote, "the main thrust of this work is not to solve an academic puzzle, but to contribute to an independent state of Taiwan." I am grateful that he grants me this opportunity to clarify my position on this issue.

First of all, I have to say, the existence of a *de facto* Taiwanese nation-state is an empirical reality, a social fact that I want to explore how it has formed. It is an empirical precondition of this study. It's simply there. The existence of a *de facto* Taiwanese nation-state cannot be proved or disproved by any study, including mine.

Then, you may ask, "is this work driven by the author's political concern?" My answer will be "yes," plain and simple. And I believe all sincere and profound works are driven, consciously or unconsciously, by researchers' personal concerns.

In my view, writing is always a political action, so is the writing of a dissertation. If you may agree with this point, then I may continue by saying that: the difference lies in that some authors are clearly aware of the political nature of their writings, while the others are not. Furthermore, among those who are conscious of the political nature of their writings, some may try to hide it while the others may not. Lastly, only a few writings would actually have an impact on the realities, while most of them would not.

My position on the relationship between political concern and academic soundness is as follows. I am well conscious of the political nature and potential implications of

my dissertation, and I suppose every author who is writing a dissertation on a political topic should have such a sober awareness, let alone writing a dissertation like mine that focuses on the national history of a newly formed yet still internationally contested nation. Moreover, being conscious of the political nature of my dissertation, I do not attempt hiding it. Lastly, although I don't think it will have an impact on the realities in the near future, I do take a positive attitude toward it if it would actually have some influences.

Of course, in taking this position, it doesn't mean I am going to sacrifice the academic soundness of this study. On the contrary, it is just because I am conscious of its political nature and implications that I do it in all seriousness and with great earnestness. Instead of an impediment, it is a strong impetus for me to work out an academically sound approach that could serve better to address the empirical and theoretical questions that I am really concerned about, because I know only the studies founded on an academically sound base can serve well the concerned questions in the real world.

On the References

Concerning the cited works are too limited in number, I would like to say some words on this point.

First of all, it is about the strategy of writing. Prof. Schubert probably knows this very well that to avoid distractions in the process of writing, I used to adopt a strategy of limiting the bibliography to the most important studies that help me develop my argument.

And, this strategy is also related to the nature of this study. In theoretically constructing a new framework for understanding the history of Taiwan, this study is made to be a model-building historiographical work, instead of a historical investigation in line with the conventional historical positivism.

Figuratively speaking, I set a role for myself in this study as an "architect," who is responsible to draw a blueprint for the envisioned building, that is, the history of Taiwan. Of course, to serve as a competent architect, I have to get familiar with various kinds of materials that could be used in the construction of the envisioned building, such as bricks, woods, steels, cements, glasses, and plastics.

I do rely on the ready-made materials made by the craftsmen, but I don't make them myself. I have to get a wide knowledge of them, so that I could draw a proper blueprint for the envisioned building.

In order to theoretically constructing a new framework for understanding the history of Taiwan, I did have spent years on making sense of related studies, theories, and approaches in multiple disciplines, including not only political science but also sociology, anthropology, history and a little bit of archaeology and philosophy.

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