# Jesse Kalata
Europeanizing the
Bundeswehr?

An Europeanization analysis of "misfit" between
the EU's Security and Defense Policy and
German military policy

Tübinger Arbeitspapiere
zur Integrationsforschung

TAIF Nr. 2/2009

Über die Autorin

Jesse Kalata hat im Jahre 2008 den Studiengang Master of European Studies an der Universität Tübingen mit Unterstützung der deutsch-amerikanischen Fulbright Kommission abgeschlossen. Ihren B.A. Abschluss in „Internationale Beziehungen" hat sie an der Boston University absolviert. Derzeit ist sie Studentin des M.Phil Studienganges im Fachbereich Internationale Beziehungen an der Cambridge University. Außerhalb ihres Studiums hat sie als Praktikantin für das amerikanische Außenministerium in Hamburg sowie für zwei Jahre bei der US-Agentur für internationale Freiwilligendienste, Peace Corps, in Rumänien gearbeitet. Ihre jetzige Forschung in Cambridge untersucht die Konvergenz zwischen den Standpunkten von EU-Mitgliedstaaten bezüglich internationaler Sicherheitskrisen. In Zukunft plant sie eine Promotion zum Thema Deutschland und die ESVP.

About the author

Jesse Kalata graduated from Universität Tübingen's Master of European Studies Program in 2008 with support of the German-American Fulbright Commission. She earned a B.A. in International Relations at Boston University and is currently studying for a M.Phil. in International Relations at the University of Cambridge, United Kingdom. She has also previously worked as an intern for the United States Department of State in Hamburg, Germany and served for two years with the United States' international volunteer agency, Peace Corps, in Romania. Her current research examines convergence in EU member state response to international security crises, and next year she plans to begin doctoral research on Germany and the ESDP.

Zusammenfassung

Seit ihrer Gründung im Jahr 1999, hat sich die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESVP) überraschend zügig weiter entwickelt. Da in der ESVP aber nach dem intergouvermentalen Modus entschieden wird, verfügen die Mitgliedstaaten immer noch über die volle Kontrolle hinsichtlich ihrer Militärpolitik und Reibungen zwischen intergouvernamentalen Entscheidungen auf EU-Ebene und nationalen Policies sind unvermeidlich. Dies wird besonders deutlich anhand der nationalen Umsetzung von Entscheidungen auf der EU-Ebene. Durch Anwendung von Europäisierungsansätze von Radaelli (2003) sowie Börzel und Risse (2003), untersucht die vorliegende Arbeit fünf Bereiche von „misfit" zwischen ESVP und deutscher Militärpolitik, die Schwierigkeiten bei der Umsetzung oder „downloading" von Entscheidungen auf der EU-Ebene zu Auslandseinsätzen verursachen oder verursachen könnten: die nationale Sicherheitsstrategie, ESVP-NATO Beziehungen, Verteidigungsausgaben, entsendbare Truppenzahlen sowie die Voraussetzungen eines Bundestagsmandates für Auslandseinsätze. Nachdem diese fünf Bereiche im empirischen Teil der Arbeit detailliert untersucht werden, erfolgt eine Analyse im Rahmen der Europäisierungsansätze, die den Veränderungsgrad von Politiken, die diesen „mistfit" aufheben könnten, klassifiziert und soweit möglich, erklärt.

Abstract

Since its 1999 inception, the European Union's Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), has quickly developed into a robust European policy area. However, as member states continue to have full control over their own military policies, friction between even unanimous, intergovernmental EU-level decisions and national policies is bound to occur. This can be clearly seen upon national implementation of EU-level ESDP decisions. Applying the Europeanization models of Radaelli (2003) and Börzel and Risse (2003), this study examines five areas of "misfit" between German military policy and ESDP which have caused or have the potential to cause difficulties in "downloading" or implementing EU-level decisions to deploy German military forces under the ESDP: national strategy, ESDP-NATO preferences, defense expenditure, deployable personnel, and finally, the parliamentary approval process. After examining the areas of friction in detail in the empirical section, analysis is provided based on the Europeanization model to classify and explain the degree of change which has occurred within each area towards alleviating "misfit" between German policy and the ESDP.

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1.   Introduction

Since the 1998 St. Malo agreement between France and the UK cleared the way for security cooperation in the context of the European Union, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has become institutionalized at the EU level and resulted in 20 diverse military and civilian missions. However, as the ESDP is an "intergovernmental" EU-policy area, it relies heavily on voluntary member state participation to adapt and supply forces to EU missions. The success of ESDP is therefore dependent on the ability and willingness of participating Member States (MS) to adapt their national policies to ESDP's strategic and physical requirements. To varying degrees and in differing areas, they experience difficulties in doing this, which in turn affects overall ESDP functioning (Breuer 2006: 207).

This work examines five difficulties Germany has had in adapting its military policy to the ESDP since the launch of the project until the first half of 2008. It applies the "Europeanization" approach as developed by Börzel and Risse (2003) and Radaelli (2003) to identify areas of "misfit" between ESDP and German military policy, determine the level of domestic change that has occurred to remedy this, and finally, pin down factors contributing to or restraining change.

Chapter 2 briefly introduces the reader to ESDP as well as important developments in German military policy. **Chapter 3** presents the Europeanization approach and discusses the way it will be applied in the present study. **Chapter 4** describes five significant areas of "misfit" between ESDP and German military policy and movement towards domestic change. **Chapter 5** then applies the Europeanization framework to each area to determine the level of domestic change as well as factors driving or restraining it. Finally, **Chapter 6** draws conclusions to future problems between ESDP and German policy and makes recommendations for further research.

2. Overview of ESDP and German Military Policy

Before beginning to look at areas of misfit between the ESDP and German military policy, I will briefly outline the development of both in the following sections.

2.1. Overview of ESDP

During the Cold War, NATO was the primary alliance for western European security cooperation and focused on deterring or, if necessary, defeating the Soviet Union. European security and defense cooperation in the framework of the European Community did not exist, although there was limited cooperation in foreign policy matters (Keukeliere/MacNaughtan 2008: 44-45). The establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 created the first post-Cold War chance for development in security cooperation within the new EU. In its early stages, however, the CFSP focused more on foreign than security policy due to differences between member states about if it had a place in the EU (ibid.: 48-51). This changed with the 1998 St. Malo Agreement between the United Kingdom and France, when the two agreed that security policy should become an EU policy area (ibid.: 2008, 56; Howorth 2007: 33-37). Since, security and defense cooperation within the EU has rapidly developed and become highly institutionalized and operational.

Following St. Malo, in 1999 the formal name ESDP was coined at the Cologne European Council (Fröhlich 2008: 102). At the Helsinki Council later that year, MS established the Headline Goal (HHG), in which they together committed to making 50-60,000 national troops available by 2003 for a rapid reaction force to fulfil the Petersberg Tasks[1] (Howorth 2007: 103; Fröhlich 2008: 102). Accompanying the HHG, a European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) identified common equipment shortfalls and coordinates improvement of common capabilities (Howorth 2007: 106; Fröhlich 2008: 103). To provide an institutional framework, the Helsinki Council also set up three bodies at the EU-level for military and political advising and planning[2] (Howorth 2007: 67-76; Fröhlich 2008: 104).

Given this framework, the ESDP was in theory ready to launch missions. However, before it could do so, Atlanticist MS wanted to clarify and formalize its relationship with NATO. This was achieved with the 2002 Berlin-Plus Agreement providing for ESDP access to NATO command structures and capabilities (Dembinski 2005: 61-80). Following the agreement, the first ESDP mission, *Concordia,* replaced the NATO force in Macedonia.

While ESDP by 2003 had significant operational capacity, the policy continues to be refined and expanded. A first step was the adoption of a European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 (Council 2003a). The document defines threats towards which the ESDP should be geared in terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime. The strategy also adds three additional security tasks for the ESDP to the Petersberg tasks in "joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism, and security sector reform" (Council 2003a: 12).

In 2004 two new Headline Goals continued to build ESDP. With the Military HG 2010, the EU set new capacity goals and also created EU Battlegroups and the European Defense Agency (EDA). The Battlegroups are combat units of around 1,500 troops from a single or multiple MS organized, trained and certified in advance (Lindstrom 2007: 24-25) and deployable within 10 days (ibid.: 14). Designed to respond to crises requiring immediate action, the formation can either be deployed independently or as the first stage of a larger ESDP or other multilateral missions (ibid.: 13-14). They have been fully operational since 2007 but to date have not been deployed (ibid.:14-15). The second Military HG 2010 development, the EDA, serves to formalize coordination and cooperation in European defense investment, research, technology, and procurement (Howorth 2007: 109-111; Fröhlich 2008: 107).

While this study focuses on the military aspects of ESDP, the policy also includes a significant civilian element, and the majority of missions have been civilian to date.[3] The Civilian HG 2008 reflects the growing importance of civilian crisis management and provides goals for MS contributions to civilian crisis reaction contingents in the areas of rule of law, security sector reform, police training, and border monitoring (Howorth 2007: 130-131; Fröhlich 2008: 108).

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[1] These tasks are: "Humanitarian and rescue tasks", "peacekeeping", and "tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking

[2] The Political and Security Committee, composed of member state representatives managing political and strategic aspects of ESDP, the EU Military Committee, composed of military representatives advising on concrete military matters, and the EU Military Staff, composed of seconded military personnel and active in "early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning."

[3] See Council (2008a) for list of ESDP missions.

Finally, the most recent ESDP development is the establishment of an EU Operations Center (Opscen) in 2007, providing independent EU mission command should NATO or a MS command not be available (Keukeliere/MacNaughtan 2008: 180-181). Not a permanent structure, it can be rapidly activated and convened, staffed by members of the EUMS and seconded national personnel.

To date, the ESDP has launched four military and sixteen civilian missions worldwide. Table 1 provides information on military missions.

Table 1. ESDP Military Missions

Year	Name	Country	Goal	Berlin Plus?
2003	Concordia	Macedonia	Peacekeeping	YES
2003	Artemis	Dem. Rep. Congo	Stabilisation	NO
2004-present	EUFOR-Althea	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Peacekeeping	YES
2006	EUFOR RD Congo	Dem. Rep. Congo	Election security	NO

Sources: Council 2003b, 2008b, 2008c, and 2008d.

Since ESDP is part of the EU's intergovernmental "second pillar", it heavily relies on voluntary MS participation for success. Unlike in policy areas under the supranational "first pillar", i.e., the European Community, the EU cannot force MS participation in its programs or missions through legislation or later legal action.

2.2 Overview of German Military Policy

In the aftermath of the Third Reich, both the Allies and the West German people were reluctant to rebuild the country's military (Wellershof 2005: 22-23). It soon became clear that this would only occur if the armed forces were integrated into a western collective security arrangement. The first attempt to do this in the form of a European Defense Community failed when France balked at pooling forces with Germany (ibid.: 20). Given the tense Cold War environment, in 1955 NATO offered West Germany membership, and the country constructed a new, democratic, military, the *Bundeswehr* (ibid.: 21).

From NATO entry until the abrupt end of the Cold War system in 1989, the *Bundeswehr* was only active in the framework of NATO collective defense structures (Bohnen 1997: 49-50). When the Wall fell, united Germany gained full sovereignty under the 2+4 Agreements (Küsters 2005: 7-9) and began to face new security challenges. Rather than ushering in the "end of history" (Fukuyama 1992), the post-Cold War era presented the West with a host of new security threats, beginning with ethnic conflict. Globalization meant that although not originating in western countries, these threats could have global security spillover.

In the early 1990s, German politicians hesitated to define the military's role in the new security environment. Some argued that the *Bundeswehr* existed only to provide territorial defense within the NATO area and therefore could not lawfully be deployed in combat elsewhere in the world on so called out-of-area or OOA missions (Baumann/Hellmann 2001: 73-74). In 1994 the Federal Constitutional Court issued a landmark decision deeming OOA missions legal (ibid.:74). This opened

the path for OOA deployment, and finally, in 1999, after much public debate, German soldiers were sent into their first substantial combat mission to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo (see Lantis 2002 or Maull 2000). Since, the *Bundeswehr* has deployed to many theatres around the world in the context of the UN, NATO, and the ESDP. It has participated in all four ESDP military missions. Table 2 presents completed and continuing missions, including non-combat missions before the 1994 Constitutional Court decision. Ongoing missions are boldfaced.

Table 2. Bundeswehr OOA Deployments

Year	Framework	Name	Country	Strength
1991-1996	UN	UNSCOM	Iraq	37
1992-93	UN	UNTAC	Cambodia	150 medics
1992-1994	UN	UNSOM-II	Somalia	
1994	UN	UNAMIR	Rwanda	30 air force
1999-present	**NATO**	**Allied Force/KFOR**	**Yugoslavia/Kosovo**	**Currently 2,870**
2001-present	**NATO**	**Enduring Freedom**	**Horn of Africa**	**Currently 250**
2002-2003	NATO	Enduring Freedom	Kuwait	Up to 250 WMD specialists
2002-present	**NATO**	**ISAF**	**Afghanistan**	**Currently 3,470**
2003	EU (Berlin Plus)	Concordia	Macedonia	40
2003	EU[4]	Artemis	Democratic Republic of Congo	Around 100
2004-present	**EU (Berlin Plus)**	**EUFOR**	**Bosnia-Herzegovina**	**Currently 140**
2005-present	**UN**	**UNMIS**	**Sudan**	**Currently 38 observers**
2006	EU	EUFOR RD Congo	Democratic Republic of Congo	780
2006-present	**UN**	**UNIFIL**	**Lebanon**	**Currently 470**
2008-present	**UN-African Union**	**UNAMID**	**Sudan**	**Up to 250**

Sources: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2008a, 2008b, 2008c.

These missions were conducted as part of ad-hoc arrangements within multilateral frameworks, but Germany has also made formal commitments to several rapid reaction forces since 1999. First, as part of the original EU Headline Goal, Germany committed 18,000 troops (Eitelhuber 2004: 30). It has

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4   King (2005: 52) incorrectly places this mission within Berlin-Plus.

also committed to participating in seven multinational EU Battlegroups with various contingent sizes through 2012 (Häusler 2006: 61), which count as part of the HG total (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2004: 25). In addition, up to 5,000 troops are on frequent rotations with the NATO Reaction Force (NRF) and 1,000 transport, medical, and "pioneer" troops are on standby for the United Nations (Eitelhuber 2004: 30-31).

The transition from territorial defense to smaller worldwide missions has required significant force reform, which the government has undertaken in stages (cf. in detail Meiers 2005). Following partial integration of former East German troops in the early 1990s, the Defense Ministry began to reduce and restructure forces (Wellershof 2005: 37). In 2000 the *Weiszäcker Kommission* concluded that the military was "too big, wrongly composed, and increasingly unmodern" (Rink 2005: 150, author's translation). In response, the Defense Ministry under social democratic SPD Minister Peter Struck released a political framework for further change in the 2003 *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien* (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2003*)* and in 2004 concrete plans in the *Konzeption der Bundeswehr* (Bundsministerium der Verteidigung 2004). The highlight of the latter is functional reorganization of forces into 35,000 *Eingreifkräfte* (reaction troops) capable of high-intensity operations including rescue and evacuation, 70,000 *Stabilisierungskräfte* (stability troops) for longer and lower-intensity operations, and 147,000 *Unterstützungskräfte* (support troops) providing medical, logistical and administrative services in Germany (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2004: 23). Finally, in 2006, the Defense Ministry under the conservative party CDU/CSU's Minister Franz-Josef Jung published a new *Weißbuch* (White Book) that serves as an updated and more comprehensive counterpart to the *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien* (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2006)*.*

As we will see, a thorough understanding of German defense policy, however, requires more than an overview of on-paper developments. Germany has long been considered a unique security actor by scholars due to the existence of a "culture of restraint" regarding military matters (Baumann/Hellmann 2001: 62). The experience of the Third Reich, the Second World War, and the Holocaust has led to three normative trends that shape military policy (cf. Maull 2000). First, the devastating experience of war led to deep commitment to pacifism and force as a last means. Second, the country sought to integrate itself into a western European and transatlantic security framework to guarantee (to itself and other states) that it would not become a future aggressor, resulting in a strong commitment to multilateralism. Finally, Germany's role as a perpetrator of genocide has led it to feel responsible for preventing further human rights abuses. Although during the Cold War the pacifist norm prevailed, with Kosovo, combat missions to prevent abuses have become acceptable.

3. The Europeanization Approach

This work applies the analytical approach of "Europeanization" to examine friction between the ESDP and German military policy. In this chapter, I first introduce the concept of Europeanization and the analytical framework it provides. I then discuss methodological considerations necessary when applying it to ESDP and national military policy.

3.1. The Concept of Europeanization

Since the 1990s studies examining "Europeanization" have become increasingly popular among literature on European integration (Graziano/Vink 2007: 3). Multiple applications of the term prevail[5], but it is often used to analyse the "domestic impact" of EU-level policies on national or lower levels of government. Since the Europeanization does not address all elements of integration, it is usually considered an "approach" rather than a theory it its own right (Bulmer 2007: 47). Attempts to link this application to the two prominent integration theories, *neofunctionalism* and *intergovernmentalism*, are weak but present. Graziano and Vink (2007: 3-4) see ways to derive a "domestic impact" Europeanization approach from both grand theories. In their view from a neofunctional perspective, supranational EU-level "creation" leads to policy output with domestic governments as receivers. They also argue that intergovernmentalists could build on Andrew Moravscisk's focus on "domestic sources of European politics" in the first level of his "two-level game" by adding a feedback arrow to domestic politics after policy adoption at the EU level (ibid.: 3-4).

3.2. Evaluating Domestic Impact

The "domestic impact" application of Europeanization has been very popular for case studies and has received extensive methodological consideration. Preliminary models saw EU policymaking as a given and analysed domestic impact in a static environment (Bulmer 2007: 49). However, in reality, policy shaping, policy implementation, and domestic feedback to the EU level are highly interconnected. Börzel and Risse clarify the relationship by describing Europeanization as both "uploading" and "downloading" policy to and from the EU level (ibid.: 48). When looking at domestic impact or implementation, one should not completely separate uploading effects and take them into account as necessary for more dynamic domestic analysis.

A widely used method of conceptualising domestic impact is captured in the idea of "misfit" between EU and domestic policy (Börzel/Risse 2003: 67-70). This perspective assumes that in a decision-making process involving multiple MS preferences, national governments will not always be able to "download" what they have "uploaded" (ibid.: 61-62). More often than not, downloaded policy represents a compromise, what Börzel and Risse call a "patchwork", some aspects of which do not fit the preferences of the downloading MS. Europeanization then can be described as "inconvenient" and result in "adaptation pressures" in areas where EU and domestic policy experience misfit (ibid., 57-58).

The way that states react to these pressures can be classified into descriptive categories. Raedelli (2003) describes the four responses of "inertia", "absorption", "transformation", and "retrenchment." Börzel and Risse (2003) modify the scheme slightly, providing for "absorption", "accommodation", and "transformation." Table 3 presents the two scales in comparative fashion.

MS response can depend on several factors, which Börzel and Risse categorize by rational or sociological institutionalist origins (ibid.: 65-66). The rational institutionalist perspective examines

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[5] Olsen (2002) identifies scholarly uses of "Europeanization" as: "changes in external boundaries", "developing institutions at the European level," "exporting forms of political organisation," "political unification project," and "central penetration of national systems of government". Here, I describe "central penetration of national systems of government" or, the "domestic impact" approach.

veto points and existence of *formal domestic institutions* facilitating change. Veto points are either "institutional or factual" and include ministries, parliaments, courts, and lobbies with real power to prevent change. The higher the number of veto points, the more difficult effecting significant change is. Looking at *formal institutions*, the opposite is true. The more institutions formally mandated to adapt domestic to EU policy (i.e., by linking to EU level or coordinating adaptation) the more likely it is that change will occur. The presence of informal or no institutions makes change more difficult.

Table 3. Europeanization Change Classification

Raedelli (2003: 37-38)	Börzel/Risse (2003: 67-70)
Inertia: "a situation of lack of change. This may simply happen when a country finds that EU political architectures, choice, models, or policy are too dissimilar to domestic practice[...]may take the form of lags, delays in the transposition of directives, implementation as transformation, and sheer resistance to EU-induced change."	
	Absorption: "member states incorporate European policies or ideas into their domestic structures, respectively, but without substantially modifying existing processes, policies, and institutions. The degree of domestic change is low."
Absorption: "Indicates change as adaptation. Domestic structures and policy legacy provide a mixture of resiliency and flexibility. They can absorb certain non-fundamental changes but maintain their "core"[...] accommodation of policy requirements without real modification of essential structures and changes the "logic" of political behavior."	Accommodation: "Member states accommodate Europeanization pressure by adapting existing processes, policies and institutions without changing their essential features and the underlying collective understandings attached to them. One way of doing this is by "patching up" new policies and institutions onto existing ones without changing the latter (Héritier 2001). The degree of domestic change is modest."
Transformation: "Paradigmatic change occurs when the fundamental logic of political behavior changes."	Transformation: "Member states replace existing policies, processes, and institutions by new, substantially different ones, or alter existing ones to the extent that their essential features and/or the underlying collective understandings are fundamentally changes. The degree of domestic change is high"
Retrenchment: " the national policy becomes less 'European' than it was."	

The authors derive a second set of normative factors from sociological institutionalism. Here, the MS will effect change either in response to *domestic norm entrepreneurs* seeking EU-compatible policy by arguing rather than power play, or due to a *domestic political culture featuring "consensus-building and cost-sharing"* reducing likelihood of players using veto points to block change (Börzel/Risse 2003: 67-68).

Finally, Börzel and Risse do not name *external normative pressure* as one of their sociological institutionalist factors but imply its effect in their introduction to domestic normative factors, writing that international pressure could push a state into domestic change, in order to be seen as "in good standing" (ibid.: 66). Furthermore, in his comprehensive study on the Europeanization of German strategic culture through 2003, Giegerich (2006: 148) finds that "participation in military missions was justified with strong references to external expectations of allies and partners and hence German reliability and solidarity". I will therefore examine this third normative factor as a possible facilitating or explanatory variable in area of misfit since post-war Germany's strong commitment to multilateralism has historically made it particularly sensitive to external views of its military policy.

3.3. Applied Methodology

In the current study I apply the domestic impact approach of Europeanization to analyse significant areas of misfit between ESDP and German military policy. In *Chapter 4* I describe policy areas where adaptation pressure is occurring but misfit persists. I first present the problem and then discuss movement towards change that would remedy misfit. In *Chapter 5* I use a combination of Raedelli's and Börzel and Risse's frameworks to classify the level of change to date. Finally, also in *Chapter 5*, after classifying degree of change, I look for explanatory factors as described by Börzel and Risse. Chapter 6 draws conclusions and makes recommendations for further research.

Before beginning, a few methodological notes are required. First, as discussed above, it can at times be difficult to separate "uploading" and "downloading" activities when examining Europeanization at the national level. This is especially true regarding ESDP, since all decisions are made in the Council and therefore involve primarily MS representatives (rather than the Commission and European Parliament as well). For simplification's sake, here I consider upload to be *input to development of new ESDP policy* at the EU level and download to be *national action implementing ESDP decision.* Downloading then translates into participation in ESDP missions, in this study military missions. "Misfit" occurs when difficulties arise in implementing the action and affects both frequency and quality of participation. I will focus on downloading but will address uploading as necessary to better understand misfit or adaptation[6].

A second methodological complication arising when applying Europeanization to security studies is that of multiple sources of adaptation pressure. Since the German military is also engaged in OOAs within NATO and the UN, most policy areas examined also display misfit with these security arrangements. A separation or quantification of ESDP adaptation pressure would prove challenging, but it can at least be *described* since it creates specific additional commitments. An Europeanization approach is still useful in order to conceptualize and identify misfit, understand its *effects* on cooperation in the ESDP framework, categorize level of change towards remedy, and finally,

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[6] Giegerich (2006: 42) applies uploading and downloading in a similar fashion to the Europeanization of strategic cultures.

understand drivers or restrainers of domestic change. In application, these results can serve as useful indicators for predicting future conflict between German policy and ESDP, noting where the gap has narrowed and where it remains problematic.

In a third methodological note, Germany also participates in civilian aspects of ESDP and supplies contingents to several civilian missions. Of course, misfit also can occur here, but since personnel is not drawn from the *Bundeswehr*, it can be quite different in nature. This work will be limited to ESDP as regards the German military.

Finally, EU policies outside of ESDP also affect the German military. For example, due to EU law mandating gender equality, Germany has allowed women into all areas of service (cf. Kümmel 2005). Changes like this also represent Europeanization, but from other policy sources. This study examines Europeanization as relates to *ESDP.*

4. Areas of Misfit between ESDP and German Military Policy

4.1. National strategy

At the EU-level mission planning stage, the presence of clear and compatible national security strategies are critical in order to "avoid surprises and hectic solutions" among potential force contributors (Gareis 2006b: 27, author's translation). However, despite on-paper commitments to the ESDP and NATO, both the German government and public remain uncertain about the country's own national interests in the new security environment and attempts to date to define them have not produced sufficient clarity. This has resulted in recurring difficulties in Germany's willingness to participate in certain ESDP military missions. Insufficient formal change has occurred to remedy this misfit, but momentum is growing.

While a minority of security scholars evaluate the European Security Strategy as largely *mirroring* German preferences (for example Schmitt 2005: 3; Krüger 2005: 536), most analysts and actors have highlighted the fact that this statement is impossible to make because German post-Cold War national interests remain to *be defined*. Breuer, for example, characterized *Bundeswehr* reform as still "occurring in a strategic vacuum." (Breuer 2006: 207). The largest soldiers' representation organization, the *Bundeswehrverband* has also criticised the broad scope, saying it feels very uncomfortable with the concept of global deployments (Deutscher Bundeswehrverband 2005).

Calls to define interests due to increasing ESDP and NATO OOAs culminated in a list in the 2006 *Weißbuch*, but the result is rather broad, reading:

- *"preserving justice and freedom, democracy, security and prosperity for the citizens of our country and protecting them from dangers;*
- *ensuring the sovereignty and integrity of German territory;*
- *preventing regional crises and conflicts that may affect Germany's security, wherever possible, and helping to control crises;*
- *confronting global challenges, above all the threat posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD;*
- *helping to uphold human rights and strengthen the international order on the basis of international law;*

- *promoting free and unhindered world trade as a basis for our prosperity thereby helping to overcome the divide between poor and rich regions of the world" (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2006: 21). "preserving justice and freedom, democracy, security and prosperity for the citizens of our country and protecting them from dangers;*
- *ensuring the sovereignty and integrity of German territory;*
- *preventing regional crises and conflicts that may affect Germany's security, wherever possible, and helping to control crises;*
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- *promoting free and unhindered world trade as a basis for our prosperity thereby helping to overcome the divide between poor and rich regions of the world" (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2006: 21).*

Scholars have taken up issue with various aspects of the definition, suggesting the *Weißbuch* has not resolved the issue. Maull sees a step backwards in official strategic thought, arguing that the *Weißbuch* is less precise in formulating national interests than its 1994 predecessor (Maull 2006: 12). He would like to see, among other elements, European integration and coherence listed as a national interest. Müller bemoans the "vague formulation" of the text and worries that adopting such broad goals could endanger territorial defense capabilities (Müller 2006: 93, author's translation).

A 2007 opinion poll, conducted by the *Bundeswehr* Social Science Institute (from here on referred to as the "SOWI poll", translations of questions and responses are the author's own) reflects significant public uncertainty about Germany's security goals as well. 45% of respondents stated a preference for Germany to "concentrate on dealing with domestic problems and stay out of the problems, crises, and conflicts of others as far as possible" while 55% wanted Germany to "pursue an active policy and help in the resolution of problems, crises and conflict." (Buhlmann et al. 2008a: 35). Answers to a question on appropriate tasks for the *Bundeswehr* abroad seem to confirm this ambiguity, with definite support trailing off when Germany or Germans are not directly threatened. Table 4 shows a selection of tasks and the respective level of support.

Further incongruence is reflected in responses to question on ESDP's role, which were asked in the 2006 SOWI poll but not the 2007 version. For example, 77% said the EU should "limit its security policy to strictly diplomacy and civilian crisis management" while 86% of *the same group of respondents* said they would accept ESDP *military use* for "peacekeeping" missions only. A further 59% would be ready to accept necessary combat missions to "defend EU interests" (Buhlmann et al. 2008b: 183). However, 74% said they supported *Bundeswehr* Battlegroup participation (which could involve high-intensity combat) although 63% then admitted that they had never heard of the formation (Buhlmann et al. 2008b: 184-185).

This lack of clarity regarding the role of the military both before and after the *Weißbuch* has already had clear effects on Germany's ESDP participation. Speaking of ESDP and NATO according to Müller, "almost every OOA has been nothing more than a half-hearted compromise." (Müller 2006: 92). In mission *Artemis*, for example, Germany was unsure of its national interests in the mission and therefore reluctant to participate and unwilling to take command (Meyer 2006: 134; Freuding 2007: 79-80). One official in the EU's PSC noted of German colleagues: "they dug their heels firmly into the

ground and had to be dragged as usual to consent to this operation. They ran out of arguments, when the UN personally asked for our action in this crisis" (quoted in: Meyer 2006: 134). Under both UN and EU MS pressure, the German government agreed to make a contribution, providing transport capacities as a symbolic gesture (Freuding 2007: 77-79).

Table 4. Public Opinion on Bundeswehr Tasks Abroad

Task	"Agree"	"Tend to agree"
Assistance in natural disaster	83%	13%
Evacuate German nationals	71%	21%
Prevent terrorist attack on Germany	66%	23%
Free German national from hostage-takers	66%	23%
Help a NATO partner who has been attacked	54%	31%
Prevent genocide	54%	30%
Stabilize a crisis region in Europe	52%	33%
Participate in fight against international terrorism	46%	31%
Prevent spread of weapons of mass destruction	45%	30%
Secure German supply of energy and raw materials	45%	25%
Patrol and secure maritime transport	42%	36%
Secure free and unhindered trade	39%	35%
Keep countries like Iran from developing a nuclear weapon	38%	24%
Suppress drug cultivation and trade	33%	25%
Help with running democratic elections	32%	33%
Help stabilize a crisis region in the Middle East	31%	31%
Help stabilize a crisis region in Africa	27%	34%
Remove a government from power that violates human rights	26%	22%

Source: Data from Buhlmann et. al 2008a: 93, task description shortened in translation.

The second EU mission to the Congo, *EUFOR RD Congo*, served to highlight Germany's strategic uncertainty to an even greater degree. Here, the government was again hesitant to participate in a mission where national interests were unclear. However, France and Britain had recently succeeded in concluding the EU's Africa strategy and setting up the Battlegroups, specifically designed with Africa's security needs in mind (Schmidt 2006: 72-77). While several MS announced their intention to sit the mission out early on, Germany failed to do this (ibid.: 70-71). France originally wanted to request that the on-standby Battlegroup for the period be deployed, but the German government balked at this, since it would have involved 1,500 German and just 4 French troops (Szandar 2006). In

the end, the compromise involved an ad-hoc group with Germany providing a third of the troops as well as taking command (ibid.).

As a result of its hesitancy, it took more than four weeks for the German government to agree to command, which held up further planning at the EU level (Freuding 2007: 88-89). In addition, in exchange for taking command, the Defense Ministry used its position to constrain the mission by confining deployment to Kinshasa and limiting it to four months, which left little time for EU intervention should violence occur after the presidential elections for which security was being provided (Stark 2007: 799). During the process, the Defense Ministry openly stated that *Bundeswehr* participation was a matter of solidarity with the EU (Schmidt 2006: 68). Parliamentarians from both the CDU/CSU and SPD also aired their doubts as to Germany's interests in Africa (Szandar 2006). While the *Bundestag* did approve the mission with a significant majority, it was at the time the closest vote on an OOA mission to date (Freuding 2007: 93).

In both missions, Germany was not able to make a clear decision about its interests and therefore could not decide if it wanted to participate at an early and appropriate stage of planning. This ambiguity left it vulnerable to pressure from other MS to participate, and at this stage it could also not assert itself. Finally, once committed to the mission, it did not deliver results that reflected its full capacities, and in the case of *RD Congo* actually used its presence in the mission to constrain it. While the missions were successful in achieving their goals, the ESDP planning process could have been smoother if Germany had had a clear sense of its own interests. Once it agreed to deployment it would have then been able to legitimize making full resources available to the mission. The lack of a clear strategy also leaves international partners wondering if commitments made can actually be met due to the "ad-hoc character" of the current deployment decision process (Gareis 2006a: 189). Legendary SPD politician Egon Bahr nicely sums up the dilemma that Germany's own uncertainties create for the ESDP by saying "the German past cannot be allowed to burden the European future [...] I have doubts if a poorly developed German can be a good European" (Bahr 2008: 18, author's translation).

While the current situation has clearly strained German ESDP participation, the good news is that increasing ESDP, NATO and UN missions in both number and variety have led to recognition of the problem and boosted discussion among politicians and security studies scholars (Mair 2007: 11). In recent years, Chancellor Merkel (Die Welt 2008), the General Inspector of the Bundeswehr (Spangenberg 2008) and a former military planning staff director (Borkenhagen 2007) have encouraged public discussion of national security interests and strategy. Academics have also called attention to the problem and made a host of suggestions regarding national interest definition (for example Müller 2006; Maull 2006; Bahr 2008). Due to the high interaction between security studies scholars and policymakers in Germany (Howorth 2004: 219), it is reasonable to assume that eventually the intensifying debate will bear practical fruit. The 2006 SOWI poll also shows public readiness for debate, with 83% of those polled saying they found Germany needed a "discussion about foreign policy goals"(Buhlmahn et. al 2008b: 50, author's translation, "certainly" or "rather so"). However, few organized interest groups exist to keep pressure on politicians and academics as in other policy areas (Miskimmon/Paterson 2006: 36).

In addition, very recently, new movement towards further debate at the national political level has come with the CDU/CSU *Bundestag* Group's May 2008 unveiling of a proposal for a "Security Strategy." Although the party intends for the document to be the "beginning" of a "discussion"

(CDU/CSU Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag 2008b), it represents a relaunched and slightly more precise effort to name concrete national interests compared to the White Book. Image 1 presents this section of the English version of the strategy. While the SPD *Bundestag* group did criticize other aspects of the paper, it interestingly did not give a response to the national interest proposal (SPD-Bundestagsfraktion 2008).

Table 5. National Interests in CDU/CSU Security Strategy

In view of the threats to our security specified above, it is in our interest to consider the following points,

- regional crisis and conflicts that could compromise our security and our interests should be prevented if possible, or we should make a contribution to resolving them where they originate,

- global challenges such as the threat of transnational terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the consequences of climate change must be tackled,

- we must contribute to the sharing of respect for human rights, freedom, democracy and the rule of law (good governance),

- we must promote free and unfettered global trade, including secure raw material and energy supplies as the foundation of our prosperity, and close the divide between rich and poor regions of the world based on the concept of social market economy,

- strengthen the cohesion amongst the European Union, NATO and the transatlantic partnership, and increase their political, economic and military efficacy,

- we must deepen relations with states that share our goals and values and create strategic partnerships with them, and

- we must contribute to strengthening an effective multilateral international order based on international law.

Source: CDU/CSU Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag (2008a: 3).

4.2. EDSP/ NATO Relations

Since the *Bundeswehr* was born into and existed only as part of NATO for most of its history, continued deep commitment to and integration into NATO structures seems natural from an institutionalist perspective. Faced with ESDP, Germany has therefore been hesitant to accept a policy independent of NATO. When the government first showed support in the mid-1990s for developing a common European military capability, the concept was being discussed as a development inside NATO (Overhaus 2004: 555; Howorth 2007: 42-45). While it eventually accepted ESDP within the EU, the first ESDP mission outside of Berlin-Plus, *Artemis*, caused worry, particularly in the CDU/CSU. While NATO/ ESDP *joint missions* have been unproblematic for Germany, unease with *independent* ESDP missions has in the past caused friction in its ESDP participation. However, in recent years, both politicians and the public seem to be growing more comfortable with independent missions when necessary or sensible, without turning their back to NATO in the process.

Before looking at the development of Germany's preferences, it is worthwhile to consider the reasoning behind an independent ESDP capability. Since the launch of ESDP two arguments have developed favouring the possibility of independent ESDP missions, neither of which imply rivalry with

the transatlantic Alliance. First, sometimes, the EU may engage in missions that NATO is not suited for or doesn't want to include in its profile. Bailes argues that an independent EU mission is best for "tough but small jobs or larger low-risk ones; tasks under closer UN supervision than NATO would be likely to accept; and deployments that have a major civil component and/ or demand close coordination with other civilian players and assets of the sort the EU understands best" (Bailes 2008: 123). In her view, a mission to Africa like *Artemis* especially meets these criteria and therefore was reasonably concluded outside of Berlin-Plus.

Second, even if NATO is perceived suitable for the mission, it may not have available resources or would experience strain. While early concepts of the ESDP might not have taken into account an extended and difficult NATO engagement in Afghanistan, this argument increasingly becomes a real consideration. Reverting to NATO for political reasons simply doesn't make sense if it is not necessary. The United Kingdom, the staunchest Atlanticist in the EU, has recognized this and promoted an independent ESDP mission in *Artemis* in order to remove burdens from NATO (Holländer 2007: 126-127.)

A look back at developments in Germany shows a gradual shift towards acceptance of independent ESDP missions, first in the SPD and later the CDU/CSU. In the first several years of ESDP, the country was deeply committed to a NATO link. During the 1999 German Council presidency, the SPD/Green government played an active role in furthering an ESDP in the EU but "made it absolutely clear that the project would only work in close cooperation with NATO" (Howorth 2004: 224; see also Howorth 2007: 152; Overhaus 2004: 556). When talk of a NATO-autonomous policy arose in response to the conflict in Macedonia in 2002, Germany's preferences were applied in practice. Due to German (as well as British and Dutch) insistence, the first ESDP mission, *Concordia*, was only launched after the "Berlin Plus" agreement providing for formalized cooperation between ESDP and NATO was signed (Holländer 2007: 76). France had preferred "ad-hoc" cooperation arrangements specific to the mission, but Germany and her partners worried this would set a "precedent" which would prevent a formal agreement in the future (ibid.: 78).

Germany's preference for an ESDP closely tied to NATO was again tested when the EU undertook its first mission outside of Berlin-Plus, *Artemis.* Here, a SPD shift was already noticeable, but CDU/CSU preferences remained unchanged. In the planning stages of the mission, the historically very Atlanticist CDU/CSU, then in the opposition, pressured the SPD/Green government to promote a NATO command for the mission at the EU level, but this was not possible due to the fact that even the UK preferred an independent mission to avoid overburdening NATO (ibid.: 126-127). The CDU/CSU expressed their disapproval of the government's agreement in the Bundestag deployment approval debate, strongly arguing that operations outside of *Berlin Plus* should not become the status quo*,* but the mission was permitted (Deutscher Bundestag 2003: 4230).

At the same time as the CDU/CSU's commitment to NATO was being demonstrated regarding specific missions or upon "download" of ESDP, tensions with the United States over Iraq were straining German-American relations and crystallization of SPD/Green acceptance of independent ESDP missions were reflected in the "upload" direction of Europeanization. In at the April 2003 "Praline Summit" the SPD/Green government met with French, Belgian and Luxemburgish leaders to discuss the development of a "European Security and Defense Union" including a collective defense clause as well as plans for an independent EU command center (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Online 2003). Shortly thereafter, a line in the new *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien* issued by the

SPD Defense Ministry seemed to confirm this new orientation: "ESDP is based on the strategic partnership with the North Atlantic Alliance and allows independent action where NATO must or does not wish to be active" (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2003: 22). The 2004 *Konzeption der Bundeswehr* goes even further, mentioning the discussed European Security and Defense Union as a "long-term" goal (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2004: 8).

However, this development experienced a turnaround once the CDU/CSU won partial government control within the Grand Coalition with the SPD in 2005 and the Defense Ministry went to the CDU's Franz-Josef Jung. The conservative parties had condemned the SPD government's involvement in the "Praline Summit" and signalled commitment to an ESDP linked to NATO (Ridderbusch 2003: 5). The Grand Coalition has since highlighted the interdependent nature of the two policies and has been reluctant to discuss ESDP separately of NATO. The 2006 *Weißbuch* makes no mention of the "Security and Defense Union" or independent capacities, instead saying "The EU and NATO are not competitors; both make vital contributions to our security. Germany will continue to work towards improving the relationship between the two organisations in a manner that will lead to closer cooperation and greater efficiency, avoid duplication, and fortify European and transatlantic security in general" (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2006: 7). Chancellor Angela Merkel not only pushed for continued cooperation but in 2006 also established a hierarchy of German military commitment, saying that NATO is Germany's "first security partner" (Grevi 2006: 7).

What's more, public opinion still largely mirrored the CDU/CSU preferences despite continued irritation with American security policy over Iraq. In the 2006 SOWI data 65% of respondents considered NATO "the most important security alliance", while only 18% felt that NATO had "lost its importance" due to ESDP (Buhlmahn et al. 2008b: 64, author's translation). Similarly, when asked about independent ESDP missions, only 21% were in favor, while 42% preferred "close work with NATO" and 19% wanted a NATO-only command for ESDP (ibid.: 68). Rudolf argues that NATO remained popular among German politicians and the public despite differences with the United States over Iraq because that conflict was not discussed within the NATO context but took place as a "coalition of the willing" (Rudolf 2005: 140).

Recent developments, however, bode for a CDU/CSU more accepting of an independent ESDP. First, while lack of NATO presence in *Artemis* was a source of irritation, the *EUFOR RD Congo* Bundestag deployment approval debate centred on Germany's role in Africa. The lack of Berlin-Plus arrangements was not mentioned (Deutscher Bundestag 2006b). In addition, a major dispute in early 2008 with the United States over sending troops to South Afghanistan brought German-American relations within NATO to a low point in which even the CDU/CSU seemed irritated (Frankenfeld 2008: 5). In the aftermath, American Defense Minister Gates spoke more fondly of the ESDP in an apparent effort to mend fences, saying: "In the future, the E.U. and NATO will have to find ways to work together better, to share certain roles – neither excluding NATO from civilian-military operations nor barring the E.U. from purely military missions" (Gates 2008). In sum, in the past year, Germany has become more NATO-critical and the United States more ESDP-friendly. These developments could provide a framework in which the CDU/CSU is more comfortable supporting independent ESDP missions under certain conditions, bringing it more in line with SPD preferences.

Change could also be underway regarding public opinion. While the SOWI poll does show a high preference for NATO-cooperation in missions, the authors suggest this is due to the fact that NATO is more well-known than the ESDP in Germany and that the public associates the EU with non-security

matters as well which may influence their opinion of the ESDP (Buhlmahn et al. 2008b: 65). Indeed, a 2008 poll in the foreign policy journal *Internationale Politik* could point to a more ESDP-friendly public. 53% still say that "NATO should remain the most important security alliance," but 41% felt "Europeans should concentrate on their common security and defence policy" (March 2008 issue: 5, author's translation).

4.3. Defense Expenditure

I will now move away from strategic elements and look at practical misfit in limited defense expenditure and personnel in the next two sections. Regarding expenditure, both the Petersberg Tasks and new tasks foreseen by the ESS require a mobile and flexible force, able and to deploy to diverse climates and terrains for action of various intensity. It is therefore critical that MS supply properly-equipped contingents. Germany's chronically-low defense budget, combined with inefficient allocation of funds, has challenged it in this area. The lack of funds results in inadequate equipment for the new tasks and reluctance to deploy at all in the interest of savings. Little significant change seems to have occurred over the lifetime of ESDP, and indicators suggest this will remain so for the near to medium-term future.

That Germany's defense budget is problematically low is recognised by diverse stakeholders. In 2005 *Wehrbeauftragte* Robbe, who represents soldiers' interests in the *Bundestag,* bemoaned the "long-term underfinancing of the German armed forces" (cited in Longhurst/Miskimmon 2007: 90). Robert Cooper, EU General Director for Foreign and Political-Military Relations at the Council of Ministers, singled Germany out in comments, saying "it is regrettable that many European governments do not spend what is necessary on defense. This is especially true of Germany. I do not have the feeling it takes the matter really seriously" (cited in Meiers 2005: 161). The same condemnation can be heard in security studies circles. Müller, for example, gives quite simple criticism: "In the *White Book* Germany's ambitions are pushed into the sky even though the authors know that these intentions are not proportional with the currently available army" (Müller 2006: 93, author's translation). A more stylized version comes from the weekly newspaper *Die Zeit*: "As an economy class power you can't expect to fly business class unless the people and the parliament arrange for an upgrade" (Joffe 2006). Former SPD Defense Minister Struck and Chancellor Schröder, current CDU Minister Jung, as well the General Inspector of the *Bundeswehr* have only echoed these calls (Sommer 2006; Leersch 2003).

In order to understand this criticism, one only need to look at the numbers. Following reunification, Germany was especially eager to take advantage of its "peace dividend and between 1991 and 2000 cut defense expenditure by 21% (Grams/Schütz 2006: 296-297, author's translation). In comparison to France and the UK, which in 2006 spent around 2.43% and 2.5% of their respective GDP on defense, Germany allocated 1.32% (European Defense Agency 2007: 4). This is also reflected in the percent of the total budget spent on defense. France and the UK reserved 4.5% and 5.5% of their budget for defense in 2006, but Germany only 2.88% (ibid.: 5). In order to catch up with its European partners, one expert estimates it would have to increase spending by 16 billion Euros annually! (Meiers 2005: 158).

Reasons for this gap are multiple. First, through 2006 Germany was in an economic slowdown and the budget was tight in all policy areas (Grams/Schütz 2006: 297). The urgent need to reform the social system as well as pressure to meet the Eurozone's tight Solidarity Pact deficit bar added to the

crunch (Hackett 2008: 109). In addition, public opinion for defense spending increases remains low, further discouraging policymakers from taking the plunge (ibid.: 283). The 2007 SOWI poll, as shown in graph 2, illustrates stable preferences for keeping defense spending at the same levels (the grey bar) from 1997-present. It is true that the percentage wishing to decrease expenditure (white bar) has dropped significantly and the percent to increase spending (black bar) has grown slowly and steadily, but the latter doesn't approach a majority. The Vice-General Inspector of the *Bundeswehr* as recently as 2007 attributed this reluctance to a "scepticism towards anything military" due to the Nazi past (Weißenborn 2007: 4, author's translation).

Graph 1. Public Opinion on Level of Defense Expenditure

Abbildung 10.1: Allgemeine Einstellungen zu den Verteidigungsausgaben

Frage: „Was meinen Sie? Sollten die Ausgaben für die Verteidigung in Zukunft erhöht werden, sollten diese verringert werden oder sollten sie gleich bleiben?" (Angaben in Prozent)

Anmerkung: Anteile „Stark erhöht werden" und „Eher erhöht werden" zusammengefasst; Anteile „Stark verringert werden" und „Eher verringert werden" zusammengefasst.
Datenbasis: Bevölkerungsbefragungen des Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts der Bundeswehr 1997–2007.

Source: Buhlmahn et al. 2008a: 129.

The first effect of the low defense budget is that the military has significant gaps in equipment critical for OOA missions like those foreseen in ESDP and NATO policy. Especially Battlegroups and the NRF require specific investments, as Ulf Häusler of the Army Staff describes: "The demands on our equipment regarding NRF and EU BG are extremely diverse. It has to be light, transportable by air, have flexible use in all climates and diverse terrain and feature sufficient protection for operations of higher intensity as well."(Häusler 2006: 62, author's translation). He notes that these capacities are not fulfilled to date, pointing out deficits in "armoured vehicles and mobile shelters." Meiers (2005: 159) points out further gaps in "strategic deployment, global reconnaissance and efficient interoperable command-and-control systems". The *Bundeswehrverband* soldiers' union also issued a formal complaint in 2007 regarding substandard personal and common equipment (Deutscher Bundeswehrverband 2007: 12). 22% of members who had served on missions abroad complained of bad or very bad and 49% of mediocre personal equipment. Regarding general equipment, 26% gave a rating of bad/very bad and 42% mediocre.

Making the problem worse, the government has had trouble getting currently available funds to the required new technologies due to high costs in other military areas and over-allocation of funds to heavy technology. Regarding expense structure, Germany spends 74% of its defense budget on administration, with 50% of this for personnel costs alone (Grams/Schutz 2006: 285). According to some experts, high personnel costs can be partially attributed to Germany's ongoing policy of conscription, discussed in more detail in the next section. In comparison, France and the United Kingdom, with their all volunteer-forces, are leaner. For Germany, this means that expenditure on investment, research, and development suffer. Table 6 shows key indicators in allocation of German defense expenditure compared with France and the UK for 2006.

Table 6. Indicators of 2006 Defense Expenditure for France, the UK and Germany

|	**Personnel Costs as % of Defense Expenditure**	**Investment as % of Defense Expenditure (Procurement and R & D)**	**Investment per soldier (thousands of Euros)**
France	55% (including Gendarmerie)	23.2%	38, 542 (excluding Gendarmerie)
United Kingdom	40%	24.4%	65,027
Germany	57%	15.6%	19,297

Source: European Defence Agency (2007: 9, 16, 18).

A second barrier to channelling finances to new equipment requirements arises from poor allocation of present investment funds. Experts point to several areas where Germany has overspent on heavy technology. Müller (2006: 93), for example, finds the recent order of 80 Tiger helicopters to be unnecessary. Wagener (2006: 85) similarly sees the purchase of 180 Eurofighter jets at a cost of 15.42 billion Euros as excessive and detrimental to other areas of potential investment. The SPD recently recognized this overzeal and has announced plans to attempt to scale back the order by 34 planes (Wiegold 2008).

The fact that all *Bundeswehr* deployments are currently funded from Plan 14, the General Defense Budget, creates a further problem, since the Defense Ministry is reluctant to agree to expensive deployments that would siphon away funds from much-needed investment projects (Hackett 2008: 109; Schmidt 2007: 58). When formally requested for information by the FDP parliamentary opposition, the current government provided the costs of all missions abroad since 1996 (see graph 2).

Indeed, penny-pinching has affected Germany's willingness to contribute to several ESDP missions, especially where it is not clear about its interests to begin with. In the planning stages of *Artemis,* Germany at first refused to participate, stating lack of resources (Holländer 2007: 125). Although it later agreed, it limited its participation, again referring to financial difficulties (ibid.: 126). Similarly, in *RD Congo,* a part of Germany's original hesitancy to participate can be attributed to its desire to save costs, especially since first estimates for the mission put total expenditure around 56 million Euro (Schmidt 2007: 54). Both the SPD parliamentary group and *Wehrbeauftragte* Robbe warned that the *Bundeswehr* was "overburdened" (Der Spiegel 2006; Szandar 2006).

Graph 2. Cost of Bundeswehr Missions Abroad

Source: Data from Deutscher Bundestag 2006a.

In light of the well-established gap between needs and funds and clear effects on ESDP as well as other missions, can we expect a significant increase in the defense budget? The recent economic upturn has brought with it planned increases for the budget years 2007-2011 (Hackett 2008: 109), but not to the degree that experts consider necessary. Furthermore, *The Military Balance* 2008 yearbook notes that a decrease in procurement funding has actually occurred and concludes: "It therefore seems fairly certain that without any change to this planned funding, certain equipment programmes will continue to be reduced in size and suffer delays to their projected in-service dates." (ibid.).

Calls for significant increases continue from politicians from both major parties but political action fails to follow. A recent article in *Die Zeit* suggests that neither party is willing to take the political chance of standing for increased defense expenditure given public opinion (Sommer 2006). However, the author surmises public opinion could become more favourable to increased spending were politicians to open a serious discussion on national interests as discussed above. Scholars Grams and Schütz also conclude that a debate on Germany's interests will have to be a "prerequisite" for significant budget increases (Grams/Schütz 2006: 287, author's translation). Of course, even if increasing expenditure came to be viewed more positively, this would imply decreases in other budget areas, which would draw its own political fire.

One area where budget relief could come and that would positively affect Germany's willingness and ability to participate in ESDP missions is that of mission financing. Recently, the Bundestag defense committee held discussions about the possibility of funding future missions from the general budget rather than Plan 14 in order to take the burden off the Defense Ministry (Hackett 2008: 109; Schmidt 2007: 58). Defense Minister Jung also requested this (Deutscher Bundestag 2006a: 1). To date, however, this change has not been codified, and in 2006, the government said in response to a FDP opposition question in parliament that it would decide on a "case by case basis" (ibid.: 3).

4.4. Deployable Personnel

In describing this area of misfit, Meiers (2005: 159) puts the problem in blunt terms: "The German armed forces remain, for the foreseeable future, the least deployable of NATO and EU leading powers". Applied to ESDP, this has the effect that Germany is limited in its participation even for missions where it clearly has a national interest. For those where it is uncertain, the personnel crunch is yet another factor discouraging participation. Unlike in the area of budget, where major players are united in their assessment of the problem but do not have the political clout to force significant change, here real political disagreement has occurred on appropriate remedy. For this reason, improvement in this area is not to be expected in the coming years.

While Germany does have a total force of around 250,000, troops categories from which OOA personnel are drawn are severely strained. The first category, *Eingreiftruppe,* is the 35,000-strong pool from which the NRF, EU HG and EU Battlegroups, UN missions, as well as standby troops for rescue and recovery operations draws (Häusler 2006: 60). Although Battlegroup and NRF forces are coordinated and staggered so as not to be pledged at the same time (ibid.: 61), one must also take into account required training times, rest periods, and additional, ad-hoc commitments of career soldiers (Krüger 2005: 535). The NRF, for example, requires a training period of a year followed by a standby phase of six months (Häusler 2006: 60-61). The Battlegroups need 18 months for preparation, and are also on a half-year standby for deployment (ibid.: 61). Since to date no Battlegroup has deployed, these troops have not seen action but been unavailable for other missions. Likewise, the second group of troops, *Stabilisierungskräfte*, will at full-capacity due to long required rest and training only be able to send 14,000 of 70,000 at a time abroad (Die Zeit 2006).

De Wijk (2004: 377) summarized the resulting predicament concisely, noting "Germany, with a land force of more than 220,000, cannot deploy more than 10,000 troops for stability operations in 3-4 theaters simultaneously." In 2006, *Wehrbeauftragte* Robbe made similar criticism, saying that with 9,000 soldiers in six missions, the Bundeswehr was severely stretched for personnel (cited in Schwarzer/von Ondarza 2007: 24).

The crunch is also reflected in complaints by both by Robbe and the *Bundeswehrverband* regarding insufficient rest time between OOA missions. In his 2007 yearly report, Robbe expressed concern that "tight personnel is being balanced out by burdening individual soldiers" (Deutscher Bundestag 2008: 14, author's translation). *Bundeswehrverband* Chair Gertz also launched a formal complaint in 2008, condemning "massive overburdening of personnel" in the areas of medicine, intelligence, and military police (Die Bundeswehr 2008).

The concrete impact on German ESDP participation is similar and interconnected to that of low defense expenditure in that it leads to reluctance to agree to new missions as well as low force contribution, especially in missions with unclear national interest. As described above, Germany contributed only around 100 troops to the *Artemis* mission and supplied only "a portion" of initial troops requested for *RD Congo*. In addition, it has been speculated that Germany decided to withdraw 200 troops from *EUFOR* in Bosnia in 2006 for personnel reasons (Die Zeit 2006). Finally, one can imagine that Germany has "uploaded" the fact that it is strained for personnel to the EU-level, which could have unknown effects on deciding which prospective missions are feasible regarding personnel.

There are several solutions to the personnel crunch; however, the only one receiving serious discussion is that of reforming or ending conscription. Of course, one option would be increasing the size of the total force, but given current budget problems as well general public aversion to military increases (as with budget), this could be very difficult. A second solution would involve reducing rest and home times for career soldiers between missions but this is also unlikely since there are already concerns about current periods being too short (for example Deutscher Bundestag 2008: 14; Deutscher Bundeswehrverband 2008: 10). Reforming conscription therefore is the most frequent suggestion because it would both free up forces and, according to some estimates, significantly reduce operating costs.

From a European perspective, Germany is unique in its maintenance of conscription. Many of its neighbors have either already converted or are planning to convert to all-volunteer force (AVF) in order to meet new security needs. The UK has had an AVF since 1963, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and Portugal converted in recent years (Howorth 2007: 100-101; Longhurst 2003: 149).

There are multiple factors surrounding conscription that limit deployable personnel. First, conscripts cannot be sent on overseas missions, and a second category, called "voluntary longer-serving conscripts," is limited to participating in low-intensity missions (De Wijk 2004: 377). These groups currently number 35,400 and 24,351 troops respectively (Bundeswehr 2008). This means that primarily career soldiers can be sent on missions like the ESDP foresees. Making matters worse, many OOA-eligible career soldiers are occupied by training the flow of new conscripts. Estimates show a ratio of one career soldier needed to train every two to three conscripts (Renne 2004: 55).

A second argument for reducing conscription is that of additional savings. As noted above, the *Bundeswehr* is lacking technology necessary for OOAs and has thus properly been described as a "colossus on unstable technological feet" (Groß/Rose 2002: 18, author's translation). Cutting conscription could be a way to streamline personnel costs and transfer existing funds to investment (Grams/Schütz 2006: 285). In addition to reducing direct personnel costs, savings would also come through resulting consolidation of *Bundeswehr* infrastructure and administration (Groß/Rose 2002: 21-22). A study by the Institute for Peace Research and Security Studies Hamburg (IFSH) suggests that total troop numbers could easily be cut by 50,000 conscripts in order to save costs without sacrificing capacity (ibid.: 43).

Given these practical considerations, why has Germany not switched to an AVF like its neighbors? The answer involves both normative and administrative factors. In the postwar period, conscription was a way to both democratize the military and maintain a large territorial defense force (Longhurst 2003: 152-153). With the end of the Cold War, the question of change was raised, but both main parties long remained resistant. In 2000, the *Weizsäcker Kommission* recommended a scaleback to 30,000 total conscripts, but both SPD Chancellor Schröder and Defense Minister Scharping rejected the plan (Maull 2000: 75). This persistence continued under following SPD Defense Minister Struck (Spiegel Online 2007).

Some indications of openness to change in SPD and CDU/CSU policy have come in the past two years. In 2007, the SPD agreed to a party line promoting the end of compulsory conscription with the option of "voluntary" short-term service (Spiegel Online 2007). CDU Defense Minister Jung and Chancellor Merkel have rejected this option (Longhurst/Miskimmon 2007: 92; Die Welt 2008), but

the CDU/CSU has also made remarks suggesting more long-term flexibility. In 2007, it vaguely announced that conscription would have to be "adapted to new security challenges" (Der Tagesspiegel 2007). And in 2008, Merkel said that conscription was necessary as long as a discussion on the purpose of the *Bundeswehr* was outstanding (Die Welt 2008). However, the CDU/CSU Security Strategy renews its commitment to conscription, arguing Germany needs conscripts for "homeland security" tasks (CDU/CSU Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag 2008a: 9, author's translation). Public opinion seems to reflect current political ambiguity. A 2007 poll by newsmagazine *Der Spiegel* shows 51% support conscription while 45% would like to abolish it (Szandar 2007) while the 2007 SOWI poll shows 58% support it and 27% prefer abolition (Buhlmahn et. al 2008a: 134).

Despite potential new openness, however, there is still significant opposition to abolishing or even modifying conscription. Merkel still argues along the normative line of the need for a "democratic military" (Die Welt 2008). The *Bundeswehrverband* opposes changes, arguing that conscription helps recruit soldiers to stay on (Deutscher Bundeswehrverband 2005). *Wehrbeauftragte* Robbe also opposes changes, saying it would actually raise costs (Associated Press Worldstream – German 2004). Others bring different considerations to the table, including the related issue of the civil service, an alternative for conscription, arguing that abolishing conscription would end the civil service as well, which would have a disastrous effect on social institutions and organizations counting on volunteers to reduce labor costs (Longhurst 2004: 162; Bartels 2007). A final argument, made by former Defense Minister Struck among others, concerns local economic interests rather than strategic or democratic considerations (Associated Press Worldstream – German 2004). Reducing the number of conscripts would mean closing bases around Germany which contribute to local economies (Groß/Rose 2002: 21-22).

4.5. Parliamentary approval process

A final area in which misfit should be discussed is Germany's longstanding policy of parliamentary control of deployments. In order to democratize military policy, Germany's post-war armed forces were subjected to strict parliamentary control, including regarding force deployment. The constitutional right of the parliament to debate and then approve or reject OOAs was confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994 (Gareis 2006: 40). Today, Germany employs one of the strictest parliamentary approval processes in the EU (Von Ondarza 2008: 14-15). However, with the development of rapid reaction capabilities in both ESDP and NATO, the concept of the "parliamentary army" has come into question (ibid.: 5). Especially the creation of Battlegroups, designed to deploy within 10 days of EU-level agreement in Brussels, has increased debate. In this area, despite no problems to date, politicians are moving towards policy change to avert future misfit.

The debate centers on several subquestions. First, specifically regarding ESDP, does the *Bundestag* have the right within international law to vote against a deployment of German troops already agreed to (by the German minister among others) at the EU level? Second, does the approval process have the potential to slow down the deployment process to the extent that it could defeat the *rapid* reaction goals of Battlegroups and NRF? Finally, applicable to ESDP, does the current process, which puts pressure on the Bundestag to approve all ESDP missions proposed to it without involving it in the planning process, undermine the *Bundestag's* role in democratic legitimisation of deployments and could an alternate process restore it?

Beginning with the question of conformity with international law, the issue has recently been raised by Mölling (2007: 11). The origins of potential legal conflict lie in the fact that ESDP missions are decided upon as Joint Actions at the EU level, which according to Art. 14 of the EU Treaty do have legal binding under international law. Should a Joint Action be concluded and require German deployment, the argument has been made that a *Bundestag* rejection of would constitute a legal breach. At the moment, however, the issue remains purely theoretic. Furthermore, Von Ondarza (2008: 15) argues that the German government in past ESDP deployments has informally assured *Bundestag* approval before agreeing to a Joint Action at the EU level, rendering the possibility of a later rejection minute. Von Ondarza (2008: 21) as well as Mölling (2007: 11) also note that normative pressure from other MS is high once a commitment has been made, further reducing the likelihood of Bundestag rejection.

Second, regarding expediency, the tasks of the new security environment require quick decisions, and delays can determine victory or defeat in theatre. The *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien* recognize the importance for the transformed *Bundeswehr*: "Germany's commitments to rapid response abilities within NATO and the EU make similarly quick political decision-making ability at the national level critical." (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2003: 24, author's translation). Opinions on the *Bundestag's* timely abilities are mixed. The CDU/CSU Security Strategy expresses concern that current procedures could take too long for Battlegroups and NRF (CDU/ CSU Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag 2008a). Former SPD Defense Minister Struck has made similar comments (Welt Online 2007). However, current SPD Foreign Minister Steinmeier finds that "This is not a burdensome, time-consuming formality, but an issue which strikes at the very heart of our understanding of the constitution. The approval of the Bundestag is the legitimation and moreover the personal reinsurance of every soldier sent on a mission" (Steinmeier 2007: 4).

Finally, the fact that it would be very difficult for the *Bundestag* to reject a mission approved by the German government at the EU level poses the question of the *Bundestag's* remaining democratic purpose in the process. If the *Bundestag* has little room to decide against a mission, does the parliamentary process become merely symbolic? During the *RD Congo* approval process, for example, the mission command center had been established and in pre-deployment operation in Potsdam two full months before *Bundestag* approval (Von Ondarza 2008: 20). Von Ondarza (2008: 15) and Schmidt (2006: 71) conclude that the process is still valid since the government consults with the relevant *Bundestag* committees before making EU-level agreements. For some scholars, however, this informal process is not enough, and there have been calls for legislative changes that would formally include the *Bundestag* in pre – Joint Action decision-making (Noetzel/Schreer 2007a: 40).

Proposals to change law regulating parliamentary approval to address the three concerns above are multiple. Regarding concerns about conformity to international law and expediency, the CDU/CSU in the past favored what Meider-Klodt (2002: 10) calls the "revolutionary option", since it would possibly require a constitutional amendment. Its proposal saw an adaptation allowing the government to agree to Battlegroup and NRF deployments while giving the *Bundestag* the right to bring them back (Noetzel/Schreer 2007a: 36-37). In developing its Security Strategy, however, it toned down its approach (Spiegel Online 2008) and left final recommendations vague: „Bundeswehr units must be ready to respond quickly if and when they are to be deployed as a fixed component of a multinational military crisis management intervention. The Parliamentary Participation Act must be

amended accordingly" (CDU/ CSU Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag 2008a: 11, author's translation). In its response, the SPD parliamentary group still portrayed this to mean the extremer variant featuring pre-approval and argued that the Federal Constitutional Court had ruled in May 2008 that that all missions that *could* involve combat must be approved by the Bundestag, rendering the CDU/CSU proposal invalid (SPD-Bundestagsfraktion 2008). However, supporting the argument of a real retreat in CDU/CSU preferences, Chancellor Merkel expressed her continued support for parliamentary approval in June 2008 (Associated Press Worldstream – German 2008).

Given the CDU/CSU's apparent recent change of heart and SPD hesitations, a more moderate change, the "evolutionary option," (Meider-Klodt 2002: 10, author's translation) could be more appealing to both major parties. Both SPD and CDU/CSU politicians have previously discussed the option of limiting the details about which the Bundestag decides upon to only the length of the mission rather than the current lengthy procedure of determining exact deployment area and number of troops (Noetzel/Schreer 2007a: 36-37; Welt Online 2007).

A separate and possibly complementary proposal seeks to restore the *Bundestag's* role in democratic legitimation of deployments. Here, Noetzel and Schreer as well as Schmidt suggest a "deployment committee" be established in the Bundestag made up of members of the "budget, foreign policy, and defense committees" that would work closely with the government throughout the EU and domestic process (citing Noetzel/Schreer 2007b: 4 author's translation; also see Schmidt 2007: 41-42).

Since both major parties seem to recognize the need for change in this area, a variety of adaptation could occur in the near future. Especially the CDU's moderation of its views could bring it more in line with the SPD's preferences for change. However, as noted above, some in the SPD remain determined to maintain the status quo and avoid even moderate policy adaptation.

5. Europeanization Analysis: Measuring misfit and assessing its impact

After examining five areas of misfit, we can now apply Europeanization analysis to determine the level of adaptation that has occurred to date as well as driving or restraining factors. Before beginning with this analysis, however, it is useful to quickly summarize the sources of adaptation pressure and the level of misfit occurring in each area.

5.1. Sources of Adaptation Pressure and Level of Misfit

First, as noted in Chapter 3, some policy areas experience adaptation pressure from both ESDP and NATO/UN, while other areas are pressured solely by ESDP. Table 7 provides an overview of the sources of adaptation pressure for each area. Here, we can see that NATO/UN pressure is present in three of the areas since unclarity on national interest as well as limited defense expenditure and deployable personnel affect all potential deployments regardless of the security framework. It is not present in the area of ESDP/ NATO relations since operations in the context of NATO were the status quo before ESDP was introduced. By definition, ESDP can therefore be the only source of adaptation pressure in this area. In the area of parliamentary control, especially the Battlegroups and NRF have caused adaptation pressure due to their rapid reaction goals and pre-planned training, certification and standby rotations.

Table 7. Sources of adaptation pressure

	NATO/ UN	**ESDP**
1. National Strategy	X	X
2. ESDP/ NATO Relations		X
3. Defense Expenditure	X	X
4. Deployable Personnel	X	X
5. Parliamentary Approval	NATO (NRF)	X (Battlegroups)

Second, since the focus of this study is on ESDP, what effect does misfit have on the functioning of the policy as designed and adopted at the EU level? Does misfit prevent Germany from successfully participating in ESDP? Table 8 gives an overview of impact of misfit for each area.

Table 8. Impact of misfit

	Low/ Unknown	**Medium (sometimes problematic)**	**High (always problematic)**
1. National Strategy		X	
2. ESDP/ NATO Relations		X	
3. Defense Expenditure			X
4. Deployable Personnel			X
5. Parliamentary Approval	X (future misfit?)		

Characterizing the impact of misfit can best be done by considering the impact it has on willingness to deploy at all as well as quality of contribution once deployment has been agreed upon. Willingness to deploy may impact the number of ESDP missions Germany participates in. Quality of contribution involves both troop numbers and equipment. Here, impact will be characterized as "low" when it does not significantly affect willingness to deploy or quality of deployment, "medium" when it sometimes does, and "high" when it always does.

The first two areas of misfit examined are sometimes problematic for the functioning of ESDP and therefore can be characterized as reflecting "medium" impact. Regarding national strategy, problems only occurs when Germany is confronted with cases where it is not sure of its interests. This happened in both Africa missions, but in the Balkan cases, German interest was not questioned. Similarly, ESDP/NATO relations only become problematic regarding missions outside Berlin-Plus.

In contrast, the areas of budget and deployable personnel always cause problems for downloading of ESDP and reflect a "high" impact of misfit. Even when Germany clearly wants to participate in a mission these are real limiting factors to quality and scope of participation. They could also affect its willingness to take on new missions. Furthermore, in cases when Germany is not

sure of its interest, like in the Africa deployments, these factors serve to further discourage participation.

Finally, the issue of parliamentary approval has yet to be a real problem for ESDP since to date the *Bundestag* has approved missions in a timely matter. It is therefore a theoretic or future source of misfit politicians are seeking to avert in advance. For this reason, real effects on ESDP must be rated "low". However, one could imagine complex future scenarios in which the *Bundestag* would delay or prevent a mission agreed upon at the EU level, and an upgrade to "medium" or "high" would then be appropriate.

Now that I have summarized sources of pressure and impact of misfit, we can move on to classifying level of change and explanatory factors according to the models developed by Radaelli and Börzel and Risse.

5.2. Level of Change and Explanatory Factors

For each area, I first classify level of change and then examine determining factors. In classification, I combine Radaelli and Börzel and Risse's scales to form a five-stage scale, since this better covers all outcomes in this policy area. Table 9 shows the combined scale applied below (for definitions of stages see table 3).

Table 9. Combined Europeanization Scale

Inertia (Radaelli)	Absorption (Börzel, Risse)	Accommodation (Börzel, Risse) **Absorption** (Radaelli)	Transformation (All)	Retrenchment (Radaelli)

5.2.1. National strategy

Germany began participating in ESDP missions without thorough discussion of national interests. Friction has occurred when it is asked to participated in ESDP missions in which it cannot determine its own national interest, and the *Weißbuch's* attempt to define these has led to further uncertainty. Despite this, Germany has participated in two such missions, *Artemis* and *EUFOR RD Congo*. On the scale of Europeanization provided this would qualify as Börzel and Risse's **accommodation** or Radaelli's **absorption**, since Germany did take part but change in the underlying reasoning for the participation has not occurred. Indeed, the words "patching up", employed by Börzel and Risse to describe accommodation, would qualify Germany's behaviour quite well.

Why has this level of Europeanization occurred? Both rational and sociological institutionalist factors provide insights. First, there are potentially several **veto points** that could stop attempts to define interests in certain ways, for example the Foreign and Defense Ministries or the parliament if interests were to be codified in a parliamentary document. However, since these actors appear unclear on their preferences and only very recently a formal process in one parliamentary group has been opened, veto points remain inactivated and can therefore at this stage not be considered either a driver or restrainer of change.

Formal institutions facilitating change face a similar fate as veto points since institutions that in theory have a mandate to formulate national interests have not yet done so to the extent necessary to induce transformation. The Chancellery, the Foreign and Defense Ministries, or the Parliamentary Defense Committee could be institutional drivers for change but have yet to take on this role. Policy documents under both SPD and now CDU Defense Ministers remain vague. A lack of initiative on the part of formal institutions rather than their absence in total therefore has contributed to accommodation (Börzel and Risse) or absorption (Radaelli) rather than transformation.

Turning to sociological institutionalism, a lack of **domestic norm entrepreneurs** can also partially explain why transformation has not occurred. While these are increasingly present in the form of single political actors (like Merkel and the *Bundeswehr* Inspector) and security studies scholars, they have not been coordinated or highly visible. The *Bundeswehrverband* has made criticism but only represents soldiers and not the broader public. Although attention has been drawn to the problem and diverse suggestions have been made, no process to consolidate the debate in a direction that would produce sufficient policy is presently apparent. The CDU/CSU Security Strategy could represent the emergence of the party as a more coordinated norm entrepreneur, but due to its very recent nature, no conclusions can yet be drawn in this respect.

The presence of a **consensus-oriented political culture** could in this case actually explain why national interest precision has *not taken* place, though Börzel and Risse suggest it should facilitate change by preventing veto points from being used. Due to Germany's normative commitment to multilateralism, naming specifically "national" interests long bordered on the taboo. Defining national interests, simply put, is not an area where "power politics" is considered appropriate. A high level of consensus between parties and the public is therefore required for change in this area (cf. also Maull 2006: 76-77). Since the normative need to reach society-wide consensus is very high, it may stop institutional, individual or group political actors from pushing their own more precise preferences and result in non-action rather than the heated political discussion prescribed.

Finally, Börzel and Risse's implied fifth factor of **external normative pressure** can nicely explain why at least **accommodation** (Börzel and Risse) **or absorption** (Radaelli) has occurred. Given an uncertain national strategy, other member states at the EU level have been able to push the government into participation in missions where its strategic interests were not clear. Due to Germany's normative commitment to European integration and multilateralism, it is susceptible to this type of pressure. Indeed, as described above, in both Africa missions, it clearly stated its participation was mostly based on "solidarity."

The possibility that Germany will eventually more precisely define its national interests and move to the **transformation** level of Europeanization is fairly high, but the time frame for this is hard to define and could depend on external events forcing discussion. Domestic normative pressure does have the potential to be more significant in the future should individual norm entrepreneurs band together and form real pressure groups. However, at this point veto points could also become activated and add additional friction.

5.2.2. ESDP/ NATO Relations

Before the birth of ESDP, Germany was uniquely committed to NATO. It has since been reluctant to accept ESDP missions conducted independently of NATO capacities. However, it participated in

both *Artemis* and *RD CONGO*. As with national interest formation, we must conclude for this reason that at least Börzel and Risse's **accommodation** or Radaelli's **absorption** has occurred. In this case, however, there are also several signals suggesting movement towards **transformation**. It seems that SPD preferences have already transformed, evidenced by policy uploading at the "Praline Summit" and the mention of an independent ESDP two in policy documents published under Minister Struck. Although the commitment to NATO ties seemed restored under the Grand Coalition, the lack of CDU/CSU debate over NATO prior to *RD Congo* as well as the 2008 rift with the United States over Afghanistan suggests the CDU/CSU could also be close to **transformation** in this area.

Why has this level of change occurred? Looking at **veto points**, one can see several hindering acceptance of an independent ESDP that are slowly giving way. A first was the traditionally Atlanticist CDU/CSU party in the parliament and now the executive. The United States can also be seen as a "factual" veto point in some ways since it has the ability and will to exercise concrete diplomatic pressure (and not just normative) on the German government to support an ESDP linked to NATO. These veto points, however, have shown signs of weakening. CDU/CSU politicians have shown increasing frustration with the United States due to the external factor of Afghanistan. The United States, on the other hand, has recently shown itself friendlier to ESDP and has presumably lifted some diplomatic pressure to limit ESDP to Berlin Plus.

Concerning **formal institutions**, none exist to promote an independent ESDP, but several do exist that have kept NATO ties strong. While the Foreign and Defense Ministries have sections working on both commitments, the NATO versions have naturally been in existence longer. There has also been a special German-American coordinator in the Foreign Ministry since 1981[7]. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly, to which the *Bundestag* sends delegates, further institutionalizes NATO cooperation[8].

Turning to normative factors, a combination of normative pressures favors NATO. **Domestic norm actors** have been more active on the part of NATO given the long-term domestic commitment to the Alliance. In addition to the CDU/CSU, there are many coordinated interest groups within Germany that promote transatlantic relations including the Atlantic Brücke, Marshall Fund, Aspen Institute, etc. On the other hand, the SPD still supports NATO while favouring the option of occasionally independent ESDP, making its argument more complex and less differentiated as a norm entrepreneur. Furthermore, naming similar interest groups that exist to promote an occasionally independent ESDP is difficult.

Looking at **consensus-based political culture** in this case gives little clues to why change is occurring. Though NATO participation has strong normative foundation, since support for European integration is broadly accepted, discussing an ESDP independent of NATO doesn't seem to have the "taboo" nature in German society that discussions of use of force does and that requires high consensus between parties to change. The SPD has shown itself willing to differentiate itself from the CDU/CSU on this matter from 2003 on. Potential CDU/CSU preference change can be more attributed to concrete problems with NATO in Afghanistan and the lifting of the American veto point than a desire to achieve consensus with the SPD.

Finally, **external normative pressure** has come from both directions and with similar arguments. First, the United States has exerted normative pressure for Germany to remain committed to

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[7]   See http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/AAmt/Koordinatoren/071030-D-USA-Koordinator.html
[8]   See http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/internat/interparl_orga/nato/index.html

multilateralism within the transatlantic relationship. Since this has formed the basis of German multilateralism for its entire post-war history, the argument is compelling and strong. On the other hand, France and even the UK are exerting pressure for Germany to accept independent ESDP missions, with the UK even arguing this will *help* NATO by reducing the burden placed on it while it copes with other challenges.

5.2.3. Defense Expenditure

Although most politicians recognize the need for change in this area, it has been slow to come. In fact, defense expenditure has remained low since the creation of ESDP and despite very recent moderate increase, comes nowhere near the amount experts assess as necessary for ESDP and NATO goals. For this reason, I classify change in this area under Radaelli's category of **inertia.**

In this category, therefore, the question is not why some level of change has occurred but why not. The answer can be to a large part found in **veto points**. Germany simply does not have the resources to allocate to the defense budget without either drawing funds from other policy areas (which would naturally enact veto points in the parliament depending on proposed cuts) or without increasing public debt (which would result in breaking the Stability and Growth Pact). Public opinion can in a way also be considered a veto point since acting against it could have real political consequences.

Regarding **formal institutions**, the Defense Ministry, the Chancellery and the *Wehrbeauftragte* are dedicated to increasing the budget and are using their abilities to do so. However, given the veto points described above, they are faced with a seemingly insurmountable task.

Domestic norm entrepreneurs are also multiple and rather coordinated but face the same problem as formal institutions. The *Bundeswehrverband* as well as many security studies scholars are united in their calls for budget increases but given veto points their arguments are difficult to transform into action. Similarly, a **consensus-based culture** and **external normative pressure** apparently do not have enough weight to produce significant budget increases. The political consensus exists but still results in minimal change, and both NATO and EU member states and EU level actors consistently apply pressure to no avail.

5.2.4. Deployable Personnel

Looking at this policy area, although a combination of factors result in limited deployablility, the only area where change is being discussed is with respect to conscription. However, no change has occurred to date and seems like it will not in the foreseeable future. This means Germany will continue to have difficulties providing personnel for ESDP as well as other missions. Therefore, the current state of change must be classified as Radaelli's **inertia**. Since only ending conscription is seriously being discussed as a remedy, I focus my analysis below on factors facilitating and preventing this change.

Here, **veto points** are multiple. The CDU/CSU can serve as veto players in both the parliament and the executive. Should change eventually be enacted, the *Bundesverfassungsgericht* (Federal Constitutional Court) could also become a factor. A possible "factual" veto point could also be the *Bundeswehrverband*.

Institutions that would facilitate a reduction or end to conscription do not exist. On the contrary, conscription itself is an institution that reinforces commitment to the policy. In addition, the previous SPD and current CDU Defense Ministry were/ are against change. A future SPD ministry (now that change is official SPD doctrine) could potentially leverage its institutional power to enact change, but due to the high need for consensus in this area, examined below, this is unlikely.

Domestic norm entrepreneurs do exist pushing an end to conscription and are organized. The SPD can argue and mobilize for change as can some scholars. However, norm entrepreneurs seeking to maintain conscription are active in the CDU/CSU, the *Bundeswehrverband*, and academics as well.

A **consensus-based culture** in this case could be the key to understanding why change has not and probably will not occur in the foreseeable future. Since conscription has a high normative function in representing a democratic military, and is integrated into German society, it would be difficult to change without broad consensus. Should the SPD come to power alone in the next election, it could try to assert its new policy preference of reducing conscription, but if faced with continued CDU/CSU and significant public resistance would probably not push the issue too far for risk of bringing "power politics" into this highly normative area.

Interestingly, **external actors** have not played a visible role in pushing for an end to conscription, although deployability of troops affects both and ESDP and NATO. Perhaps they recognize the normative sensitivity of the topic and prefer to keep their distance.

5.2.5. Parliamentary Approval Process

Compared with the four previous areas, it is not clear if misfit actually exists in this area. Theoretical arguments have been made in favor and against the need for policy change to adapt to ESDP as well as the NRF. Yet, concrete problems have yet to appear upon "downloading" ESDP. One must therefore classify level of change to under Börzel and Risse's **absorption**, since real adaptation pressure has been low. At the same time, political actors from both major parties are concerned about future misfit to the point that they are willing to take measures in advance in the form of modifying the approval procedure. In this case, even though misfit is theoretic, it could result in a move to **transformation** in the near future, especially since the CDU/CSU has very recently moderated its preference to a stance more compatible with that of some in the SPD. This case is therefore unique in our study in that theoretic misfit here could lead to **transformation**, while in other areas even observable, current misfit does not lead to this level of change.

The explanation of Börzel and Risse's **absorption** is simple in that it means no concrete problems and therefore low change has occurred. Therefore, let us instead examine explanatory factors to see why **transformation** in the form of moderate adaptation of approval is *possible*. Here, **veto points** play a large role in preventing substantial change, or the "revolutionary variant". Both the SPD in the executive and parliament and later the Constitutional Court could block attempts to abolish the procedure completely or reduce it to the point that it includes just the "right to bring back" as earlier proposed by the CDU/CSU. This can largely explain why Meider-Klodt's "revolutionary variant" has not taken place. Major veto points for a more moderate adaptation of the law, however, do not exist.

Institutions formalizing change are present. One might assume that the parliament has an institutional interest in preserving its powers by refusing to give up its right to decide on details of

deployments. However, since the main parties are considering change despite loss of power, perhaps they are more concerned with preventing the parliament from appearing "problematic" in the future. By being proactive and reforming their own institution, they serve to gain before the issue becomes urgent.

Looking at **domestic norm entrepreneurs**, both parties have had somewhat concerted efforts pressing for a variant of procedural adaptation, but the CDU/CSU is more organized. The SPD as a party cannot seem to agree if change is necessary. However, given the real veto points posed by the SPD and the Constitutional Court, the fact that CDU/CSU norm entrepreneurs are organized may mean little in pressing for more radical change. Academics at the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* also are active, but pressing for more moderate change, especially to reinforce the *Bundestag's* democratic role.

Finally, a **consensual political culture** could play a role in explaining why the CDU/CSU has moderated its stance in response to the May 2008 Constitutional Court ruling and SPD criticism. Since parliamentary control is a constitutional question and goes to the heart of the concept of a democratic military, it is a highly normative issue and therefore change, like in national interest definition and conscription, requires high consensus. Should the CDU come to power alone in the next election cycle, it could press on with plans for a more radical adaptation, but this seems unlikely. That form of change would require popular and broad support among the public, opposition parties, and the Federal Constitutional Court. **Transformation** therefore seems more likely in a moderate but significant variation.

External actors have not publicly exerted normative pressure on the German government to change its procedure, but a conference statement made by Foreign Minister Steinmeier defending the procedure was specifically addressed to "our foreign guests in the room", (Steinmeier 2007: 4) which suggests that non-public pressure has occurred to the extent that he felt it worth mentioning. However, without knowing the source of this pressure it is difficult to analyse.

5.2.6. Tabular Summary of Findings

Table 10. Level of Change

	Inertia (Radaelli)	Absorption (Börzel, Risse)	Accommo-dation (Börzel, Risse) **Absorption** (Radaelli)	Transforma-tion (All)	Retrenchment (Radaelli)
1. National Strategy			X		
2. ESDP/ NATO Relations			X		
3. Defense Expenditure	X				
4. Deployable Personnel	X				
5. Parliamentary Approval		X			

These tables summarize the level of change and factors encouraging or restraining it, based on analysis above.

Table 11. Factors in Change

	Veto points	Institutions facilitating	Domestic norm entrepreneurs	Consensual political culture	External Factors
1. National Strategy	Not activated	Not activated	X	-	X
2. ESDP/ NATO Relations	X (lifting)	- (NATO inst. prominent)	X+-		X+-
3. Defense Expenditure	X	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
4. Deployable Personnel	X	- (conscription institutionalized)	X +-	-	
5. Parliamentary Approval	X	+	X +-	-	X (identity?)

- means that the factor present but actually prevents change

+- means both facilitating and restraining factors present in category

6. Conclusion

Europeanization theory has proven a very useful tool for framing friction between German military policy and requirements of the ESDP. The concept of 'misfit' facilitates description of tension between the domestic and European policy, and the Europeanization stages proposed by Börzel and Risse and Radaelli are useful in categorizing move towards resolution. Looking systematically at both rational and normative factors behind change or persisting misfit permits further classification and weighting of domestic variables and thus allows for near-term projection of German behaviour within ESDP.

This study has shown that Germany's domestic defense policy has resulted in either concrete or theoretic/ future misfit with the ESDP in five key areas. This has affected its willingness and ability to participate military missions decided upon at the EU level. In the two key areas of budget and personnel, Germany remains in Radaelli's inertia stage, suggesting continued friction in the future. The misfit caused by unclear national interest formulation and unclear NATO/ESDP relationship preferences have the potential to be problematic in the future, but show signs of change that could result in remedy of misfit. The NATO/ ESDP relationship is currently closest to entering both authors' transformation stage. Finally, the area of parliamentary control has yet to cause real misfit with ESDP and can therefore be classified in the Börzel and Risse's absorption, but politicians from both parties are proactively moving to avert theoretic future problems and possibly will move to transformation.

The reasons behind each respective level of change are diverse and show that close examination is necessary. Veto points may be the key restrainer in budget and previously in NATO/ ESDP relations. They also play a significant role in preventing a "revolutionary change" in parliamentary control. Institutions formalizing change were weak in most areas and could be due to lack of ESDP specific institutions as well as power distribution in security policy across institutions. The only area of exception was the Bundestag in furthering change of its own approval process. However, the normative factor of consensual politics has also proven to be a *restrainer* to one-party moves for change in national interest formation, conscription, and parliamentary approval, though Börzel and Risse suggests the factor facilitates change. Domestic norm entrepreneurs were present but unorganized in many areas. In areas where they were organized, veto points created significant hurdles. Finally, external normative pressure was present in many areas, and especially in national interest formation, at least created some level of change.

This work represents a first attempt to comprehensively apply Europeanization theory to ESDP and national military policy. While it was able to identify and measure misfit and classify level of adaptation, it also reveals theoretical difficulties in the application to security studies, especially since adaptation pressure comes from sources beyond the ESDP like NATO and the UN. In addition, analysis of domestic norm entrepreneurs shows few non-governmental interest groups to be considered, unlike Common Market policy areas frequently examined in Europeanization studies. Further research could focus on these methodological difficulties.

A second avenue for additional research could extend the paradigm applied below to other EU member states, certainly the UK and France, but also larger Eastern European states like Poland and Romania. A comparative study would be informative and also allow for methodological streamlining.

Finally, this study did not address the Europeanization of the German defense procurement market, since this Europeanization dynamic is more similar to Common Market Europeanization in that in involves liberalization as well as economic interest groups. A comprehensive independent study of this aspect of ESDP could prove useful for both scholars of both security studies and economic integration.

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