Common Holdings and Strategic Manager Compensation. The Case of an Asymmetric Triopoly

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dc.contributor.author Stadler, Manfred
dc.contributor.author Neus, Werner
dc.date.accessioned 2018-07-31T06:20:12Z
dc.date.available 2018-07-31T06:20:12Z
dc.date.issued 2018-07-26
dc.identifier.other 508079470
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10900/83380
dc.identifier.uri http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-dspace-833809 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri http://dx.doi.org/10.15496/publikation-24771
dc.description.abstract We study an asymmetric triopoly in a heterogeneous product market where quantity decisions are delegated to managers. The two biggest firms are commonly owned by shareholders such as index funds while the smallest firm is owned by independent shareholders. Under such a common holding owner structure, the owners have an incentive to coordinate when designing their manager compensation schemes. This coordination leads to a reallocation of production and induces a redistribution of profits. The trade volume in the market is reduced so that shareholder coordination is detrimental to consumer surplus as well as welfare. en
dc.language.iso en de_DE
dc.publisher Universität Tübingen de_DE
dc.publisher Universität Tübingen de_DE
dc.rights ubt-podno de_DE
dc.rights.uri http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=de de_DE
dc.rights.uri http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=en en
dc.subject.classification Economics de_DE
dc.subject.ddc 330 de_DE
dc.subject.other Common holdings en
dc.subject.other index funds en
dc.subject.other shareholder coordination en
dc.subject.other manager compensation en
dc.title Common Holdings and Strategic Manager Compensation. The Case of an Asymmetric Triopoly en
dc.type Article de_DE
utue.publikation.fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften de_DE
utue.publikation.fakultaet 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät de_DE
utue.publikation.source University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; 109 de_DE

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