dc.contributor.author |
Haylock, Michael |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2020-02-25T10:17:02Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2020-02-25T10:17:02Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2020-02-25 |
|
dc.identifier.other |
1690924969 |
de_DE |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/10900/98337 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-dspace-983372 |
de_DE |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://dx.doi.org/10.15496/publikation-39718 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
Executives are often paid for short-term changes in shareholder wealth, but rational shareholders want executives to maximize long-term shareholder wealth. Incentives for short-term and long-term oriented behavior may depend on an executive's level of pay in the distribution, holding other factors constant. This paper tests for distributional heterogeneity of short-term and long-term incentives in a 12 year cross-country panel of executives. I use the band-pass filter to separate short-term and long-term shareholder wealth changes (Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003), and estimate of the shareholder wealth-pay relation using method of moments-quantile regression, developed by Machado and Santos Silva (2019), which accounts for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity of executive-firm pairs across the distribution. When using yearly total compensation to measure pay, executives in the upper tail of the conditional compensation distribution have longer-term oriented incentives. In contrast, when accumulated executive wealth is used to measure pay, executives in the upper tail of the wealth distribution have shorter-term oriented incentives. Since executive wealth encompasses changes to executive utility after pay is granted through accumulated equity-linked pay, it is the preferred measure for evaluating equity-linked pay. Results thus suggest that equity-linked pay should have a longer vesting period for executives in the upper tail than in the lower tail. I find evidence that executives in the upper-tail are evaluated relatively to the industry's short-run and long-run performance. |
en |
dc.language.iso |
en |
de_DE |
dc.publisher |
Universität Tübingen |
de_DE |
dc.rights |
ubt-podno |
de_DE |
dc.rights.uri |
http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=de |
de_DE |
dc.rights.uri |
http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=en |
en |
dc.subject.classification |
Verteilung , Benchmarking , Leistungsvergleich |
de_DE |
dc.subject.ddc |
330 |
de_DE |
dc.subject.other |
Executive Compensation |
en |
dc.subject.other |
Method of Moments-Quantile Regression |
en |
dc.subject.other |
Short-Term Performance |
en |
dc.subject.other |
Long-Term Performance |
en |
dc.subject.other |
Distribution |
en |
dc.title |
Executives' Short-Term and Long-Term Incentives - A Distributional Analysis |
en |
dc.type |
Article |
de_DE |
utue.publikation.fachbereich |
Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
de_DE |
utue.publikation.fakultaet |
6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät |
de_DE |
utue.opus.portal |
utwpbusinesseco |
de_DE |
utue.publikation.source |
University of Tübingen Working Papers in Business and Economics ; No. 131 |
de_DE |